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PREFACE 
This study is a report on USIMINAS as part of the project 
"Technological Evolution of the Steel Industry of Minas Gerais: A Mi-
cro-economic Analysis" sponsored by the Inter-American Development 
Bank'and the Economic Commission for Latin America through their Re-
gional Program in Science and Technology, and by the Fundagaò Centro 
Tecnologico de Minas Gerais Kith the participation of the. State Secre-
tariat of Science and Technology. 
The report is the result of several months of research by 
Carl J. Dahlman, an economist, and Fernando Valadares Fonseca a metal-
lurgical engineer. The first stage consisted of an intensive search 
and collection of publicly available information on the company. It 
was the basis, for a preliminary volume on the technological evolution 
of the firm. A second stage, involving a detailed plant visit and 
collection of information from each of the productive and support sec-
tors was planned, but could not be undertaken. The present volume is an 
analysis of the firm's technological evolution based on the information 
collected in the first stage, a short two day plant visit, information 
provided, directly by the firm and a series of interviews with persons 
inside and outside the firm. 
The authors thank the Secretariat of Science and Technology of 
the State of Minas Gerais, through Drs. JOSÉ ISRAEL VARGAS and OCTAVIO 
ELISIO ALVES DE BRITO, for intervention and contacts at the level of 
State Government and Presidency of the Company. They extend special 
thanks to CETEC which has provided a base as well as technical, financi-
al and administrative support. In particular they thank Dr JUAREZ TAVORA 
VEADO, the Technical Director, for support and encouragement; the Infor-
mation and Documentation Sector for invaluable assistance in locating 
and obtaining publications, and CLAUDIO ARAUJO BRANDAO for the design 
work. 
iii 
The authors also thank Dr JORGE RATZ, Coordinator of the 
BID-CEPAL Program of Research in Science and Technology and Mr. PHILLIP 
MAXWELL, who is engaged in similar steel studies in Argentina, for sup-
port and exchange of ideas and information. 
The authors thank USIMINAS for the chance to visit the 
plant and for the time taken by some of its personnel to discuss various 
aspects of its development. 
Finally, the authors wish to extend special thanks to Dr 
AMARO LANARI JUNIOR, President of USIMINAS from 1957 to 1975, and to Dr 
LUXZ VERANO, formerly Superintendent of Operations of the Company, for 
interviews and invaluable information about the company. 
In addition to the main text the present study consists 






- The Technology Used by USIMINAS and the 
Technological Frontier 
- Evolugao das Sinterizag5es da USIMINAS 
- Carvao mineral - Aspectos: Política Na-
cional, Crises e Efeitos na USIMINAS 
- Casos Exemplo: Atuagao dos Departamentos 
da Infraestrutura Tecnológica. 
- Evolupáo da Qualidade dos Laminados da USIMI-
NAS. 
iv 
APPENDIX VI - Table of Contents of Volumes Re-
sulting from First Phase of Re-
search Study. 
Error of fact or misinterpretations remain the sole 
responsibility of the respective authors and should in no way be 
ascribed to any of the various institutions involved. 
v 
"THE PROCESS OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT IN SEARCH OF 
BETTER EFFICIENCY, BETTER QUALITY AND LOWER COSTS IS 
ESSENTIALLY DYNAMIC, CONTINOUS AND UNDEFINED IN TIME. 
THAT IS WHY IT DEPENDS ON A PERMANENT VIGILANCE OF 
MANEGEMENT, AND PRINCIPALLY ON THE AUTHORITY AND LI-
BERTY OF ACTION OF EACH FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF FUNC-
TIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; ON STIMULUS AND MOTIVATION TO 
OVERCOME THE NEW CHALLENGES WHICH ARE PLACED AFTER 
EVERY OBSTACLE SURMONTED OR EVERY GOAL ACHIEVED". 
Amaro Lanari Junior, 1975 
( PRESIDENT OF USIMINAS : 1957-1975) 
a 
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This paper is a case study of technical change and 
technological development in USIMINAS., an integrated steel plant in 
Brazil. USIMINAS is currently Latin America's largest steel produ-
cer. According to Fortune Magazine's listing of the 500 largest non-
financial companies outside the United States USIMINAS ranks 308 
Figure 1.1 presents a summary series of the main production, finan-
cial and technological indexes of the firm. USIMINAS is the sucess story 
of a Nippo-Brazilian joint-venture. Founded in 1956 it started pro-
duction in 1962 and under the operational responsibility of the Japanese 
partners who owned 40% of the stock, it reached planned nominal ca-
pacity of 500.000 tons per anum in 1966.Operational responsibility 
then passed to the Brazilians who had increased their share to about 
80%. Over the next six years they increased capacity approximately 
140% to nearly 1,200,000 t.a. with basically the original equipment 
and very little additional investment. Between 1972 and 1976, as a 
result of a maj or expansion plan, USIMINAS increased capacity to 
2,400,000 t.a.. As of March of this year USIMINAS is producing at 
the rate of 3,000,000 t.a. and is in the midst of a second large 
expansion plan which shall increase its capacity to 3.5 M.t.a. 
r 2") (million tons per anum) by next year J 
Even though USIMINAS is perhaps the most dramatic 
case, such rapid expansion is not atypical for Brazilian steel firms. 
COSIPA, which also started out with a capacity of 500.000 tons at 
about the same time, produced slightly over 1.5 million tons in 1977 
and is supposed to reach 3.5 M.t.a. by 1980. The Companhia Siderur-
gica Nacional (CSN) which started production with an initial capaci-
ty of 300.000 t.a. in 1949 produced nearly 2.0M.t.a. in 1977 and is suppo-
f 11 Fortune .August, 1978 
(2)Such a rapid expansion has been possible, in part, by the tremendous growth 
of steel demand, particularly in the last 10 years which has resulted from 
Brazil's rapid industrialization. Between 1968 and 1977 apparent consumption 




US1H1NAS IN NUMBERS 1963-1077 
(All »»lue figure» -In «UHons ef nmra t cruteiros) 
if e a a T? T6 7S 74 73 . •72- 7.1 70 69 tl «7 66 t s 64 63 
1. Productiai of steel lnjets (1000s of ton) 2731 2345 1771 1187 1342 . 1179 950 850 791 649 S70 S29 383 276 73 
2. Total sales'0' I M K 766S 4935 2418 1477 1013 768 SOS 332 217 144. 84 55 27 S 
3, Export as a percentage of total 
. sales M na lia na 3 10 S 12 17 19 33 18 39 na na 
4. Cost of Products Sold^' 6S25 3320 2882 1468 . 793 496 399 268 185 140 107 10 44 22 6 
S. Cost of Products Sold/total sales (4/Z) 48.4 49.8 38.4 60.7 S3.7 50.0 52.0 S3.1 SS.7 64.S 74.3 9S.2 80.2 El. S 1». 
6. Cross Profit 6417 3564 1893 865 631 484 ' 236 149 147 76 37 4 10 6 6 ) 
7. S»leS-Expensesic) 2238 VW4 563 306 197 135 110 7S 63 36 24 9 7 3. 1 
8. Central Expenses^' 2526 1339 676 337 130 101 94 69 . SO 29 44 28 17 20 12 
9. Bepreciationand Aciorti:atiai^ 1609 1008 246 141 162 132 36 27' 23 11 8 17 - -
JO.. Other Income(Net) 463 280 130 77 31 63 49 32 40 11 m 2 2 2 1 
SI. Amortization of insuficifieat Depjecia-
tion 67. 134 - . . - - - . - _ . . _ 
1?. Profit before Provision'^ 459 279 538 173 176 •182 155 84 30 •11 (26) (4s; (12! (IS) 
13. Ket Profit. 310 168 409 150 120 128 139 77 28 11 - • - - -
14. Ket Equity S714 38ÓS 3922 2703 1752 1508 1JS2 673 655 519 448 12S 110 66 :c 
IS. Fixed Assets (total)(s)!h) 14961 * 9504 7827 5107 2926 1873 1281 11S6 1096 947 682 173 143 70 43 
16. Fixed Productive Assc:s (g)^(Excludes 
capital tied up in expo's i ens but inclu-
des acurculated depreciation). 10762 8744 5350 2625 1642 1411 1234 1074 1035 945 682 17S 143 39 ;c 
17. r/Q » (16/2) .to 1,14 1.08 1.09 1.11 1.39 1.61 2.13 3.12 4.35 4'.74 2.03 2.61 1.44 
M- & " 100 115/14 » 100) S.4 4.4 10.4 5.5 6.8 8.5 10.3 11.4 4.3 2.1 - - - - -
19. Ket Profit 
inrctiatcd Capital CrJ .08 • OS .24 .09 .10 .11 .13 .21 .08 .03 - -
jo Pereentape of capital cvned by 
the Japanese (Dec) 17.J 17.3 17.3 18.6 18.7 18.7 20.9 20:9 18.8 18.8 13.8 21.3 21.5 40.0 jr.-
KOfES: o) Total sales incl'jdes resale of products imported under CONSIDER inport schcoc. No dissajgrcgaticn was passible, 
b) Does' not include taxes or depreciation 
e ) Includes statencise tax (IOI). distributiui costs, and others 
d) Includes general administrative expenses. financial expenses and others 
• ) The figures for depreciation arc not cortM jicRt because USIMIKAS changed depreciation practices four times involving chances from 
straight line to,i;.ussiau to top U-iussijn ami- hatl to straight line. 
f ) Tl<is is usually ferinccwu tax ahhcxtph in s o « years provision for doubtful-buyers was included here rather than under Sales Expenses 
j ) Includes Monetary correction and is net of accicitilatcd depreciation 
h) Before 1007 no adjustments veic c.ulc for noictary corrcctlai 
SOUKCTS: Al l infonnatim is based en WSIM1NAS' Annual Rrports. Since tl>e presentation of the inform tion varied from year on atteapt vas cwlc 
at achieving suio cuisisttncy when possible, Laic should Ic taken in the interpretation of the results. 
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PÎGUR.E 1 .2 
BRAZILIAN STEEL PRODUCTION AND SHARES .OF THREE LARGEST PRODUCERS: 1964-1977 
( P r o d u c t i o n in 103 tons o f s t e e l i n g o t s ) 
Shares in p e r c e n t a g e p o i n t s ' 
T o t a l 
B r a z i l i a n 
P r o d u c t i o n 
'USIMINAS CSN COSIPA 
T E A S 
Production Share Production Share Production Share 
1977 l l , 1 6 4 m 2 .721® 24.4 . 1 . 9 6 2 « 17.6 1 ,S40
C 1 5 13.8 
i97«r " 9 7 2 Z 7 " ® •2V34S<10> 2 5.-4 1 , 3 9 6 ® , I 5 - 1 796 ® 8 .6 
197 S TT7T l ( 1 0 > 21.3 1 . 4 9 1 ® 17.9 . 7 8 9 ® 9 .5 
2974 I S . 8 1.4X0® 18.8 754 ® 10.0 
197 S T T T i ï « « 17342 i l C ) 18.8 1 . 5 7 6 ® 22.0 609 ® 8.5 
1972 i ; l 7 g - a 0 ) 1 8 . l ' 1 . 5 7 3 ® 24.2 687 ® 10.5 
1971 e v o n r * ® 950 15.8 1 . 5 5 3 ® 2S.8 6 5 1 ® 10.8 
1970 5","390~U3ì K O « 1 « 15.8 . 1 . 4 9 1 ® 27.7 563 ® 10.S 
1969 4192-4 (13) 7 9 I ( 1 1 ) 16 .1 1,392 ® 28.3 , 5 5 1 ® 11.2 
1968 , « .4S®<U> 6 4 9 » " 14.6 1 , 3 3 0 ® 29.9 557 ® 12.5 
1967 3 , 7 2 0 ® 570 15.3 • 1 , 1 8 6 ^ 31.9 : 395 ® .10.6 
1966 3 , 7 6 7 ® 529 14.1- 1 . 2 4 8 ® •33.0 • 4 3 1 ® ; ; 1 1 . 4 
1965 2 , 9 7 7 ® 383<12> 12.9 1 . 2 5 6 ® 42 .1 - -
1964 3.044 ( 8 ) 276<12> 9 .1 1 , 2 1 8 ® 40.4 - -
SOURCES: 
1. IBS-REVISTA, n» 23 . . ( M a r ? o - A b r i l . 1978) p .22 
2. CONSIDER-MIC, R e l a t S r i o Anual 1976. p . 8 
3. CONSIDER-MIC, R e l a t S r i o Anual 197S. p . 10 
4 . CONSIDER-MIC, R e l a t ' ó r i o Anual. 19*3. p . 10 
5 . COSI PA (Assess or i a de Re la C Bes P ú b l i c a s ) . C a t a l o g o I n f o r g a j , i v o (Onda"«1)-• P-
6 . ABM-METALHRGIA, n* 1.7.5, V o l . 23 ( j u n h o 1972) p .461 
7 . CSN, R e l a t S r i o Anual 1970, pp. 14-15 ( e s t i m a t e d f rom graph. i ) 
8 . CSN, R e l a t S r i o Anual 1967 . p .19 1 n u h i n » CoinanV. 
9 . R A D Y . - ^ n T l d Edmund. V o l t » Redonda. A lbuquerque . New Mex i c o , R i o G r a n d e P u b U s h t n g Company. 
1973, p .182 . 
10. USIMINAS, P . e l a t S r i o Anual 1976 , p .9 
11. USIMINAS, R e l a t S r i o Anual 1971 . p .11 
12. USIMINAS. R e l a t S r i o Anual 1967 , p..6 Anrrndi lascm 
13. B r a s i l (CoTvC-ni o "M in i s t e r ! o do T r a b a l h o . - S1DF.RBRAS •; S e r v i o Nacional de^prc^^ 
I n d u s t r i a l - IBS ) , A MSo.de Obra na I n d u s t r i a Mdorurp. i t jJ B r a s i i c i r _ . 
Denanda-Ofcr ta , p .87 
- 3 -
FIGURE 1 .3 
USIMINAS' SHARE IN THE BRAZILIAN SUPPLY 
OF BOM-COATED FLAT STEEL PRODUtTS BY CATEGORY 
1 BRAZILIAN 
Y E A R I PRODUCTION 
1 (1000 of tons o f p rod ) 
USIMINAS* MARKET SHARE ( I ) 
Non-Coated 
F l a t s Thick P l a t e s 
Hot Ro l l e d 
Products 
Cold R o l l e d 
P roduc ts 
1977 3 . 7 5 6 « » S8<S> 7 S ( S ) S 4 ( S ) 4 7 ( S ) 
1976 2 . 8 S 9 ( Z ) > 7 < S > : 7 3 ( S ) 53<S> - S 2 ( S ) 
197S 2 . 6 S 3 ^ S 2 ( S ) 7 2 ( S 0 46 < « 4 2 ( S ) 
1974 2. U S « « ' 4 7 ( S ) 69<S> „(5) 2 4 ( S ) 
1973 2 . 3 8 0 ^ 45 "J «4Í« 44(S). 24(s) 
1972 2 . 2 3 9 ( 4 ) 4 3 ( S ) S3 ^ ; 2 - ( s ) 2 4 ^ 
1971 1.914<4> 43 (6) S7(6) 38<1 0> 2 7 ( 1 0 ) 
1970 l .S60< 4 > 38 ss(6) 2 6 ( 1 0 ) 
1969 1.527<4> J2(6) S 1 ( 6 ) 33(10) 23(10) 
1968 l.J«i<4' „(6) 47(6) „ ( 9 ) 22<9> 
1967 1 . 0 1 3 { 4 ) JS(6) 43(6) j4(8) 25Í «> 
1966 1 .1451 4 ' 2 7 . « » 4 7 ( 6 ) „ ( 7 ) 1 2 ( 7 ) 
1965 9 5 3 ( 4 ) 19(7) 4 0™ 7 m 1(?? 
1964 78014^ i s « 7 ) 3817^ - -
SOURCES: 
1 .IBS,IBS REVISTA, n ' 23. (mar?o -ab r i l 197S) p.24 
2. CONSIDER-MIC, R e l a t o r i o 1976 , p .9 
3. CONSIDER-MIC, R e l a t o r i o m 5 , p .11 
4 . IBS, 1975 Year Book, p .30 e 31 
5. USIMINAS, R e l a t o r i o Anual 1977 . p.12 
6 . Co ta , Jose Barros , "A lguns Aspectos da Constr ibui<;ac da USIMINAS para o Descn-
v o l v i m c n t o N a c i o n a l " , USIMINAS R e v i s t a , Ano 8 , 1977, n ' 6 , p .76 (Data e s t ima t ed 
f rom graph on p .76 ) . 
7 . USIMINAS, R e l a t o r i o Anual 1966, p . 3 5 ; IBS-Ycar Book, 1975. pp. 30-31 (data sub-
j e c t t o r e v i s i on " ) 
8. USIMINAS, R e l a t o r i o Anual 1967 . p . 1 1 - ; IBS-Year Book, 1975, pp. 30-31 
(Data s u b j e c t to r e y i s ' i o n j 
9 . USIMINAS, Re 1 a t 5 r i o Anua 1 1972 . p . 1 2 ; I B S - Y c a r Book. 1975, pp.30-31 
(Data s u b j e c t t o r e v i s i o n ) 
>0. USIMINAS, Rc 1 a to r io Anua 1 1973 , p'.,12; IBS-Year Book 1975, pp.30-31 
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USIMINAS appears t o have the highest produc-
t i v i t y index in the world. Next highest 
found in a 1976 comparison was 41 t/day/m2 
f o r a s in ter machine at Dunkcrquc belonging 
t o USINÖR fo l lowed by 40.9 t/day/.n2 f o r a 
machine at Nippon S t e e l • ( l ) . 
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Japan i s worlds leader in b last furnace t e c -
nology. Japanese average f i gures f o r 49 
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t/m3/day, coke rate 440 kg/t, fue l rate 492 
top pressure 1 kg/cm2 ( 2 ) 
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Japan has most of the new generation^jOOO m3 
blast furnaces.They averaged-productiv i ty 
2.25 t/m3/day, coke rate 400 kg/t, fue l rate 
490 kg/t , and top pressures of 2-3 kg/cm2(3] 
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In Japan .the average tap t o tap t ine was 
36 minutes 1971-1973 (4 ) 
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In Japan the average y i e l d in slabbing m i l l s 
was.in the order of 921 (5) 
* Jan-July 1975 
SOURCES: Data or USIMINAS in f i r s t f o u r columns is f r om t a b l e on p . 7 o f 1975 annual r e p o r t . 
Since then sonic indices have improved as w i l l b e e v i d e n t in t e x t . A l s o , s i n c e then USIMINAS 
has adopted cont inuos ' c a s t i n g in a second s t e e l shop, and has i n s t a l l e d a new t h i c k 
p l a t e m i l l . The s ources f o r the comments a re g i v e n in the notes. 
NOTES: 1. US1MINAS( I I R e l a t ó r i o C o n j u n t u r a l S i d e r ú r g i c o N» 1 (Mar ro 1977) p p . 48-9 
2. IBID, p .60 ; 
3. TBTDEM 
4 . 'TFTD , p . 108 
5. TETU, p . 127 
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sed to reach 4.5 M.t.a. by 1 9 8 0 ^ . 
USIMINAS however is the only one of the three which 
is on schedule in its expansion plans whereas the other two are one 
or two years behind. Figure 1.2 shows the evolution of shares in 
national steel production for the three firms. Notice how USIMINAS'. 
share has increased from 14.11 in its first full year of integrated 
production to 24.41 at present, while CÓSIPAs has just increased 
from 11. 44--to-13.81 and CSN's has fallen from 33.01 to 17.6% over the 
same period. Figure 1.3 gives a finer break-down of USIMINAS1 share 
of Brazilian production of non-coated flat products by major cate-
gories. Notice that since 1975 it accounts for more than half of 
non-coated flat products and that since 1976 it has been responsible 
for roughly half the production of cold rolled products (which are 
more processed products.) 
USIMINAS is generally considered the most efficient 
Brazilian producer. A very rough measure of this is its output per 
man employed in production which has increased from approximately 
70 tons per man in 1966 to 228 in 1972 and to 261 in 1977. (see 
figure 6.1). Figures for Brazil a whole were 113 in 1977. 
COSIPA's and CSN's comparable figures for 1976 were 
93 and 108 respectively^2l975 figures for the U.S., France, and 
Japan were 255, 198, and 315 respectively*-3^ . USIMINAS has also 
reached international standards in many of its main operational 
indexes. Figure 1.4 summarizes some of the notable indexes achieved 
by 1975, commenting on them with respect to.international standards 
when possible. 
(1) USIMINAS, CSN and COSIPA are the three largest Brazilian steel producers. 
All are majority state owned. They produce all of Brazil's flat products 
and in 1977 they accounted for 561 of Brazil's total steel production. 
(2) This was calculated based cn the number of people in the firm working 
in production in August, 1976. USIMINAS' productivity per 
man using the some criterion was 255. 
(3)USIMINAS, CIT; Relatorio Conjuntural Siderúrgico, n' 1 
(March 1977) p.122 
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The development of USIMINAS provides a rich case 
study of technical change in the context of a developing country 
which could be analyzed from many angles. The two themes around 
which this study is structured are technical change at the plant 
level, and the strategy of technological development followed by 
the firm. 
From the point of view of the former one of the most 
notable features is the tremendous capacity stretching which was 
achieved with the original equipment and what thathas implied_for 
costs. Between 1966 (which was USIMINAS' first year of operation 
at nominal capacity) and 1972, production of steel ingots increa-
sed 123% based essentially on the original equipment. At the same 
time efficiency in terms of costs, labor productivity and utiliza-
tion of the capital stock increased significantly. The ratio of 
costs of production over sales fell from 95.21 in 1966 to 49.01 in 
1972. (See row 5 figure 1.1). Over the same period output per man 
employed at the plant increased from 70 to 228 tons of steel ingots. 
The capital output ratio fell dramatically from 4.74 in 1967 to 
1.39 in 1972 showing a significant increase in the productivity of 
capital^ (row 17 figure 1.1). A second notable characteristic is 
the magnitude of the two subsequent formal expansion plans which 
involved heavy investments in new capital equipment and structure. 
The technical changes which were possible with the old equipment 
as compared to those which dependent on new equipment, the distinc-
tion between embodied and disembodied technical change, the exo-
genous-endogenous character of the change, and the role of formal 
research activities shall be the central elements of this theme. 
(1) The capital measure used was value.of fixed investment adjusted for moneta-
ry correction net c£ cummulative depreciation, and net of investment tied 
up in expansion projects as found in the anual reports. The same series ' 
gross of depreciation showed a very similar evolution, falling from 4.83 
to 1.52. 1967 was used as a base year because the figures for previous 
years were not adjusted for inflation in -the reports.(See figure -6.5) 
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In terms of the second theme, USIMINAS has developed 
a technological strategy which involves combining operational expe-
rience, research, engineering, and equipment manufacture, on one 
hand, and selective purchase of technology complemented by heavy 
investments.in human capital, on the other. In 1968 it began to 
set up its own research center which is currently the largest and 
inost complete center of its kind in Brazil. In 1971 it created a 
subsidiary for the manufacture of steel equipment which has now 
become one of the largest capital goods manufacturers in the coun-
try. Also, as a result of its expansion plans USIMINAS has develo-
ped a very strong engineering capapity. Although the original plant 
and the first phase of its first expansion plan were done by the 
Japanese partners, USIMINAS personel were responsible for 30% of 
the engineering for the expansion plan to reach 2.4. M.t.a. and 
100% of the engineering for the large expansion plan currently 
under way. It is hard to overemphasize what this means in terms of 
engineering and technological ability or what it permits in terms 
of choice and adaptation of imported technology. In addition the 
firm is selling engineering services and technical assistance to 
other firms. Currently USIMINAS is doing much the same type of en-
gineering and technical assistance for AQOMINAS, a new 2 M.t.a. 
steel plant which is to start operation in 1980, as the Japanese 
originally did for it less than 20 years ago. This evolution from 
technological dependence to technology seller is perhaps the most 
significant indicator of the technological development of the firm. 
The step by step process through which this capacity was developed 
the organizational and administrative change which this require 
and the role of more than 30 million dollars spent on technical 
assistance contracts and more than 10 million dollars spent on 
personnel training shall be the main elements of the second theme. 
An attempt will be-made throughout the study to deve-
lop how various specific factors such as initial choice of techno-
logy raw materials, financing, general macroeconomic conditions, 
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government intervention in the market, etc. may have affected the 
technical change and the technological strategy of the firm. 
Chapter two is a survey of the main economic lite-
rature whose purpose is to place this case study in the context 
of economic theory and to identify the main issues which 
will be studied. 
Chapter three is a summary history of the develop-
ment of the Brazilian steel market and of regional rivalries which 
provides the context for the creation of the firm and explains how 
technology was obtained through the Japanese. 
Chapter four analyzes the steel technology chosen 
by USIMINAS in relationship to the then current frontier,and explains 
how the initial choice and type of technology conditions the type 
of technical change to be expected. It also summarizes the main 
changes which have occurred in the type of technology used by 
USIMINAS, analyzing them in terms of the embodiment-disembodiment 
issue, and dicusses some aspects of the measurement of technical 
change. 
Chapter five covers the development of the steel 
market in Brazil since the creation of USIMINAS and its effects on 
USIMINAS' development. After presenting the general context em-
phasis is given on how the Brazilian steel market crisis of the 
mid sixties and the increasing government intervention and plan-
ning in the market since then have affected the behaviour of 
USIMINAS. 
Chapter six analyses the technical change which has 
taken place in the firm. A distinction is made between the capa-
city stretching technical change which took place during the first 
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ten years in the context of the market and an internal financial 
crises, and the capital intensive type of technical change which 
characterizes the last six years of operation. Attention is drawn 
to the possibilities opened up by a large scale expansion, and 
to the effect of the energy crisis of the seventies on the basic 
productivity, technological and costs parameters of the firm and 
the technological response it induces. 
Chapter seven develops the role which administra-
tive and organizational changes have played in the technological 
development of the firm. Special attention is given to the or-
ganizational development which was necessary for the capacity, 
stretching phase and to the development of basic engineering as a 
response to the needs of the capital intensive expansion. The 
chapter also focuses on the large amounts of investments in human 
capital development and in specialized technology contracts which 
the firm has made, showing how they are part of its overall stra-
tegy of technological development. 
Finally chapter eight summarizes the implications 
of some of the aspects of this case study for economic theory and 
for technological policy at both the firm and the government level. 
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CHAPTER -TWO 
2, ECONOMIC THEORY OF TECHNICAL CHANGE AND THE PRESENT CASE STUDY 
Technical change has become one of the central the-
mes in the agenda of both developed and developing countries be-
cause of the potential it has for increasing output as well as for 
the implications it has for trade and employment. In the developed 
countries there is concern about narrowing technological leadership 
vis a vis other developed countries (and even some advanced develo-
ping countries) and on the effect of technology exports on domestic 
employment (via export displacement or more competitive imports). 
In the developing countries concern centers on the technological 
gap with respect to developed countries, and on the most appropriate 
policies for their own technological development, be it through the 
importation of technology or its domestic development or both. In 
this paper because of the case study nature the perspective will 
be from the point of view of an advanced developing country like 
Brazil. This chapter provides a quick survey of the main economic 
literature on technical change, makes a case for microeconomi.c stu 
dies of technical change at the firm level in order to understand 
more about the process of technical change and the relationship 
between local efforts in developing countries and the importation 
of technology, and identifies some of th3 main economic issues 
which are to be examined in this particular case study. 
2.1.Survey of Economic Literature 
Until relatively recently the mains-trearn of econo-
mic studies focused on the problem of the best allocation of exi-
siting resources toward the satisfaction oi limited wants within a 
static technologial framework. As observed by Schmookler^^ tech-
(1) J. Schmookler, "Technological Change And The Law Of Industrial 
Growth" in W. Alderson et.al(eds.), Patents And .Progress (Ho-
mewood, Illinois: Irwin, 1965) 
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nology was viewed as a parameter like the weather, which effected 
the outcome of resource allocations but which was not affected 
by these allocations. 
With the interest in growth after world War II a 
basic concern of economists was to explain the causes for and dif-
ferent rates of growth. Within this context the central idea was 
to determine to what extent growth was simply the result of an in-
crease in imputs and to what extent it was the result of something 
else - a residual which was usually attributed to technical change 
or technological progress. The first studies in this area caused 
quite a stir in the profession by showing what a small part of 
productivity growth could be explained by increases in imputs and 
how much remained as an unexplained residual which was attributed 
-to technical change for lack of better information. This led to a 
proliferation of aggregate growth studies which have refined the analysis. 
Even though these models have become increasingly sophisticated 
they face serious complications which revolve around the problems 
of specifying the underlying production function to be used and 
on the measurement and aggregation of imputs and outputs, which, 
among other things, are related to conceptual issqes of what it is 
that is being measured.^ The contribution that is eventually 
(1) The problem with the specification of the underlying production function to 
be used has to do with the validity of the restrictive properties which are 
usually assumed such as unitary or constant elasticity of substitution, type 
of returns to scale, neutral or non-neutral technical progress and embodied 
or disembodied technical change. The problems with imputs have to do with 
the aggregation of non-homogeneous imputs, actual measurement of imputs,ad-
justments for quality changes and the related question of embodiment. The 
last two are particularly relevant when trying to separate out the contribu-
tion of technical progress as opposed to mere increases in imputs. If imputs 
are adjusted for quality changes, the contribution of the technical change 
residual is diminished to the extent that quality changes depend on techni-
cal progress. Furthermore, to the extent that technical change is embodied 
in imputs, the contribution of technical change depends on the substitution 
of new technologically augmented imputs for older imputs, or in the addition 
of new imputs. With respect to the specification of outputs a problem is 
that in an aggregate production function context another factor which may 
increase total factor productivity is the realloaticn of resources from in-
dustries with low productivity to those with higher productivity (i.e. chan 
ges in the composition of output). For a survey of various studies in this 
area see C. Kennedy and A.P. Thirwal, "Surveys in Applied Economics: Tech-
nical Progress" Economic Journal (March, 1972) 
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attributed to technical progress is heavily dependent on the kind 
and nature of the adjustments which are made. The crux of the pro-
blem is that to make many of these adjustments it is necessary to 
know more about the relationship between technical change and those 
other factors, and that micro data on which to base those adjust-
ments is very scarce. Therefore, although the residual approach has 
been responsible for improving our understanding of the importance 
of technical change in the growth process, it has not been very en-
lightening with respect to technical change itself. A clearer un-
derstanding of the process of technical change is necessary in order 
to determine to what extent it is endogenous as opposed to exogenous, 
what its sources are, and to what extent its rate and direction 
may be influenced by various factors, including those which are sub-
ject to policy control. 
At the theoretical level, development in this parti-
cular direction has been hampered by the basic conceptualization 
of technical change within the production function framework and 
with the usual distinction between a move along a function and a 
shift in the whole function^. In the usual conceptualiztion a tech 
riology is represented by an isoquant which is a curve ordering tech-
niques which produce the same amount of product, by their relative 
capital and labor intensities. The assumption behind the curve is 
that there is substitutability between capital and labor. For analy-
tical convenience it is usually assumed that there are an infinite 
number of possible capital labor combinations so that the curve is 
(21 continously differentiable at all of its points^ J . A firm will move 
(1) This has been convincingly argued in N. Rosenberg, An Assessment of Approaches 
To The Study of Factors Affecting Economic Payoffs From Technological Innova-
tion. (U.S. Department of Commerce National Technical Information Service Re-
port No PB-245 905, 1975). 
(2) Theory also admits the other extreme where there is no substitutability bet-
ween capital and labor. In this case a technology will be represented by a 
point in capital labor space and if more than one technology of this type 
exists the analysis is done in terms of activity analysis such as linear pro-
graming. 
- 13 -
along such an isoquant curve in reaction to changes in imput pri-
ces as it attempts to minimize costs.. A technical change is usual-
ly represented by an inward shift of the whole isoquant which in-
dicates that as a result of the change less capital and labor im-
puts are necessary to produce that same given outputi1^ Presumably 
the idea behind the inward shift of a set of isoquant is that under-
lying knowledge has changed, making all the possible older combina? 
tions more efficient such that less imputs are required than at any 
previous combination of imputs and outputs. This has lead to the im-
plicit assumption that technical change is a matter of major inven-
tions and innovations which presumably shift the whole isoquant cur-
(2) ves rather than bending their shape.v J 
(1) These inward shifts need not imply equal proportionate reductions in both 
imputs thus leading to the concept of factor bias of technical change and 
its various definitions. A significant body of theoretical literature has 
developed around the factor bias of technical change. 
(2) Another large body of literature has developed around inventions and innova-
tion. In most works the basic idea is that technical change is the result of 
some sort of formal research. Within this framework the usual input measures 
are research and development expenditures or R and D employees, and the 
usual output measures are number of patents awarded or profitability. Even 
though there are various problems with measuring both inputs and outputs, not 
least of which is that formal R and D effort may not be the only source of 
technical change or that patents and protitability may not be the measures 
of technical change, there is a general consensus that there is a direct re-
lationship between innovational effort and innovational output although it may 
depend on factors other than effort and the relationship may not be li-
near. A-large number of studies in this area have focused on what market 
conditions are most appropriate of the stimulation of technical progress. For 
excellent surveys of this literature see. M.I. Kamien and N.L. Schwartz , . 
"Market Structure And Innovation : A Survey" (Journal of Economic Literature, 
1975); and F. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure And Economic Performance. 
(Chicago; Rand Mc Nally, 1970) pp. 346-378. : ~~ 
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While it may be true that some changes in under-
lying knowledge may have an effect corresponding to the inward mo-
vement of isoquants envisioned in the theoretical representation, it 
seems that a large part of technological improvement is 
much more he result of individual changes which affect just a li-
mited portion of the isoquant.^ 
This idea of localized and gradual technical change 
has been implicitly supported by various studies in what has come 
to be called the learning literature. These studies have pointed 
out the role of specific production experience in increasing labor 
T21 productivityv . The basic finding is that the amount of labor taken 
(1) Rosenberg, Op Cit cites seme excellent examples of how improvements depend on 
continous technological and engineering alterations and adaptations to improve 
the performance or suit specialized requirements of submarkets and the introduc-
tion c£ other canplementary imputs. One is S.C. Gilfian, Inventing The Ship (Chi_ 
cago: Follet, 1935) that shows the gradual and piecemeal nature of technological 
change in the shipping industry where it is particularly interesting to follow, 
how much of the technological change consisted of small refinements based cn ex-
perience and which many times involved adapting improved components or materials 
developed in other industries. Another is L. Hunter, Steamboats On The Western 
Rivers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949) where invention in the formal. 
sense counted far less than a multitude of minor improvements, adjustments and 
adaptatiens carried out by anonymous craftsmen, shop foremem and mechanics. 
(2) Che of the first such studies was T.P. Wright, "Factors Affecting The Cost of 
Airplanes", Journal of Aereonautica/Sciences (1936) pp.122-128, who pointed out 
that the number of hours it took to produce airplane bodies was a decreasing func 
ticn.of the total number previously produced. H. Asher "Cost Quantity Relation-
ships In the Airframe Industry"(Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation 
1956)gives a more detailed survey of the phenomenal in the same industry. W.Z. 
Hirsch, "Firm Progress Ratios";Econonetrica(April, 1956)found a similar phenenme 
no in the machine tool and textile industry. More recently N. Baloff, " Start-
ups in Machine-intensive Production Systems"Journal of Industrial Engineering 
Vol. XVII (January 1966) and "The Learning Curve: Seme Controversial Issues" 
Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. XIV n9 3 (July 1966) showed the relevance 
of learning curves in several highly mechanized manufacturing industries. 
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to produce a good in various industries is as decreasing function 
of the total number of goods previously produced. A particularly 
cited study by Lundberg^shows that such results are not necessa-
rily the effect of capital labor substitution for in the Horndal 
iron works in Sweden output per manhour rose an average of 21 per 
year even though there was no new invéstment. 
These type of studies led Arrow^ to advance 
the hypothesis "that technical change in general can be ascribed 
to experience, that it is the very activity of production which 
gives rise to problems from which favorable responses are selected 
over time." 
He developed a simple model in which technical chan 
ge is fully endogenous, being the by-product of investment. Through 
it he shows that in such a case the rate of private investment will 
be less that the social optinum because an act of .investment benefits 
future investors, but the market does not compensate thé original 
investor for that benefit. The modél is limited, among other things, 
by the assumptions that learning takes place only in the capital 
goods industry, is completely embodied in new capital goods and 
that no learning takes place in the use of capital goods once they 
are built which is contrary to evidence such as that of the Horndal 
effect and more recent learning literature. In addition , as Arrow 
recognized, he assumed that learning takes place only as a by-pro-
duct of production whereas in fact learning can be the product of edu-
cation and research activités specifically oriented to that end. 
Somewhat more .recently a more developed view of 
localized technical change which allows specific learning activi-
ties undertaken independently of production was introdued by Atkin-
(31 
son and Stiglitz1 J. For them the difference between basic scienti-
fic knowledge and technical knowledge is that while the former under. 
(1) E. Lundberg, Produktivitet Och Rantabilited (Stockholm: P.A.Nortedt and 
Soner,? 1961) " 
(2) K. Arrsw , "The Economic Implications of Learning By Doing", Review of Econo nuc Stashes, June 1962. 
(3) A Atkinson and J. Stiglitz, "A New View of Technological Change" Mimiogra-
phed-version, 1968. ,, 
lies a large variety of techniques, the later is related to speci-
fic techniques of production. Therefore improvements in one tech-
nique will leave others relatively unaffected.^ Furthermore, whi-
le in conventional economic theory the acquisition and transmission 
of knowledge is assumed to be a costless operation they note that 
increases in technical knowledge involve either research or expe-
rience in production. That "... means that the shift in the produc-
tion function will be located at the point where the firm or eco-
nomy is operating now or where it expects to operate in the future". 
Two immediate consequences are: first, that the set of techniques 
available at any point in time consists only- of techniques currently 
used or used in the past, so the distinction between movements 
along and shifts in an a isoquant may be unimportant; and second, 
that it becomes essential to decide which technique to improve. 
Although the first points are not exactly new, U s 
(21 
relevance has been emphasized by Rosenberg. J who has poin-
ted out that actual experience in operating a particular method 
of production provides signals which direct attention to opportuni-
ties for improvements in production techniques which may lead to 
"compulsive sequences" based on a succession of more or less obvious 
engineering challenges .Taking a broader perspective David comple-
ments this view by emphazising how the actual innovations genera-
ted are bound to reflect prior decisions of the firm to operate 
(1)This seems quite an extreme formulation, as it is possible to think of techi-
ques which are applicable in different, industries from those in which they 
were developed, but it serves to emphasize the change of view point regarding 
the conventional conceptualization". 
(2) N. Rosenberg "The Direction of Technological Change: Inducement Mechanisms 
and Focusing Devices " Economic Development ana Cultural Change; Vol. 18 
N* 1, part 1 (October 1969). 
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f 11 at some particular place within the spectrum of techniques. 
Even though Atkinson and Stiglitz do not develop 
their second point much beyond showing; why the long term effects 
of learning from production and investment in R and D affect cur-
rent decisions as to the level cf output and the choise of technique, 
their approach opens up the idea of planning and explicit techno-
logical strategy from the point of view of the-firm and of studying 
( 2") how it may be influenced by various micro and macro factors^ J. 
CI) P.A. David, Technical Choice Innovation And Economic Growth; (Cambridge: 
rambridge University Press, 1975) p.60 
(2) Binswanger, "A Microeconomic Approach to Induced Innovation", Economic 
Journal (December, 1974) for example, has developed a microeconomic model 
by reformulating innovation possibilities on the basis of alternative re-
search processes which have expected pay-off functions in terms of the ef-
ficiency improvements of production factors,and which explicity introduces 
research cost. Through it he shows how it is neither factor prices nor 
factor shares which alone influence optimal research mix and hence and bia-
ses, but research costs, the expected payoffs to the different types or 
research (which depend on previous efficiency improvements achieved and the 
rate of decreasing marginal returns along each research path ) and total 
factor costs as well for they will regulate the amount of the benefits to 
be obtained. He rejects the idea of any observable technological frontier 
because any economising unit would spend research resources only up to 
the point when marginal benfitis equaled marginal costs not to where, re-
turns became zero. Furthermore, he points out that a budget constraint on 
research resources, separate from one on physical investment, does not 
maximize returns from total investment because rates of return for the two 
-kinds of investment will not necessarily be equal at the margin, and that 
the form of the budget constraint has a strong influence on the direction 
of technical change. 
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Economic theory of technical change is thus moving 
decisely toward a more microeconomic approach which should be help 
ful in improving our understanding of the process and in formula-
ting appropriate technological strategies. An important implica-
tion of localized technical change from the perspective of develo-
ping countries is that research and technical change in advanced 
countries may not be the most adequate for them given different 
conditions such as factor prices, climate, raw materials, market 
size, etc. This means that many technological processes have to be 
adapted to the specific conditions. Thuscontrary to what has been 
argued by those who recommend that * developing countries leave R and D to 
developed countries(which presumably have a comparative advantage 
because their scientific and technological knowledge is more ad-
vanced), a case may made for adaptation of imported technology and 
<even outright research and development efforts in the less deve-
loped countries themselves. This would be particularly true in 
areas where there are important differences in primary imputs, 
scale, or broader social needs. 
2.2. Microeconomic Case Studies 
To date few empirical microeconomic studies have 
been done on technical change at the plant level either in develo-
ped or in developing countries. One of the few exceptions and so 
far the most detailed is a study of five Du Pont rayon plants in 
the U.S. by Samuel Hollander^ which merits a quick review for 
the light it sheds on the process and some of the issues which it 
raises. 
(1) S. Hollander, The Source of Increased Efficiency. A Study of Du Pont Rayon 
Plants (Cambridge: MIT University Press, 1965) 
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Hollander set out to answer the following broad 
groups of questions: 
1) To that extent could changes in the productivity 
of the firm's imputs be ascribed to technical change in the narrow 
sense of costs reductions which are the results of changes in the 
techniques of production?^ 
2) What was the relationship between scale and tech-
f 21 nical change?v 
3) What was the relationship between various changes 
in technique and investment in plant equipment? To what extent were 
practicable technical changes dependent on preceding expenditure on 
plant and equipment, and were these expenditures part of replacement 
or of expansion programs? 
4) Were specific technical changes dependent on formal 
research activity? Were techniques patented? What'was the role of 
(3) small improvements?v J 
(1) Hollander chose to consider cnly the cost reducing aspect cf technical change. 
He was aware that quality improvements were also an objective of technical 
change, but he did not explicitly include them in this analisys because of the 
difficulty of obtaining any significant statistical measures for quality impro 
vements. 
(2) Implicitly he attributed cost reductions to either technical change or scale 
effects. To separate cut these two he made two types of distinctions. First 
he distinguished cost reductions which could be attributed to technical chan-
ge frcm what he called "plant expansion effects". By the latter he meant "ins^  
tances of reduction in unit costs resulting fran the spreading over a larger 
voliime of output (resulting from plant expansion) of items in total cost which 
do not increase proportionally with output ."Although he noted that it was com-
mon in the literature to consider as economies of scale the effects of more 
efficient equipment and methods introduced at large scale operaticns, he cho-
se to include such changes within the designation technical change, albeit 
technical change resulting from the scale of operation. His second distinc-
ticsi was then an attempt to separate out the effects of technical change which 
were linked to expansion of production from the rest. He thus defined direct 
technical changes as those which permited the production of given output le-
vels at lower unit costs and thereby reduced unit costs; and indirect techni-
cal changes as those which permited production of higher output levels from 
substantially unchanged plant facilities and complementary imputs. 
(3) He made a fundamental distinction between what he termed maj or and minor tech 
nical change. A change was considered major if its development was considered 
"difficult" to accomplish by men skilled in the pertinent arts before the 
development program. Major changes usually involved significant departure from 
existing methods which was one of the reasons why they were difficult to accan 
plish. A change was considered minor if its development was judged to be a 
relatively simple process as judged by individuals after the event. Minor chan 
ge usually involved an evolutionary attention to existing techniques. 
The main results of his study were: rn 
1) In all "but one of the plantsv J technical change 
was almost wholly responsible for the net decrease in unit costs. 
Improvements in imput quality including improved labor and better 
organization were acknowledged to accounted for part of the cost re-
auctions resulting from technical change, but their contribution was 
estimated to have been no more than 10%. 
-2) Technical change which involved an increase in 
production from substantially unchanged plant facilities and comple-
mentary imputs played a more important role in cost reduction than 
technical changes which Dermitted the production of given output le-
vels. at lower unit cost. This shows that there is an important rela-
tionship between technical change and volume of output. It implies 
that a growing market may be required to stimulate an important por-
f 21 .tion ..of improved technology1 } 
(T) The plant for which technical change accounted for less than 
85% of total cost reductions was not considered representative 
in that its construction embodied many cost reducing technical 
changes' which had been introduced in an earlier plan.tj there fore the 
effects of cost reducing technical change were not recorded 
while those of plant expansion were, as the plant was doubled 
soon after its establishment. 
(2) The large role played this type of technical change also implies 
that it may not be statistically possible to separate out the 
effects on productivity of increased volume from those of tech-
nical change because of their interdependence. 
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3) Most technical changes required investment in 
plant and equipment. 80 to 90 percent of the net reduction in unit 
costs were dependent on investment. However, replacement investment 
was seen as more important than investment which added to the exis-
ting capital stock. Analysis of interplant differentials suggested 
indirect evidence of the importance of investment for in nearly all 
cases of delay in the application of existing technology, the main 
reason was that required investment outlays could not be justified 
at the time. It was also noted that with relatively small outlays 
incorporating modifications to existing plants it was sometimes pos-
sible to reduce unit almost to the same level as that of newly con:s 
tructed plants.^ 
The critical role of investment in connection with 
the implementation of technical change indicates that a lot of tech 
nical change is embodied in capital. However, the fact that it was 
possible in many cases to increase the efficiency of older plants 
through modifications which required relatively small outlaySj means 
that technological change is not completely frozen in a given vinta-
ge. This implies that it is important to pay attention to the rate 
at which the existing stock of capital is altered to introduce tech-
nical change rather than simply to variables which determine the 
rate of expansion of the capital stock, and that significant moder-
nizations can be accomplished on essentially dated equipment which 
has important implications for modernization versus rennovation 
choices faced by the firm. 
(1) Similarily , modifications to a plant designed for one product in 
order to permit the production of a new product were possible 
with relatively small outlays compared with those required for 
the construction of an entire new plant. 
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4) The cummulative contribution of evolutionary chan-
ges of existing techniques was usually greater in terms of cost re-
duction than that of major changes in technique. Hollander noted 
however that there might be•a limit to the potential alterations of 
existing facilities, and that without some preceding major change 
the potential stream of minor changes could be exhausted. 
5) Patented technology played a very small role in 
the case of minor technical changes. Most technology was not paten-
ted. The bulk was developed at the plants themselves or by the en-
gineering department sometimes in cooperation with the equipment 
suppliers. Personnel attached to.Technical Assistance to Production 
played the most important role. Major technical changes were mostly 
dependent on internal formal R and D, although Technical Assistance 
also contributed substantially. Generally, major process changes were 
not patented as a whole although individual features were. Some tech 
nology was licensed from other companies. 
The importance of minor technical changes, which were 
done mostly internally by Technical Assistante to Production person-
nel, implies that a lot of'what is going on has to do with learning 
over time.^It also implies that close attention should be paid to 
the various methods companies adopt to exploit minor technical chan 
ges, to the relationship between these efforts and those of a rese-
arch department and to the relation between major and minor changes. 
It also suggests that organization and the attitude or managers may 
be very important. 
(1) In fact Hollander states: 
Our study tends to support the view to some extent that a conside-
rable portion of technical change can be ascribed to experience, 
that is, to the very activity of production which gives rise to 
problems for which favorable response are selected over time, 
(p.204) 
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A major limitation of Hollander's study is to have 
focused just on cost reducing aspects of technical change.^ As 
was shown in Philip Maxwell's (1976) study on a steel plant in 
(2") 
Argentina^ J and has been confirmed in other studies underta-
ken by the BID-CEPAL research program on science and technology in 
Latin America, technical change has broader objectives than cost 
reduction. These additional objectives can be sumarized under three r 31 broad headings.  
(1) A major criticism to the study in addition to the fact that it 
focused solely on cost reducing technical change is that it 
only studies the changes of the productivity of the labor and 
material component of costs per pound of rayon. It does not 
comput or control for changes in the amount of capital which 
the labor and material factors are working with, except to note 
that investment was generally more of the replacement type than 
of. the substituting type. This seems to be a major omission 
particularly in light of the importance of investment for the 
implementation of 80 to 90 percent of all the technical changes 
It would be useful to know to what extent the improvements we-
re embodied in the capital equipment acquired from the outside 
as opposed to being a change internal to the firm. Essentially 
this involves a more careful identification of the nature and 
sources of technical changes and is something which will be 
attempted in this study. 
(2) P. Maxwell, "Learning And Technical Change In The Steel Plant 
of Acindar S.A." (Monograph n9 4 of the BID/CEPAL Research 
Program on Science and Technology: Buenos Aires, 1976) 
(3) J. Katz "Cambio Tecnologico, Desarrollo Economico Y Las Rela-
ciones Intra Y Extra Regionales De La America Latina" (CIEPLAN 
Seminar, Santiago, May 25-27, 1978)has suggested that the broa 
der scope of technical change objectives (i.e less emphasis on 
cost reduction and more emphasis on product diversification and 
production increase found in the micro economic studies under-
taken by the BID-CEPAL may be associated with the greater 
protection and greater market concentration in Latin American 
markets than in.the U.S. or Europe. 
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1) Changes in product mix including introduction 
of new products, product differentiation^or 
quality changes 
2) Increases (or decreases) in the capacity of ins-
tallations^ 
3) Changes in imput mix including use of substitutes 
and imputs of different quality or origin, some-
f 31 times for reasons other than costs. J 
(1.) Good empirical examples from the work of the BID-CEPAL program are 
provided in J. Lucangelli, J. Fidel and P. Shepherd, "Perfil y 
Comportamiento de La Industria de Cigarillo En Argentina"(Mono-
grafia n9 7, Programa BID/CEPAL: Buenos Aires, 1976) on the'ci-
gare t industry and G. Vitelli "Competencia, Oligopolio y Cambio 
Tecnologico En La Industria de La Construcción: El Caso Argenti^ 
no" (Monografia n9 .3, Programa BID/CEPAL: Buenos Aires, 1976) 
on the construction industry. 
(2) For an interesting theoretical piece on capacity stretching as a 
barrier to entry see R. Levin."Technical Change, Economies of 
Scale and Market Structure" (PhD. Dissertation Yale University), 1 
1974). 
(3) One commom example of this in. the Latin American context is the 
Substitution of imported for domestic imputs which sometimes 
takes place even when local prices are higher because of Govern-
ment legislation (as will be the case in USIMINAS with respect 
to national coal) or due to greater risk associated with imports 
under conditions or changing import and tariff barries. 
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Recently Katz et a l ^ studied technical 
change in an Argentine subsidiary of Dupont which, like Hollanders 
plants, also produced Rayon.-The study shows how the type of tech-
nical change which occurs in.the plant varies in response to chan-
ging external conditions at three levels: the market, the home plant 
and general macroeconomic conditions. 
Initially, as a monopolist well protected from inter 
national competition by tariff barries in thè order of 200®O) and 
in the context of excess demand, the emphasis of technical change 
is to increase capacity and to improve the performance of installed 
capacity. When new firms enter the market and start enlarging their 
market shares, the emphasis is on improvement of the quality of its 
products and on diversification of production. During a third period 
characterized by strong competition by cheaper substitute products 
(nylon and other synthetic fibers) and rising labor and raw material 
costs the plant suppresses a labor intensive-finishing stage and 
technical change focuses or reducing raw materials costs through 
better recovery methods for chemical products and adaptation to use 
cheaper substitute imputs* It also substitutes capital (which it is 
able to obtain cheaply second hand from the home company) for labor 
whose cost has been steadily increasing. As demand displacement by 
substitute products becames stronger and the firm is forced to ope-
rate at sub-optimal scaleJ the plant develops a new production pro-
cess to permit the firm to operate profitably at reduced scale which 
was tradidionally considered anti-economical. 
Technical change is conditioned by the firms rela-
tionship to its home plant not only in terms of access to technolo-
gical innovations developed by the home plant but also in terms of 
(1) J.Katz et al."Productividad Tecnologia y Esfuerzos Locales De 
Investigación y Desarrollo" (Monografia N9 13, BID/CEPAL,1978) 
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availability of second hand equipment at scrap value which results 
from the closure of one the U.S. plants and also in terms of the 
quality of the management it sends to the Argentine plant. 
Finally technical change is conditioned by macro 
elements in that: 1) new legislation which demands shorter working 
hours in the chemical section of the plant increases labor costs; 
2) after 1957 the atmosphese was favorable to factory modernization 
and the incorporation of new capital equipment from abroad. Combi-
ned with the -availability of -second hand equipment at the home 
nlant this leads to a capital intensive modernization of the plant. 
Also the availability of cheap well trained Argentina chemical en-
gineers conditions the nature of technical change in that they are 
absorbed into the firm and capacitate it for a technical change 
such as developing a production process for small scale operation, 
i 
2*3. The Present Case Study 
As these examples make clear, in order to unders-
tand the process of technical change at the microeconomic plant 
level it is necessary to broaden the objectives attributed to tech-
nical change and to specifically consider how the technical chan-
ges taking place within the firm are related to external as well 
as internal conditioning factors. It is also necessary to explici-
ty consider the technological strategy of the firm. This is an 
area which has received very little attention in the economics li-
terature. In fact, the technology used by the firm has been virtu-
ally ignored. In large part this is because the conventional lite-
rature assumes that information is perfect and costless. ThuSj the 
firm which exists in most theoretical models does not have a tech-
nological problem..It always knows all about production technology 
and its improvements. Its problems are usually reduced to output, 
pricing, and in some more complex cases considerations of quality 
or product differentiation. With notably few exceptions, economists 
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have made virtually no attempt to study what actually takes place 
in the black box which transforms imputs into output, how a firm 
acquires the technology to make that transformation, or how that 
technology changes and evolves over time. 
These issues acquire aditional dimensions in the 
context of a developing country. 
Information is more imperfect and there are gene-
rally less persons who have either the technological knowledge of 
certain production processes or the background to adapt that know-
ledge to specific conditions or to develop it further. A characte-
ristic of recent technological development in less developed 
countries is that in large part it is based on the transfer of tech-
nological developments which have occurred in more developed coun-
tries. This transfer occurs in various ways ranging from direct 
investment by foreign groups to joint venturesyto purchase of li-
censes and technological assistance contracts by local groups. In 
this context it is important to study: 
1) how the firm searches for, acquires, implements 
and develops ^  technology; 
2) how each of these activities is affected by cer-
tain conditions such as original technological profile specific lo-
cal raw material conditions, development of the world technological 
frontier local development of the market, and general macroeconomic 
conditions. 
- In the present study an attempt is made-to use the 
case of USIMINAS to study various microeconcmic aspects of technical 
change at the plant level and the technological strategy of the firm 
and of how both may be influenced by various external and internal 
conditioning factors. 
(1) The bulk of the literature on technological development has focused on the 
selection of foreign technology and on terms of technology transfer. It is 
only more recently that there has been an awareness that significant adap-
tions and improvements are done on imported teclinologies and that there are 
even seme siginificant local technological developments. 
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Within the first theme the main issues to be analy-
zed in this particular case study are: 
1) The various objectives of technical change (cost 
reduction, production increase, product diversi-
fication including quality improvements, and 
imput type or mix changes). 
2) The extent to which technical change is dependent 
on investment, and when so dependent, the degree 
to which it is embodied in capital goods. 
3) The extent to which technical changes embodied 
, in capital goods require scale multiplying plant 
expansions rather than capacity stretching by 
changes embodied in complementary equipment. 
4) Whether decreasing returns (saturation effects) 
can be identified within given vintages of equip-
ment . 
5) The contribution of technical change efforts 
realized within the plant versus those due to 
technology embodied in new equipment, on various 
productivity parameters. 
6) The relationship between technical change and 
formal research activity as opposed to production 
experience and routine technical activities. 
7) The role of initial technological conditions 
(equipment and raw materials )in conditioning the 
technical change path. 
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Within the second theme the main issues are: 
1. How the firm initially obtained the technology 
necessary for production and how the search for 
acquisition, implementation and development of 
technology has changed over time. 
2. How various objectives of technical change may 
have been influenced by conditioning factors at 
three levels: micro (initial technology chosen, 
raw materials, various institutional factors -
capital goods suppliers), market (evolution and 
diversification of demand, competition from other 
producers), and macro (government intervention, 
exchange rates, tariff barriers ,capital incenti-
ves, general development of engineering capacity, 
etc.) 
3. What exogenous as opposed to endogenous demands 
were put on the firm in terms of needs for tech-
nical change. 
4. What types of organizational changes were made 
. within the firm in order to satisfy those demands. 
5. What has been the relationship between internal 
development versus purchase of technology, how has 
it changed over time,and what has been the firm's 
strategy in terms of technological development. 
The next chapter will set the stage for the analy-
sis by sumarizing the development of the Brazilian steel industry 
until the creation of USIMINAS, explaining the context in which it was 
created, and detailing how and why the Japanese became involved. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3, HISTORY OF STEEL INDUSTRY AND OF THE CREATION OF USIMINAS 
3.1. Short History of the Brazilian Steel Industry Before the 
Founding of USIMINAS 
Iron has been produced in Brazil since 1590 when 
the first iron works were founded^but steel production did not 
really start until the beginning of the twentieth century. Domestic 
steel production was almost neglible through the first two decades. 
Brazil's growing steel consumption was satisfied through imports. 
In the period 1908-1912 imports of rolled steel averaged 272,500 tons 
per year. Even by 1924, the earliest date for which there are sys-
tematic figures, production was only 4 4 9 2 . ^ The•development of 
the Brazilian Steel industry since then can be seen in figure 3.1. 
By the second half of the 1920s steelmaking began 
to expand rapidly such that by 1929, 75% of steel ingot consumption 
was supplied domestically. Nevertheless steel ingot consumption 
during the 1920s was only 3-71 of rolled steel product consumption 
and even by 1929 less than 10% of rolled product consumption was 
produced domestically. 
The growth, of iron and steel production in thi^ 
period was based completely on the initiative of private entrepre-
neurs. The dominant producer was the firm Queiroz Junior, which 
was responsible for most of the pig iron production increase in the 
WWI period.^ 
(1) Werner Baer, The Development of The Brazilian Steel Industry 
(Nashville, Tennese :Vande'rbilt University Press, 1969) p.57 
(2) Ibid, p.58 
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FIGURE 3 . 1 
BRAZILIAN STEEL, AND ROLLED-STEEL PRODUCTION AND.CONSUMPTION. 1.910-19.6.7 
S T E E L I N G O T S ROLLED-STEEL-PRODUCTS 





Imparts a s u 
p e r c e n t a g c o f 
c-onsumptiort 
1920 14,409 100.0 
1921 7,281 100.0 
19 22 5,748 100,0 
1923- 4,276 100.0 
1924 4 492 11,697 61.6 
192S 7 559 14,123 .46.5 .283 373,485 99 .9 
1926 9 875 15,908 37.9 10 .501 399,381 96 .0 
1927 8 205 14,S81 43.7 16 .638 435,767 96 .2 
1928 21 390 28,932 26.1 26 227 483,149 94 .6 
1929 26 842 35,712 24.8 29 898 514 ,206 94.2 
1930 20 985 24,766 15,3 25 ,89S 259,224 90 .0 
1931 23 130 24,777 6 .6 18 .802 143,480 87.1 
19-32 34 192 36,431 6 .1 29 ,547 16S.650 82,2 
1933 53 567 56,469 5 . 1 42 369 277,028 84.7 
1934 61 675 65,904 6.4 48 699 343,590 85.8 
1935 64 231 69,390 7.4 SZ 358 345 ,380 84.8 
1936 73 667 80,426 8.4 62 946 3S6.689 83.7 
1937 76 430 85,746 J 0 . 3 71 419 505,352 85 .9 
1938 92 420 101,433 8.9 85 666 355.662 75.9 
1939 114 095 120,842 5.6 100 ,996 429.845 76 .5 
1940 141 201 147,810 4 .5 135 ,293 414,519 69.4 
1941 155 357 159,333 2.5 149 ,928 368,268 66.2 
1942 160 139 161,743 1.0 15S .063 262.764 43 .3 
1943 185 621 189,034 1.8 157 620 325,534 54 .9 
1944 221 188 259,350 14.7 166 534 492,613 68 .1 
194S 205 935 233,474 11.8 165 80S 465,630 67.S 
1946 342 613 378,824 9 .6 .230 229 656,751 65 .4 
1947 386 971 431,180 10.2 269 452 738,554 63.8 
1948 483 085 492 ,545 1.9 381 .480 567 ,579 38.2 
1949 615,069 625,250 1.6 405 .111 698,064 3S.7 
19S0 788 557 803,119 1.8 572 ,489 843,049 32.6 
19SI 842 977 871,526 3 .3 681 815 1 068.016 36.2 
1952 893 300 911,831 2 .0 703 ,103 1 087,934 3S.6 
1953 1 016 ,300 - 794 ,460 1 006,821 21.1 
1954 1 148 300 - 834 037 1 486,411 43 .9 
1955 1 162 500 - - 932 283 1 265,659 27.3 
19S6 1 364 ,800 - - 1 073 ,661 1 324,508 19.1 
1957 1 470 ,000 - - 1 ,130 189 1 521,321 25.9 
1958 1. 659 000 - - 1 ,303 ,633 1 ,518,146 14.1 
1959 1 866 000 - - 1 ,492 ,009 1 998,826 25.3 
1960 1 843 019 - 1 .712 ,289 2 128.331 20.4 
1961 2 443 221 - - 1 .931 ,785 2 257,701 14.8 
1962 2 565 226 - - 1 ,998,913 2 275,654 12.4 
1963- 2 824 045 2 ,142 ,•100 2 631.700 18.6 
1964 3 015 69S - - 2 108 "84 2 338,106 11.5 
1965 2 982 ,994 - - 2 ,096 ,i i s 2 305,860 8 .6 
1966 3 781 ,797 - - 2 .677 .176 - -
1967 3 696 .145 - — 2 , 8S3 ,177 
SOURCE: Baer OP C i t . . J>p. 61,85 
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Most of the small iron and steel plants that 
were set up during the 1920s were constructed by firms whose prin-
cipal activity was in other fields. 
It should also be pointed out that the government 
encouraged the development of the iron and steel industry. In 1918 
and again in 1925 the government passed decrees giving iron and 
steel producers various types of tax favors, favorable credit, lo-
wer freight rates, and import duty exemptions^. 
The decade of the thirties was one of rapid growth 
in the iron and steel industry. Pig iron production increased almost 
five times to 160,016 tons in 1939, accounting for virtually all 
of domestic consumption. Ingot steel production increase slightly 
more than four times to 114,095 tons, fulling more than 95% of 
Steel ingot consumption. Rolled steel production also increased subs-
tantially, rising almost three and one half times and increasing 
the share of domestic production to almost 25% of consumption. 
* In Brazil, as in many other Latin American coun-
tries, industrial recovery from the world depression of the thir-
ties was rapid. The shortage of imported manufactured goods and 
strong devaluations made it profitable to substitute previously 
imported products by expanding domestic industrial production. 
By 1933 the output of pig iron, stèel ingot and rolled products 
were already higher than the peak of 1929. 
During this decade the expansion of one company, 
(1) Baer, Op. Cit, p.59 
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Belgo Mineira, dominateci the Brazilian steel industry^. 
In 19-36 when pig iron production in Brazil stood 
at 78.419 tons and steel output production stood at 73,667 tons 
Belgo Mineira's share with its Sahara plant was 37.6% and 41.8% 
respectively. In 1-940 when tot-al national -pig iron output was 
135.293 tons and steel output was 141. 2t) 1 tons, Belgo Mineira, with 
its Sahara and its New Monlevade plant was producing 62.6% and 60.7% 
respectively. The dominance of Bel-go Mineira was even greater in 
tire production of rolled products. In "".940, its Monlevade plant 
(2 1 alone produced 70.6% of the total domestic output of 135.293 tons.^; 
More than ten other- steel plants started produc-
-ti-on in- this decade. However, they were largely small because of 
limited financial means, and were usually located near sources of 
C3") raw materials or markets. By 1938 the number of blast furnaces in 
(1) Its origins went back to the Companhia Siderúrgica Mineira which 
began production in 1917. In 1921 a Belgian group led by the 
ARBED (Acieries Reunies de Burbach-Eich-Dulelange) absorved the 
Companhia Siderúrgica Mineira, which then became named the Com-
nhia Siderúrgica Belgo-Mineira. Although the new company was 
committed to building an integrated charcoal based steelworks 
at Monlevade, M.G., the construction of that new plant could 
not be undertaken until 1934 when a rail link from Belo Horizon-
te was completed. In the meantime Belgo Mineira gradually en-
larged the works of the old Mineira company into a small but 
integrated plant at Sabara by .adding a small Siemens Martin 
steel furnace and a small rolling mill to the already existing 
blast furnace. Construction of the Monlevade plant started in 
1935. By 1940, with the completion of its new rolling mill, 
Belgo Mineira became Sourth America's largest integrated steel 
mill, and the world's largest charcoal based integrated stell 
works. See Baer, Op Cit, pp. 58-9, 68 
(2) Baer, Op Cit, p.63 
(3) The most important of these was the Usina das Neves of the 
Groupo Hime 
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Brazil had increased from 11 in 1930 to 19, all based on charcoal. 
In that year there were also 23 electric furnaces, four for reduc-
tion of pig iron and scrap metal preparation and nineteen for the 
refining and fusing of steel.^ 
Although the erection of Belgo Mineira's Monlevade 
plant significantly increased national steel capacity, it was not 
enough to keep pace with the growing steel needs of the Brazilian 
economy due to growing industrialization. Furthermore Brazilian 
plants produced products mainly for light manufacturing and cons-
truction ;the domestic steel industry did not have the capacity to 
produce the heavier steels required for the naval industry, rail-
road rails, flat products, and heavy products for the construction 
industry. Existing steel companies, with the exception of Belgo Mi-
neira (which was not prepared to expand beyond its Monlevade plant) 
were generally too small and had no funds for large expansion pro-
grams. Also, it was generally felt that the substitution of heavy 
steel imports could only be achieved through the creation of a lar-
ge-scale, coke-based, integrated steel plant because Brazil's forest 
reserves were not adequate to suppy a large-scale charcoal-based 
steel industry.^ 
(1) Edmund Ray, Volta Redonda,( Albuquerque, New Mexico: Rio Grande Publishing Co.) 
197 pp.108-118. 
(2) ThQ idea of constructing a large-scale integrated coke-based steel complex 
was not new. It dated at least back to the pre-WWI period when the government 
had shown a strong interest in promoting such a steel works, financed by fo-
reign capital. After WWI the idea was carried forward by Percival Farquar ,an 
American entrepreneur who was very active in various large scale undertakings 
throughout Latin America. Between 1914 and 1939 Farquar presented various 
plans which combined the export of iron ore with the construction of. a large 
scale integrated steel enterprise. However, for a variety of non-econcmic 
factors , which included regional politics, nationalism, and international 
politics as well as what seems to have been the reluctance of the major sour-
ces of foreign finance to disturb the established markets by setting up a 
steel industry in a steel importing country, all his plans came to no end. 
See Baer, Op Cit, pp. 69-90 and Charles A. Gould, The Last Titan Percival 
Farguar, American Entrepreneur in Latin America. 
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Various other plans were put forward by different groups, 
and pressure, particularly from the military, increased on the 
government to develop a large scale steel industry. < 
; Betwèen 1931 and 1937 thé Vargas government appoin-
ted four successive commissions to study the steel sector. These 
were the Leite de Castro Commission, (January 1931), the National 
Steel Commission ; (August 1931); the Preparatory Commission for the 
National Steel Plan,( 1934); and the Technical Council of Economy and 
Finance,(1937). Through these series of commissions it was decided 
that to enable the private metallurgical sector to continue expanding 
without damaging competion from the large quasi-governmentcompany 
that was being proposed, it should produce heavy sheet metal, plates, rails 
and similar goods which where being imported. The mill was to manu-
facture about 350.000 tons of pig iron per year, and its fuel was 
to be coke derrived as much as possible from Brazilian c o a l . ^ 
A.long and intense debate developed as to which 
foreign group (U.S. or Germany), Brazil should turn to for equipment, 
financial and technical assistance. This involved not! only economic 
but also political considerations as it took placé in the period 
immediately preceeding and during W W Ï Ï . ^ 
The Companhia Siderurgica Naciorial, as the company 
came to be called,, was finally founded in April 1941 and located at Volta 
Redonda in the State of Rio de Janeiro with U.S. assistance.' Private 
U.ST group s in 11 i all y- in té re s ted ' in : thé pro j e c £•'" (n omely Dupont and" " 
(1) Ray, Op. Cit, pp. 119-120 „ ^ 
(2) For studies of some of the issues and the history of the nego-
tiations s-ee Ray, Op Cit, and Baer, Op Cit, pp. 71-80 
United States Steel) had withdrawn^but Brazil obtained finan-
f2) 
cial support for the project through the U.S. Export Import Bank. 
Although the initial idea was to have the company controlled by 
private Brazilian capital there was trouble in raising that 
money and for all practical purposes CSN became a Government owned 
and operated company. 
C3) The building of CSN represented a major effort. J 
(1) Dupant seems to have withdraw because at the time it was interested natio-
nalistic pressures for a state owned mill were too strong. U.S.S. eventual-
ly withdrew citing financial difficulties, pointing out that it had lost 
its nickel operations with the Russian invasion c£ Finland and feared making 
further foreign investments. 
(2) The U.S. Export-Import Bank lent Brazil U.S. $20 million for the project in 
September 1940 under the condition that because of Brazils inexperience in 
the production of steel on a large basis the management of the firm should 
include U.S. personnel until to the mutual satisfaction of both parties the 
firm could be run entirely by Brazilian technicians. Arthur G. Mackee and 
Co was chosen to design the project and later to help expedite the purchase 
of necessary machinery. 
(3) Wartime conditions in the U.S. and the American Governments priorities of 
U.S.production efforts which supported the war caused the Brazilians con-
siderable difficulties in obtaining various parts of the equipment on time 
Equipment price rises caused by war and the increase in transportation 
costs due to dangers of maritime shipping increased the price of the equip-
ment by about 601. The construction work which was directed by Colonel* 
Macedo Soares, aided by Brazilian and American consultants, involved 17.000 
workers among whom there were 120 engineers and 80 draftsmen. MaKee main-
tained 12 engineers to assit Macedo Soares in supervising the entire pro-
ject between 1942-1946. Also, each of the other U.S. firms with whan CSN 
had subcontracted stationed technical representatives. The total number of 
engineers and technicians hired by CSN in the U.S. to help build Volta Re-
donda was 55. CSN would have liked to hire more, but that was not possible 
since the U.S. war effort drafted many of them. See Ray, Op. Cit., pp. 
154-157. 
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Figure 3.2 : VOLTA REDONDAS PRODUCTION AS A SHARE OF 
BRAZILIAN PRODUCTION 
1946-Ì966 , . 
(percent) 
































































SOURCE Calculated based on CSN production figures compiled by Rady, 
Cp. Cit., based òn CSN anual reports. 
Having to procure items during the war meant that there were many 
delays in filling the orders and in transporting them to Brazil. 
A lot of improvisation had to be done at the plant site; wrenches 
belts, shackles, drift pins., etc., were made in the plant's forge 
and machine shop. Small pony trucks were modified to transport hea-
vy girders or converted into crane trolleys to pull girders into 
position., In addition many of the machinery arrived without ins-
tructions for assembly and set-up. Because of the generally low 
level of training of the work force, night schools to train workers 
were conducted fo a six month period in 1942. On the job training 
was also given in the operation of the mill. The building of Volta 
Redonda thus also represented a tremendous of mount of investment 
in human capital which was to be useful for the creation pf later 
Brazilian steel mills. 
;; The creation of Volta Redonda had a marked impact 
on the production capacity of the Brazilian steel industry. As can 
be .seen in figure 3.2 in 1949 when all sections of the plant were 
functioning^ it accounted for half of the total steel ingot and 
rolled steel production, of; the country¿ Over one third of its. out-
put consisted of rails, about one half consisted of sheet metal 
designed for the manufacture of railway rolling stock, automobiles, 
trucks and buses. Notice too that as indicated by figure 3.1 with 
the.entran.ee into production of CSN imports of steel ingots fell 
.from about .10% of total consumption; to less than 2% and that imports 
of rolled .steel. fell from over.601 to less than 401. 
7 . " : Another important steel firm which started produc-
tion in theforties was Acesita (Aços Especiáis Itabira)which was devoted. 
(1) Volta Redonda's steel ingot capacity was 270.000 tons when it opened in 
mid 1946. By 1949 when all section of the plant were functioning steel 
. ingot production was 308.000 tons. 
to the production of special quality steel. Although initially set 
up by private c a p i t a l a s the plant was built more and more fi-
nancing had to be obtained from the Banco do Brasil such that by 
1952 the bank had full control of the company^. 
As can be seen by the production series in figure 
3.1, during this decade Brazil reduced imports of steel such 
that be the end of the decade they were less than 3% of total con-
sumption. In rolled products however, even by the end of the deca-
de imports still acounted for more than one third of consumption. 
Throughout the fifties CSN was able to maintain 
its share of the market at roughly 50% of national production 
through various expansions, even though steel ingot and rolled steel 
production increased 1361 and 161% respectively during the period 
1950 to 1959.The other half of the production increase came from the 
expansion of the smaller steel producers. As can be seen in figure 
3.1., however imports of rolled steel through-out this decade ave-
raged 28% of consumption so was still considerable room for import 
substituting expansion by domestic producers. 
3-2- The Creation ofUSIMINAS And. The Participation Of The Japanese 
Minas Gérais, known as the iron heart of Brazil, 
produced practically 100% of Brazilian iron ore, and was well-en-
dowed with most of the other minerals necessary for steel produc-
tion excep coal which was only available in the stale of Santa Ca-
(1) Mostly by Percival Farquar 
(2) Baer, Op. Cit., p.68 
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tarina in the south. The creation of a large integrated steel 
works had been the ambition of the state the for various decade» This am-
bition suffered a temporary set-back with the location of CSN at 
Volta Redonda, close to the sea,rather than near the mines in the Iron 
Quadrilateral of Minas Gerais. 
Through disheartened various interest groups in 
Minas continued making various studies on the feasibility of crea-
ting their own plant while they awaited more favorable conditions. 
In the meantime, industrialists in the state of Sao Paulo, seeing 
the success of the CSN and the existence of an easy market represen-
ted by the large part of rolled product consumption which was still 
being imported, decided to create a large integrated plan in their 
own state as it was the largest consuming market and the industrial 
center of Brazil. In 1953 a group of Paulista industrialists foun-
ded the Companhia Siderurgica Paulista (COSIPAi, which was to produ-
ce 500.000 t.a. Initially COSIPA was to be a private firm, but as 
a number of alternative projects were looked into it was soon rea-
lized that private capital could not put up the amount of money 
required., so the State of Sao Paulo and the Federal Government 
became involved.^ 
As soon as the State of Minas discovered (Janua-
ry 19o6) that the Federal Government was going to participate in 
COSIPA both directly, and indirectly though CSN, a strong protest 
was sent to the President of the Republic stating Minas ' right to ask for 
Federal participation in a project of the state. Through 
such a protest the COSIPA project was temporarily suspended. In the 
meantime Minas prepared its project for a 500.000 t.a. capacity 
(1) The state of Sao Paulo became a major sharerolder in 1956 to be j oinded soon 
afterwards by the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDE). The latter 
eventually became the majority shareholder with 58% versus 23% for the 
State of Sao Paulo and 7% for mixed government companies and private groups 
in 1965 
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steel plant. On April 16, 1956, this was presented to the newly 
elected President of the Republic and former governor of the state 
of Minas Gérais, Juscelino Kubitscheck.President Kubitscheck coo-
led the regional dispute by offering Federal support to both the 
Mineiro and Paulista projects on equal footing. To the Mineiros he 
recommended that they legally incorporate a company so that they 
could receive Federal aid and cooperation from national and inter-
national institutions. 
Nine days after the President's statement, with a 
small, almost symbolic capital equivalent to .50,000 dollars, a group 
of Mineiros created the Usina Siderurgiga of Minas Gérais (USIMINAS) 
Its first objective was to promote economic and financial studies 
necessary to build the firm, and to determine the amount of capital 
which would be necessary for the undertaking.^ 
Various countries showed strong interest in parti-
cipating in Brazil's economic development during this period. Ger-
many, France and Italy invited a group of Brazilian engineers and 
industrialists to visit their countries to learn about their indus-
tries. Krupp (Germany), Cresot (France), Oscar Sinigaglia and Cor-
niglian (Italy) were very interested in the USIMINAS project. Krupp 
wanted to propose a complete turnkey project. Various foreign mis-
sions also visited USIMINAS. Three different German groups (Otto 
Wolf, Salzgitter and Demag) contacted the Board of Diretors about 
selling equipment. A Checoslovakian mission was interested in finan-
ciang equipment in exchange for iron ore. Italy presented a proposal 
f 21 for a steel mill base on electric processes. } 
(1) The information on the creation of USIMINAS was taken primarily from Jose 
Dermeval Pimenta. Implantaçâo da Grande Siderurgia em Minas Gérais.( Belo 
Horizonte, Universidade Federal de Minas Gérais, 1967), which has an excel-
lent collection of original documents. 
(2) USIMINAS, Company Anual Reports, 1956-1963 (Belo Horizonte, 1964). 
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However, the group which ended up participating 
in the USXMINAS project was the Japanese. At this point Japan was 
interested in developing the export market for capital equipment 
in steel. They wanted to show not only the quality of their equip-
ment but also their technological and entrepreneurial capabilities. 
It seems that at the time USIMINAS was being founded they were loo-
king for a show-case of their equipment and ability. Initially the 
Japanese were also interested in COSIPA, but negotiations there 
were already too for advanced with other groups so they focused on 
USIMINAS*-1-*. They sent a mission led by Masao Yukawa (Superinten -
(1) Initially the COSIPA project received advisory assistance from the Koppers 
company of Pittsburg, but in 1959 when the various financial obstacles which 
had been devaying the construction of the company were finally overcome, 
COSIPA contracted Kaiser engineers of California as consultants. Kaiser 
helped the COSIPA engineers to plant the layout of the plant, pre 
pare the overall plan and draw up the list of equipment, although it seems 
the Kaiser played little or no part in selecting the raw materials, products 
to be manufactured or the location of the plant as this had already been 
chosen. Kaiser mainted five engineers in Sao Paulo during the construction 
phase (1961-4). In the construction of the plant COSIPA obtained assistance 
from CSN with cooperation from McKee under a contract for the provison of 
general advisory assistance. The most important part of CSN's assistance was 
through the Ccmpanhia Brasileira de Projetos Industrials, which was origi-
nary CSN's Design Department and later the Engineering Division of CSN be- . 
fore eventually becoming a subsidiary in 1963. COBRAPI was responsible for 
all the engineering part of the construction. Based on 6000 designs received 
from Kaiser and equipment suppliers it prepared 5000 additional detail plans 
for the project, including the layout of the equipment on the site and the 
civil construction plans with the exception of the calculations of reinfor-
ced concrete which were subcontracted to another Brazilian firm. During the 
construction period COBRAPI maintained 60 to 70 engineers, technicians the 
planers on the COSIPA project. (See Bruno Leschner, The Transter of Techni-
cal Know-How in the Steel Industry in Brazil (New York: UNIDO 1969 pp.69-70) 
COSIPA's started production late in 1965 rolling ingots and slabs which it 
obtained from CSN and USIMINAS. It was not until the end of 1965 that all 
of its sections went into operation. 
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dent of the National Steel Industries of Japan and member of the 
National Council of Science). This mission contacted the Directors 
of USIMINAS and prepared a study on the feasibility of Japanese 
investment. 
As a result of this study, the Japanese government 
invited a Brazilian technical mission to visit Japan to work out 
the details of Japanese participation in the project. The mission, 
which travelled extensively in Japan from August to Setember of 
1956, signed a preliminary agreement with the Japanese industria-
lists who had received them. In principle the agreement called for 
the creation of a private steel plant with capacity of 500.000 t.a. 
The Japanese were to contribute 40% of the capital stock and finan-
ce the equipment to be purchased from Japan which was estimated at 
60% of the total. The Japanese sent a second technical mission 
composed of engineers and economists which worked with Brazilian 
counterparts in determining the exacts size and location of the 
plant. This was followed by a third mission which arrived in April 
1957 to complete the preliminary agreements and to set the condi-
tions for the Nippo-Brazilian joint venture. The main points of 
this agreement , known as the Horikoshi-Lanari Agreement, signed 
in June 1957, were : ^ 
1) Each group's representation on the board of 
Directors would correspond to its share of the 
capital stock. 
2) Of the five directors, the technical and admi-
nistrative directors were to be Japanese. The 
chiefs of such departments were to be chosen 
by the Japanese, and the sub-chiefs by the Bra-
zilians, or vice-versa. The rest of the person-
nel, Japanese and Brazilian, was to be chosen 
seeking the greatest efficiency of the plant's 
operations and depending on the availability of 
qualified Brazilian personnel. 
(1) Pimenta, Op. Cit., pp 174-186 
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3) Forty percent of the capital stock was to be 
supplied by the Japanese equipment manufactures. 
The other 60% was to be subscribed by the Bra-
zilian Federal Government through the Banco 
Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico, by the 
State of Minas Gerais, and by various Brazilian 
companies related to the steel sector. 
4) Sixty percent of the equipment credits was'to 
be supplied by the Japanese at 6% for 15 years, 
with the first three free of interest. 
5) Additional financing which became necessary 
for any reason was to be the responsibility of 
the Brazilians. 
6) Another Japanese mission was to go to Brazil to 
chose the construction site and to do the detail 
engineering in cooperation with the Brazilians. 
A Brazilian mission was to travel to Japan 
to cooperate with the Japanese technicians in 
the selection of machinery and equipment. Trai-
ning of Brazil and Japanese personnel, was to 
be done in Brazilian and Japanese industries. 
With respect to the Japanese interest in the 
USIMINAS project it should be noted that the Japanese cabinet had 
already agreed on April 12, 1957 that all necessary actions should 
be taken for the establishement of the Brazilian joint venture. In 
fact the project was declared a question of national honor. In De-
cember, 1957 the Japanese steel companies and steel equipment sup-
pliers founded NIPPON USIMINAS LTD, an investment organization 
created to make the equipment contracts and the financial contracts 
with Brazilian and Japanese financial sources. 
Given the succe.ss of the joint venture which re-
sulted it is interesting to speculate why the Japanes were chosen. 
Although we have not been able to collect any information on the 
concrete terms of other offers there seem to be at least three 
main reasons which made the Japanese choice most attractive. 
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First of all the Japanese equipment credit was 
offered three percentage points lower that the credit extended by 
Brazil's own National Economic Development Bank. 
Second, the Japanese were not only ready to extend 
equipment credits, but also to participate in the capital stock. As 
co-partners the Japanese were assuming responsibility for the effi 
cient operation of the plant. As already mentioned they were inte-
rested not just in making one specific sale of steel equipment but 
in demonstrating to the world market that they had reached as ad-
vanced a technological capability as the U.S., England and Germany-
which at that time dominated the market of capital goods for the 
steel industry. They were thus most interested in making this first 
large export project a success. This guaranteed the Brazilians that 
they would really be getting a lot of assistance. Also, it meant 
that USIMINAS lid not have to depend on CSN's technological assistance 
which given the intense regional rivalries was another advantage 
Third, the Japanese and Brazilians were to work 
closely in teams which offered an excellent learning opportunity 
for the Brazilians. It seemed implicit in the agreement that the 
Brazilians were to assume greater responsibility as they developed 
their capabilities under Japanese training. How clearly defined 
this was at the beginning is not clear, but that was that effecti-
vely happeend as will be seen below. 
Through 1958 and 1959 missions from each country 
flew back and forth establishing operating norms for the implemen-
tation of the various aspects of the project including hiring pro-
ceedures, equipment purchases, and engineering of the plant. The 
latter was done in Japan and then discussed with Brazilian techni-
cians before submission to the Board of Directors of the company 
for approval. 
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Construction started in 1959 and the first units 
entered into production in 1962 although the plant was not comple-
tely integrated until 1965. We have not been able to determine exac-
tly how much the initial plant cost. The original project called 
for Cr$ 4.000 million in capital and Cr$ 6.520 million in equipment. 
However actual costs turned out be much larger than these because 
of rapid Brazilian inflation betweem the original plans and the 
actual construction period, and the devaluation of Brazilian curren-
cy. As -a result the company suffered a severe financial crisis even 
before it entered into operation. It was solved in part by an increase in the 
capital stock to Cr$ 18 million in 1962 and eventually to Cr$ 150 million in 
1965 and by the extention of more credits. One estimate supplied by the company 
is that the investment in the initial project for a capacity of 
SO0. 000 t.a. was US$ 270 million dollars. It is interesting to note 
that even though it had been specifically stipulated in the contract 
that'any additional capital which might became necessary was the 
responsibility of the Brazilians, when they ran into this diffi-
culty and turned to the Japanese, the latter increased their parti-
cipation to maintain their share at 401 of the capital stock des-
pite the capital expansion, and also ended up financing 80% of the 
equipment rather than the 60% originally agreed on. 
• , To summarize, USIMINAS v/as created in a context 
of strong regional rivalry. As the state of Minas was the producer 
of i ron ore it had always wanted to build a large integrated steel 
enterprise within its boundaries. However, it lacked coal, capital, 
and most importantly, the technology for such an undertaking. CSN, 
the large integrated, state owned, steel enterprise which had been 
built with Government capital in a state without iron or coal, 
il) USIMINAS: The Company, 1975 canpany brochure 
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had already acquired the steel technology necessary for that type 
of an undertaking through technology contracts mainly with U.S. 
firms. Nevertheles CSN was already commited to supplying technical 
assistance to COSIPA which was to be build by Government and private 
capital in a state which did not have coal or iron, but which was 
the main steel consuming center of the country. At that point the 
Japanese entered the scene and offered not only to supply equipment 
on credit as most other foreign countries were doing, but to parti-
cipate in the stock (helping to solve part of the capital problem) 
and to assume initial responsibility for the operation of the firm 
(solving the technological problem). The advantages offered by this 
situation were readily perceived by the Mineiros. Having been gua-
ranteed additional financial support by the Government and the State 
of Minas Gerais, agreements were quickly negotiated and the plant 
was soon under construction. In fact, USIMINAS started to operate 
two years sooner than COSIPA which had been founded three years 
earlier. 
USIMINAS thus started out as a joint Nippo-Japanese 
venture made possible by Minas Gerais' strong interest in having 
its own large integrated steel plant, and the Japanese interest in 
setting up a showcase of their equipment and technology in order 
to enter the world market for steel producing capital equipment 
which at that time was dominated by U.S., England and Germany.^ 
The Japanese were responsible for the basic, pro-
ject and detail engineering of the plant as well as for starting 
production and operating the plant. They were charged with deter-
mining all the operating and quality standards as well as the whole 
administrative system.^ NIPPON USIMINAS, the Japanese corporation 
(1) The Japanese have been very succesful in exporting capital equipment in the 
steel industry. In Brazil they have a virtual monopoly on imported equipment 
and during the period'1965-1975 they supplied 50% at all technical assistance 
to the Brazilian steel industry. 
(2) Jose Barros Cota, "Investimentos em Recursos Humanos Gerenciais na Area Tec-
nologica e seu Retorno", USIMINAS Revista Ano 7, n' 13, (abril 1976) p.30 
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grouping the Government and large Japanese steel firms and equip-
ment manufacturers with special interest in USIMINAS, gave tech-
nical assistante with the construction, installation and start-up 
of the plant. That technical assistance was given free of charge 
until one year after each section had entered into operation.^ 
Through 1966 when the technical assistance was completed, 531 Japa-
nese engineers and technicians of different degress of specializa-
tion passed through USIMINAS with the responsibility of attaining 
(2) the pre-established indexes and training the Brazilian team. 
(1) Tokinata Takahashi "Multinational Companies and the Iron and Steel Indus-
try: the example of USIMINAS" (Uhido Third Interregional Symposium on the 
Iron and Steel Industry; Brasilia 14-21 October, 1973) UN: ID/WG 146/65 
May 1973. 
(2) Cota, Op Cit, p. 31 
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C H A P T E R F O U R 
4o STEEL T E C H N O L O G Y A N D T E C H N I C A L C H A N G E 
Before proceeding to the analysis of further 
developments of the Brazilian steel market and their effect on 
USIMINAS it will be fruit ful to make a quick digression on va-
rious aspects of steel technology and its developments and their 
implications for the nature of technical change in the steel in-
dustry. 
4.1. Steel Technology 
The production of steel in an integrated plant con-
sists of three basic transformations. First, the iron contained in 
mineral ores has to be extracted. This iron is usually found 'as 
Fe203 or Fe304 in the ore. The first task then is to free the iron 
from the oxygen. This can be done basically in two different ways. 
One is to heat the iron ore in a furnace with carbon. At high enough 
temperatures carbon links up with the oxygen forming CO and C02 and 
producing liquid iron with several, impurities. The other is to sub-
mit the iron ore to a blast of natural or carbon gas or a solid 
reductor which links up with the oxygen and yields solid pellets or 
sponges with up to 90! iron contentC^The first method can be done 
by using charcoal or coke based blast furnaces or electric reduc-
tion furnaces. The second method, called direct reduction, can be 
done through a number of processes with different names depending 
on the reduction agent used. 
(1) Blast furnaces produce a liquid product consisting of molten pig iron and slag. 
Direct reduction, on the other hand, produces a solid product in the form of 
spoige iron or pellets. 
The second transformation involves reducing the 
carbon content of the pig iron or reduced material produced in the 
first stage. The basic difference between pig iron and steel is the 
higher carbon content of the former. The dividing line between the 
two is usually 2.0% carbon content. The reduction of the pig iron 
can be done through a number of different methods. The main ones 
are the open hearth process, the basic oxygen process and the elec-
tric arc process 
The third transformation involves turning the steel 
ingot into a steel product. As a first step the steel ingot is 
first rolled into a steel slab or a steel block called a bloom or 
billet depending on its dimensions. After that blooms or billets 
go through different rolling equipment depending on whether they 
are to be flat products such as thick plates for ships or sheets 
for many consumer durables such as cars and appliances; or whether 
they are to be non-flats such as structural steel, rods, nails, or 
forged products such as generator shafts, truck axles etc. A relative-
ly recent innovation is continuos casting through which the liquid 
steel, rather than being poured into ingot molds, goes through a 
casting machine which allows the first part of the rolling pro-
cess to be skipped. 
(2) There are important differences among the processes with respect to the change 
(inputs) they take. The basic oxygen process requires a charge consisting mos-
tly of molten pig iron and little solid scrap iron. The electric arc process 
takes a mostly solid charge consisting of scrap iron. The open hearth process 
allows more flexibility in the ratio of the solid scrap to liquid iron. Also, 
the electric arc process is more limited to relatively smaller scales and is 
used more for higher quality steels. The choice of process thus depends not only 
on relative costs, but also or input availability (namely scrap), the type of 
steel to be produced, and the scale. 
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Appendix I describes the technology chosen by 
USIMINAS with reference to what was available on the technological 
frontier and sumarizes some of the recent advances in these tech-
nologies.. U S I M I N A S chose the then most conventional steel making 
route for an integrated producer with its planned capacity. This 
consisted of coke based blast furnaces, oxygen steel converter and 
conventional rolling from cast ingots. 
As noted in the previous chapter, engineering for 
the plant was done by the Japanese partners who in addition sup-
plied 801 of the equipment. It is hard to speculate how the plant 
may have been different if some foreign group other than the Japa-
nese had been involved. However, it seems the basic technology would 
have been the same and that apart from the specific origin, most 
of the equipment would have been roughly similar. 
As emphasized by the perspective of localized tech-
nical change the initial choice of technology depends on past tech-
nological developments which have shaped the choice set available 
in the frontier. The specific technology chosen will, in turn, con-
dition the types of changes in the future. While the latter will 
probally be less true at a more aggregate level since different 
processes may be developed and the whole frontier may be moving 
in different directions because of the influence of varying local 
conditions in worldwide uses, it will be more true at the level 
of the firm. At least initially the firm will work around the 
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technology it choses. The tvoec of changes will depend both on the 
type of technology chosen and on various conditioning factors such 
as initial plant layout and plant bottlenecks, evolution of rela-
tive factor and raw material urices and quality, market demands, 
and new developments at the tecnnological frontier. 
In discussing the technological nature of basic 
production processes Bela G o l d ^ hss made a very useful distinc-
tion between what he calls "capital-dominated", "labor-dominated", 
and "materials dominated" processes. A "capital dominated" process 
(e.g. power plants, cement mi 11 si is one in which production wor-
kers are engaged mostly in starting, stopping, loading, unloading, 
setting controls, or in other ways facilitating tTie functioning 
of machines and other capital facilities. Materials are merely 
acted upon by the machine process. A "labor dominated" process 
(bricklaying, carpentry, custom services) is one where manual 
efforts and related skills are the core of the production process. 
Tools and other capital are merely accessories to labor while ma-
terials once again have a passive role. In "materials dominated" 
processes (farming, fishing , smelting) both labor and capital me-
rely facilitate the production capacity determined by materials 
and related imputs. 
In each of these extreme characterizations major 
advances in the operation of the process as a whole are likely to 
come from changes in the productivity of the imput characterizing 
the process. 
(1) B. Gold , "A Framework for Productivity Analysis", in S. Eilon, B. Gold 
and J. Soesan, Applied Productivity Analysis For Industry (Oxford: Per-
gamcm Press, 1972) pp. 33-35. 
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In terms of the above typology the production of 
pig iron stage of USIMINAS tends to be mostly of the material do-
minated type while the production of steel and steel products tend 
to be mostly of the capital dominated types. A priori it is to be 
expected that a substantial portion Of technical change occuring 
in the first stage would be related to the control of the physical 
and chemical properties of the raw materials ^ . In the other two 
stages it could be expected to depend on the control and programing 
of the process in order to achieve maximum utilization of the equip-
ment. As will be developed in the next chapter these expectations 
were confirmed in the case of USIMINAS. 
It is important to note that there has been consi-
derable technological development in the process chosen by USIMINAS 
and that these have also had an impact on the technical change car-
ried out within the firm. As detailed in Appendix I the main devo-
id ) lopments in each of the processes have been the following. 
1. Coke based blast furnaces: 
a) use of auxiary fuels such as oil; 
b) oxygen enrichment of the air; 
c) use of top pressure; 
d) high temperature of the blast; 
e) large size blast furnaces; 
f) continuous charging of large blast furnaces; 
g) equipment for distribution of the charge; 
h) utilization of pressure of furnace gas to run turbines; 
i) computer control. 
2. BOF oxygen convertors: 
a) preheating of the solid charge; 
b) use of computer to help control the process; 
c) utilization of LD gases as fuel; 
d) direct computer control of the process. 
3) Rolling: 
a) continous casting; 
b) continous mills rather than semi-continous; 
c) computer control. 
(1) This tendency would be expected to be even stronger in cases such as 
USIMINAS' since the technology had been developed abroad where the physical 
and chemical properties of the raw materials would be most likely to be 
different. 
(2) The main source for these developments was Instituto Chileno Del Acero, Es-
tudio Sobre Technologia En La Industria Siderúrgica Latino Americana (Mono-
grafía n9 5, BID/CEPAL: Buenos Aires, 1976) pp.29-60. 
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As noted in Appendix I, USIMTNAS has incorporated 
or is planning to incorporate all of these changes except 1-d; 1-g; 
1-h. Some comments on the embodied/disembodied nature of these chan 
ges will be helpful for the- subsequent analysis. The key point about 
the embodiment/disembodiment issue would apper to be whether the 
development can be incorporated into existing equipment or whether 
it is embodied in new equipment. This is significant in that presu-
mably disembodied technical chang.e is easier to adopt since it 
could be expected to require a smaller capital out-lav and not do requi-
re a scraping or big new expansion decision with all the additional 
complications either of the latter would involve. 
Using this criterion the technical changes listed 
would be mostly of the disembodied types which is to say that in 
large part they would be based oh or complementary to existing 
equipment.^ The two exceptions are large size blast furnaces 
(which intrinsically require new equipment) and continous casting 
(which involves skipping the first rolling operations by going di-
rectly from liquid steel to a slab rather than passing through the 
ingot stage). 
Three caveats, should be borne in mind in inter-
preting the analysis of technical change developed in the chapters 
below. First of all, in general one of the most significant charac-
teristics of technological development in the production of flat 
rolled products has been an increase in the size of the basic units. 
It is not only the blast furnaces but also the size of the conver-
ters and the capacity of the various rolling equipment that has Increa-
sed. It is estimated that at present minimum efficient scale for such an integra-
(1) Complementary in the sense of being directly related to the 
equipment rather than in the sense of not substituting the 
equipment. 
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ted plant is in the order of 8 M . t . a ^ . It is that evident that 
scale related technical change of this type which is strictly ca-
pital embodied has played a very important role in the overall 
development of the industry, particularly in terms of the cost 
reducing aspects 
A second caveat is that in the list above we have 
considered technical development within a given technological route. 
There have also been significant technological development in al-
ternative routes such as direct reduction-electric arc steelmaking-
continous casting, which seem to be competitive alternatives under 
r 21 
certain conditions. Switches to. alternate routes would of cour-
se represent capital embodied technical change, and in fact the 
adoption of continous casting is an example of such a shift. 
The third caveat is that the list presented above 
refers just to identifiable technical changes. As was argued befo-
re, to a large extent technical change consists of seemingly en-
dless, small and more or less continous adjustments to the exis-
ting installations and inumerable variations in raw materials and 
process control. For the most part these "changes in the small" 
could be expected to be disembodied. 
(1)A. Coekerill, The Steel Industry: International Comparisons of 
Industrial Structure and Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1974) pp. 76-85. This is the estimated m.e.s. 
using the definition of the output level at which unit costs 
first decrease by less than S% when further doubled, and it is 
for a fully integrated flat producer. At one half m.e.s.unit 
costs increased 131; at one quarter m.e.s. unit costs increased 
by 301. 
(2)The Phase IV expansion of the SIDQR Plant in Venezuela (from 
1.2 to 4.8 M.t.a.), for example, is bas2d on direct-reduction 
(using natural gas) - electric arc steel furnaces - continous 
casting. This will make SIDOR the largest integrated steel plant 
in the world based on direct-re.duction-eletric arc furnace com-
bination. 
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In the subsequent analysis an attempt will be 
made to separate out the contribution of embodied versus disem-
bodied technical change on various parameters for the specific 
case of USIMINAS. 
This brings up the difficult issue of how to mea-
sure technical change which, as is evident from the discussion in 
chapter II, demands careful attention. 
4.2. The Measurement of Technical Change 
In the literature technical change is ofter trea-
ted synonymously with productivity increases. The basis for this 
is probably that since productivity increase may be an effect of 
technical change, and since it is harder to study technical change 
itself, productivity increase is used as a convenient proxy. Two 
points should be made regarding this association. First, technical 
change does not only have to do with the relationship of any given 
output and any given imput or group of imputs. It also influences 
a) the output choice set by making available better quality pro-
ducts or completely different products, b) the imput choice set 
by allowing substitution in the type and quality or degree of pro-
cessing of imputs^and c) the process of transforming imputs into 
outputs itself. Second, productivity may increase for a variety 
of reasons other than technical change as will be discussed below. 
First,a brief note on productivity. Productivity 
measures usually boil down to an imput-output comparison of one 
sort or another. At one extreme the so called imput creativity 
concept compares total output with one imput, and assumes that 
nothing has happened to the quality or to the nature of the compo-
sition of either other imputs or to outputs. At the other extreme 
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t-he conversion efficiency concept vtews cnanges in imput-output 
adjustments as due solely to changes in the processes which reduce 
wastage and increase the efficiency with which the process uti-li 
zes the potential contribution of imputs assuming that nothing 
has happened to either the i-mput-s or to the outputs^. 
It is very common to find Studies which analyse 
productivity changes (by extension, technical changes) with these 
simplistic concepts, particularly by looking at the increased out 
put per unit of a given imput without controlling for either pro-
cess changes or changes in other imputs. It should also be noted 
that to make economic sense of productivity and/or technical chan-
ges they should be studied within a price framework. It is necessa-
ry to. know what any given change means in terms n-ot only of how 
that affects the cost share of that imnut m the production process 
but of the total price effect that it has through its repercussions 
on the type and mix of other imputs used. In the steel industry it 
is very common to see lots of studies which focus on how the con-
sumption of coke per ton of pig iron produced falls over time wi • 
thout taking into account that the coke reduction,was achieved by 
a partial shift to, oil injection. It is also common to measure pro-
ductivity and technical progress in terms of output per. man hour • 
without taking into account any changes in capital, equipment or 
increased mechanization. 
In order to analyze the complex network of imput 
output relationships which are important for the measurement of 
both productivity and technical change it would necessary to ex-
plicity consider changes at each of the following three levels: 




(1) B. Gold, Op. Cit., pp. 17-19 
(2) In reality because of the variation in carbon content in the coke and other 
fuels the ideal measure should control for the amount of fixed carbon in 
the fuels. 
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I I . CHANGES RELATED TO THE ACTIVITIES OR PROCESSES OF THE FIRM 
Scope of processing activities (make or buy decision) 
Nature of production process 
Productive capacity of operations 
Degree of utilization of capacity 
Effectiveness with which operations are integrated 




Changes in the type of product or in the mix of 
products will result in changes in the productivity of the imputs 
used to the extent that different types require more or less of 
different imputs. Likewise, a change in the quality of the product 
may effect productivity in that it may require different imputs 
or imputs mixes, or more imputs per unit of output which meets the 
higher quality standards. Similarly changes in the type of imputs, 
their quality, or mix may yield more or less output and are thus 
a source of productivity change. For example, relevant to the pre-
sent case study, the use of higher quality imported coal with lower 
ash content reduces the amount of coke needed in the reduction of 
iron ore into pig iron. Thus a change in "he mix of the imputs based 
on changing the proportions of different quality and types of coal 
to produce coke will affect the productivity of coke ovens and blast 
furnaces. This turns out to be n'ot only in terms of more pig iron 
output per imput of coke, but also in terms of greater pig iron out-
put per unit of blast furnace volume because less volume is occu-
pied by coke and slag and so more iron ore can be smelted in a gi-
ven heat. 
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The level of processing activities will also affect 
productivity. For example, if a steel firm which was originally buying 
pig iron dedided to integrate backwards into the production of pig 
iron.,a measure such as steel output per employee would show a decline in 
productivity. However that decline has occurred not because worker 
productivity in steelmaking has fallen but because of a change in 
the scope of processing activities. Similar type changes can occur 
even within just one part of a plant if the degree of processing 
of the imputs or components which that, section receives changes. 
In considering changes in the nature of the production process a 
distinction should be made between the optimization of existing 
processes which involve such things as the timing and speed of 
the various sequences, imput mix and/or quality of imputs used, re-
ductions in wastage, minimization of down time for maintenance,etc .j 
and changes in the basic nature of the process which usually in-
volve changes in capital equipment, type of imputs used, sequence 
of activities etc. Changes in the productive capacity of operations 
can result from changes of the productivity of existing equipment , 
or through the introduction of new equipment. Increases in the 
productivity of existing equipment is linked to changes in opera-
ting conditions, reduction of cycle time, better planning of pro-
duction runs, closer control of material imputs and timing, and 
minor modifications in ancillary equipment all of which are rela-
ted t;o the optimization of existing processes. Productive capacity 
of operations can be increased more than proportionally to the. in-
creased investment in new equipment to the extent that there are 
scale effects (either through the duplication of existing equip-
ment, or the purchase of larger equipment units which embody sa-
vings in construction or operation) and/or to the extent that 
acquiring a new piece of equipment, even if it does not involve 
larger scale, embodies more advanced technology which permits 
more efficient use of imputs or reduction in operating time. 
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The degree of utilization of capacity will of 
course affect the productivity of the underutilized imput and of 
any fixed complementary imputs. As such changes in utilization 
will affect productivity measures. However, it must be noted that 
sometimes changes in utilization depend not only on the aggregate 
level of demand but also on technical changes which allow a better 
integration of different facilities in multistage plants where the 
capacities of the various stages can often be acquired only in 
lumpy packages. 
An issue related to the causes of technical chan-
ge is its objectives.. As should be clear from the previous discus-
sion technical change has a multiplicity of aspects and objectives, 
even though definitions of, and much of the literature on techni-
cal change have glossed over this or focused on some narrow element. 
Within the cost-minimizing/profit maximizing struc-
ture of production in a competitive environment, one of the main 
objectives of technical change is to reduce costs per unit of out-
put . This will be related to increasing the productivity of the 
production process within the context of imput and product prices, 
and will involve nearly all of the elements of changes possible 
within a plant presented earlier. 
Contrary to the usual theoretical preconceptions 
of most economists who think in terms of continuous isoquant and 
constant returns to scale, it would be useful to distinguish an 
increase in production as a separate objective. Within the fra-
mework presented above this can be reflected in 1) an increased 
utilization of Existing capacity which may involve changes in the effectiveness 
with which operations are integrated, or 2) changes in the productive capaci-
ties of existing operations which is related to the nature of 
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existing processes, or 3) expanding capacity through investment 
in new capital equipment. As pointed out before, this may involve 
different types of changes depending on whether that new invest-
ment consisted of duplicating existing facilities, buying larger 
units, or buying units which embody more advanced technology. It 
should be noted that increase in production through any of these 
means may affect unit costs and thus interact with the first objective. 
A separate objective of technical change which 
should be distinguished is changes in the quality of the product 
This is important because many times the product is of too low 
quanty to be accepted by buyers. Conscious efforts to control qua-
lity may involve not only changes in the degree of attention paid 
to the production process, but also of additions of more capital 
equipment or of the development of new methods of production. It may 
also be important as a marketing strategy in periods of excess sup-
f21 ply or competition from substitute productsv . 
Likewise a different objective of technical change 
is diversification of production. It should be noted that the usual 
distinction between changes versus process changes which is much 
cited in the literature represents a conceptual distinction which 
is hard to find in practice. Usually a change in product of its' qua-
lity may require a change in the process and a change in process 
may affect the quality or type of product produced. This is recog-
nized in the steel industry where as pointed out by Gold Peirce and 
(31 Rossegger. v J 
(1) The importance of quality in the case of steel can be clearly appreciated in 
the Brazilian case where it is estimated that annual losses caused by corro-
sion are U.S.$ 4.8 billion (3.5% of GDP)One of the main sectors 
affected is the automobile industry where the 3 large, state-owned, flat 
products producers including USIMINAS are the main suppliers. 
(2) As was the case in Ducilo Rayon discussed in chapter II. See Katz et al. 
"Produtividad Tecnologia y Esfuerzos ..." 
(3) B.Gold, W. Pierce and G. Rossegger; "Diffusion of Major Technological Inno-
vation In U.S. Iron And Steel Manufacturing", Journal of Industrial Eco-
mics, 1969-70, p.239. 
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At least in the iron and steel industry, there 
is hardly a major process innovation which did 
not have significant effects on product charac-
teristics. Indeed, recognition of this interac-
tion is institutionalized in the requirement of 
formal approval by various specification writing 
agencies for products resulting from new pro-
cesses. 
A fifth objective which may be relevant only in 
particular settings is reactions to fall in imput quality or avai-
lability. In his study of a steel plant in Argentina, for exam-
ple, Maxwell ^ w a s given a reaction to fall off in imput quality 
as a reason for introducing technical changes. In Brazil it is 
likely that the objective for several technical changes in some 
of the large coke based plants is to react to the Government re-
quirement that they use 20-40% national coal which is of lower 
quality and has several undesirable and troublesome characte-
ristics . 
At this stage unfortunately^the amount and detail 
of information which we could obtain for this case study is not 
sufficient for an analysis of technical change covering all the 
aspects mentioned. Our data are particularly weak with respect 
to the evolution of product costs,imput prices, and imput shares. 
As a result we have been forced to deal with aggregate physical 
parameters, and in view of that limitation the analysis will be 
considerably simplified. 
Due to the capital domination of the industry we 
have focused on certain key productivity parameters, which have 
been disaggregated by main equipment unit in order to try to se-
parate out the contributions of major new units, which may embody 
(1) P. Maxwell, Op. Cit. 
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technical change, from improvements accomplished through changes 
witn existing unit«; This also has the advantage of permiting an 
analysis of tne changes in each section in order to avoid the 
problems having to do with scope of activities mentioned above, 
and to keep track of changes in production process productive capacity and 
utilization rates, in general we have tried to have 3 different 
measures: output per employed person, output per some physical mea-
sure ot the equipment, and output per some principal raw material. 
These could be considered rough proxies for labor, capital, and 
material imputs respectively. In addition we have focused princi-
pally on the processes up to the production of steel since the 
rolling stage is more difficult to handle because of the variety 
01 products which can be produced with the same equipment and the 
degree to whicn the product mix influences output. 
Since our cost data are virtually non existent, 
implicitly the analysis will be in terms of production increasing 
technical change. However, when possible, an attempt will be made 
to point out the influence of or effect on the other objectives, 
at least in a qualitative way and to discuss important changes rela-
ted to imputs. The analysis itself will be presented in chapter 
six. First, however, chapter five will present a summary of de-
velopment in the Brazilian steel market in order to place the 





5. DEVELOPMENT OF THE STEEL MARKET AND ITS EFFECTS 
ON USIMINAS' DEVELOPMENT 
The preceeding chapter developed the context in 
which the firm was created and how it acquired technology. This cha£ 
ter broadens the analysis to what happened in the market in order to 
explain some aspects of the microeconomics of the technical change 
which took place within the firm. The first part explains a market 
crises which shook "the industry in the mid sixties and discusses the re-
commendations of a government appointed study group. The second deve-
lops the increasing government intervention and planning which have 
came to characterize the industry and affect the behavior of the firms 
in the sector. The third part traces the development of USIMINAS within 
this context explaining how the market crisis as well as an internal 
financial crisis affected the technological strategy of the firm du-
ring its first 10 years of operation and how that strategy changed 
as a result a growing market and the availability of massive amounts 
of subsidized capital. 
5.1. The Market Crisis of The Mid Sixties And The GCIS Report 
5.1*1. General Description of the Crisis 
In the 1956-1960 period when USIfalNAS and COSIPA 
were being planned the government had'thrown aside considerations 
of inflation and made gigantic p u b l i c investments, including Brasi-
lia, and major infrastructure development. These all had multi-
plier effects for other investments. The increase in income also 
led to increased consumption of durable goods. All of this contri-
buted to a rapid expansion in steel consumption and an average 
growth rate of 13% per year in steel production. 
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Figure 5.1 
"BRAZIL: PRODUCTION AND APPARENT-CONSUMPTION OF STEEL PRODUCTS 1963-1977" 
(mi l l ions of tens) 
YEAR 




Rolled Flat Products 
N cm-
Flat Products Total Rolled 
! 
Flat Products j Not - Flat'Products 
1963 2.834 2.101 1.029 1.072 2.481 
I 
1.319 1 . 1 6 3 
1964 3.021 2.236 1.010 1.226 2.374 1.081 1 . 2 9 3 
1965 3.003 2.379 1.259 1.119 2.153 996 1 . 1 5 5 
1966 3.782 2.953 1.383 1.571 2.830 1.457 1 . 3 7 3 
1967 3.734 3.034 1.325 1.709 2.704 1.188 1 . 5 1 6 
1968 4.453 3.782 1.7S8 1.995 3 . 4 7 3 w 1 . 7 7 6 
1969 4.925 3.905 1.932 1.973 3.821 1.908 1 . 9 1 4 
1970 5.390 4.150 1.949 2.201 4.108 2 . 0 3 7 2 . 0 7 1 
1971 6.011 4.725 2.302 2.422 5.171 2.692 2 . 5 7 9 
1972 6.518 5.302 2.612 2.690 5 . 5 7 3 2 . 9 ( 4 0 2 - 6 3 3 
1973 7.149 5.975 2.826 3.149 6.636 3 . 5 8 7 3 . 0 4 9 
1974 7.502 6.068 2.637 3.431 9 . 1 7 6 5 . 2 ( > 0 3 . 9 1 6 
1975 8.308 6.721 3.144 3.578- 8.599* 4 . 5 3 0 * 4 . 0 6 9 * 
1976 9.169 7.018 3.368 3.650 p . 3 0 9 4 , 0 7 0 4 . 2 3 9 
1977 11.163 8.412 4.474 3.938 9.114 5 . 0 7 6 4 . 0 3 8 
Sources: IBS S ta t i s t i c a l Yearbooks 1974-1Ö78 
* CONSIDER Annual Report 1975 
Figure 5.1 
BRAZIL: EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF STEEL PRODUCTS 1963-1977 (1000s of tens: 
















Non Flat Products 
1963 - - 381 290 91 
1964 42 35 7 . 218 134 84 
1965 166 159 8 191 124 67 
1966 108 97 10 255 177 77 
1967 285 266 20 262 161 101 
1968 190 162 28 289 190 99 
1969 216 170 46 .328 231 97 
1970 382 158 224 496 316 181 
1971 172 70 102 789 540 249 
1972 272 114 157 713 503 210 
1973 267 140 127 1,465 1,157 308 
1974 149 40 110 3,946 3,133 813 
-1975 126 58 68 2,281 1,687 602 
1976 140 37 103 1.075 749 326 
1977 222 15 207 864 685 179 
Source: IBS S t a t i s t i c a l Yearbodks 1974-1978 
In contrast to the second half of the fifties, 
the middle of the sixties were marked by a major crisis in the 
steel sector which eventually led, in the second half of the deca-
de, to the assumptiom of responsibility by the government for the 
organization and direction of the steel industry. 
Starting in 1961 came a period of increasing eco-
nomic and political instability which led to the end of both 
foreign and national investment that had been the growth engine 
of increased steel demand; The deflationary policy started in 1964 
did not to much to stimulate investment which was discouraged by a 
strong increase in takes and monetary contraction.there was stagnation in 
the consumer market. Basic industries did not receive much govern-
ment stimulus. The manufacturing industry started to feel the in-
fluence of low purchasing power. 
The result of this decrease in investment and 
consumption of durable goods was a crisis in the steel industry. 
The fall in steel consumption which started in 1964 with a decre-
ase of 4.4% became more pronounced in 1965 when consumption fell 
13.2% with respect to 1963 (see figure 5.1). Apparent steel con-
sumption only returned to normal levels in 1968 even though by . 
1966 a certain improvement was already apparent. 
National production during this period did not 
suffer a significant fall ( see figure 5.1). This would seem to 
imply the apparent stability of the economic capacity of the steel 
firms. This, however, was not true since it was exactly during this 
period that USIMINAS, COS I PA, jFERRO E AGO, DE VITORIA, and ANHANGUE 
RA began production, at the same time that several expansions were 
concluded in smaller firms, all of which meant substantial increase 
in capacity without a corresponding increase in demand. Notice that 
when looking at a single company such as CSN, (see figure 3.2) 
which alone accounted for over 40% of production in that period, 
its output fell in 1964 and did not recover to the 1963 peak until 
1967. 
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In 1966 through an agreement between the Brazilian 
Government and the World Bank the consulting firm BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON 
INTERNATIONAL was asked to do a study of the Brazilian Steel Indus-
try BAHINT produced a -four volume report entitled Brazilian 
Steel Industry Study. Howeve^because of the^seriousness of the 
steel crisis and some controversy around the recomendations of 
the study, the Government decided that there was need for greater 
depth of analysis. 
As a result the Government through decree 60642 
of April 27, 1967 created a Special Advisory Group on the Steel 
Industry (Grupo Consultivo da Industria Siderurgica-GCIS) to re-
view the BAHINT report and to develop a National Steel P l a n . ^ 
(1) The study was carried out by a team of 15 persons. The Ameri-
cans from. BAHINT were responsible for the study but they worked 
with a group of ten technicians from the state steel producing 
firms. 
(2) Specifically the GCIS was entrusted with the following: 
1. An expansion program for the supply of the internal market for the 
period 1967-71 based on the existing steel plants, as well as the ou-
tline of a plan for the five year period, including, if necessary,the 
.creation of new plants. 
2. An evalution of the total resources necessary in both national and fo-
reign currencies not only for the initial program, but also for the 
subsequent expansion, including suggestions on how to obtain these 
resources. 
3. Setting operating standards which would assure the economic equi librium 
of the steel companies under the control of the State , and the measu-
res to regulate the financial relationship among the enterprises and 
between them and the credit granting institutions. 
4. Definition of a project for the production of semi-finished steel pro-
ducts destined for the international market as an extension of iron 
ore exporting activity. 
5. Creation of a permanent administrative mechanism or entity in the area 
of the steel industry for the internal market with the following at-
tributes: 
a) coordinate the execution of programs of expansion assigned 
. to each of the enterprises as well as periodically update 
such programs; 
b) mobilize and distribute between the enterprises the resour-
ces necessary for the realization of the specific programs, 
c) establish directives that would assure the permanent auto-
nomy and equilibrium of each enterprise, including during 
the period of its recovery. 
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The fall in apparent steel consumption in the pe-
riod 1964-1965 was accompanied by a strong increase in exports and 
a reduction in imports (see figure 5.2).Note that the fall in con-
sumption was more rapid and more drastic for flat products than for 
non-flats. This was because the demand for non-flats is primarily 
linked to the construction industry while that for flats is prima-
rily linked to manufacturing industry, and the latter was the first 
to show signs of retraction. The. different reactions of demand for 
these two classes of products also had significant implications for 
the state controlled firms versus those controlled privately becau-
se virtually all flat production was in the hands of the state 
while almost all non flats were produced by the private sector. 
5.1.2 Analysis of the Crisis 
In 1966 the Brazilian Steel Industry was composed 
of 41 plants controlled by 36 companies producing rolled products 
foundry products or cast products: ^ T h ese were distributed as 
follows: fourteen plants belonging to eleven companies were fully 
integrated, twenty one companies were semi integrated (19 produ-
cing rolled steel products.2 producing foundy items); three compa-
Footnote (2) continued from previous page 
6. Definition of a global policy that would assure the revi-
talization a£ the ccal ecenemy of the state of Santa Catarina, 
maintaining the current consumption of metallurgical coal. 
7. Any other matters which, at its judgement, were necessary to the full 
execution of the objectives c£ the decree. 
The CGIS based its analysis ai the BAHINT study, the report c£ a technical 
group from the Banco Nacicxial de Desenvolvimento Eccncmico, and, cn the various 
expansion projects presented by the several steel plants. 
(1) The five firm concentration ratio was 731. For comparative purposes the 
following five firm concentration ratios should be noted: UK, 85$; Belgium, 
72%; France, 70%; Japan, 67%; Italy, 60%; U.S., 60%; Geraiany, 58%. While 
Brazil was not the most concentrated it was probably more dependent on 
imports. (CR data from La Convention Etat-Siderurgie La Documentaçâo Fran-
çais IlLustre N' 22, 1966 .Cited in Piano Siderurgico Nacional, Vol.1 
p.2/13. 
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nies operated four plants producing pig iron or steel for foundry; 
one non integrated company produced rolled products from billets; 
the 21/rst plant was being reorganized by the Government. In all a 
total of thirty one companies produced rolled products with a 
total installed capacity of 4,640f00C tons of steel ingots. 
The State was the.majority owner in five of the 
Companies (CSN, USIMINAS, COSIPA, COFAVI and ACESITA). Whose com-
bined production was 2,740,000 tons of steel ingots or approxima-
tely 59$ of total installed ingot capacity. ^  The three largest alone 
accounted for 57% of total installed ingot capacity and produced 
almost 100% of all flat products, this gave the State virtually 
complete control of the flat product sector whereas the non-flat 
sector was almost completely under private control. 
Foreign capital participated in six companies ope-
rating eight plants with a total production of 580.000 tons of 
C2") rolled products. J 
The remaining 25 companies, which were responsible 
ior 27 .plants,.were owned predominantly by private Brazilian capi-
tal and accounted for 420.000 tons of rolled products.^ 
The crisis was the result of a conjunction of va-
rious factors. First of all a fall in market demand coincided with 
a significant expansion of steel capacity with the simulataneous 
entry of USIMINAS and COSIPA in the flat products sector, and the 
(1) In terms of rolled steel products these five state controlled 
firms produced 1.7 M.t.a. out of a total of 2.7 M.t or appro-
ximately 6-3% of total rolled steel production. 
(2) Of the total plants six were dedicated to the production of 
special steels, one of them producing electric plates for 
m ot or s. 
(3) Two of the plants did not produced rolled products but pig iron 
for centrifugal tybes. 
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expansion of various-existing plants in the non-flat sector^ ^ 
Secondly a policy ot Government price controls 
which started at the beginine of 1965 controlled the price <rf 
steel at an artificially low level while the cost of imputs was 
allowed to increase as a result of rapid general inflation. The 
deterioration of steel prices with respect to general costs can 
be seen figure 5.3 below which shows that the wholesale price 
index increased 331 more than the price of steel products of CSN 
between 1965 and 311 more than the average price of steel products 
for Companhia Siderurgica Belgo Mineira (the largest of the non-
flat producers). These two companies' e x p e d i e n c e was typical of 
that of most steei producers. It should be pointed out nonethe-
less, that if these two companies which were already well conso-
lidated were in difficult financial shape without even enough wor-
(1) Back in the fifties when planning was being done for the creation of USIMINAS 
estimates were that consumption in 1966 was to be somewhere between 2.3 and 
2.6 million tons of steel. Projections of expansion of the existing steel 
plants were that they would be producing 1.8 million tons by 1960. According 
to Dr Amaro Lanari Junior, who was the representative of the BNDE in the Bra-
zilian economic mission which travelled to Japan in 1957 to work out the 
USIMINAS agreement with the Japanese, there would therefore be a shortfall 
of 500.000 tons which was exactly the capacity which the mission was arguing 
for the USIMINAS plant. Upon questioning by the Japanese, however, Dr Lanari 
revealed that the 1.8 million production estimate did not include the 500.000 
tons of the COSIPA project. The Japanese.nevertheless ,decided to participate 
in the venture. (See Pimenta, Op. Cit.,pp.111-112). Ch a later ocasion at the 
meeting on the mining-metallugica problems of Brazil held in April of 1961, 
Dr Lanari stated that according to the Kafuri Report for COSIPA it was esti-
mated that about 3.5 million tens of steel would be demanded in 1965. That 
meant, he said, that it was necessary to increase capacity by one million 
tons. Half of that would be filled by COSIPA, the other half by USIMINAS. 
Furthermore^  he stated that he was not worried about increasing capacity 
by that much given the rapidly rising of steel consumption which was being 
experienced in Brazil, and that in case there was any oversupply problem 
they could always export the excess supply particularly given the current 
value of the dollar. (Geología e Metalurgia, N9 23 (1961) pp. 263- 5) 
As will be seen, although the market was in a weak phase in the mid sixties 
swung to a boom in the seventies. 
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king capital, the situation was much worse for new plants such as 
USIMINAS, COSIPA, COMPANHIA FERRO § AQO DE VITORIA and AQOS ANHAN 
GUERA which had just entered the market precisely the moment 
when demand was retracting. These new firms were in critical trou-
ble given their financial obligations on the large loans they had 
taken out for their construction which were supposed to be covered 
through their operating profits. 
Figure 5.3 







ce Index C/A x 100 C/B x 100 
1965 A B C D E 
January 100 100 100 100 100 
June 100 112 111 111 99 
December 100 t 112 125 125 112 
1966 
January 110 123 137 125 111 
June 110 127 156 142 127 
December 121 139 177 146 127 
1967 
January 129 149 184 143 123 
June 147 149 196 133 131 
164 200 122 
Source: Piano Siderurgico Nacional, Sintese (1969) 
Table VI p.15 and Table VII p.16 
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A third cause for the crisis, and related to Go-
vernment price control was that as part of the Revolutionary Go-
vernment's general policy of reestablishing realistic prices, im-
port duties on steel imports were reduced. Whereas they had been 
at an average level of 60% set by Decree Law 3244 of 1957, they 
were reduced first to an average level of 50% through Decree Law 
63 of 1966, and then further to 40% through Decree Law 264 of 
1967. Some products, among them a substantial portion the flat 
products produced by the large three state firms, had import duties 
reduced from 60% to only 15%. ^ 
In general the State firms were harder hit by the 
crisis than the private firms for a variety of reasons. First of 
all, the large three flat producers felt the crisis earlier as the 
demand for flats fell before the demand for nonflats. Second, the 
simultaneous entry of COSIPA and USIMINAS in the same product line 
created substantial excess capacity in several types of flat pro-
ducts. Third, the cut-back in production caused by the fall in de-
mand hurt the large flat producers more because most flat products 
have to be produced a large scale in order to achieve lower unit 
costs, while the medium and small private firms producing non-flat 
products had much more flexibility and less rigid cost structures 
(1) The GCIS argued that since most steel products were usually 
sold at an average level of at least 30% below the internal 
price of the respective exporting countries, a 15% duty did 
not offer any effective protection. As a result the GCIS re-
commended that the low duties be increased to 40% so and that 
all steel duties be uniformized at that level. 
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since those products are normally produced in smaller production 
runs and are subject to less economies of scale. Fourth, the large 
three flat producers were subject to greater price control than 
the producers of nonflats. Finally, tariff duties on flat products 
suffered the greatest reduction. 
The deficit forseen by the GCIS for the five State 
firms for 1967 amounted to 371 million new cruzeiros distributed as 
follows: COSIPA, 228 million; USIMINAS, 91.7 million; CSN, 42.1 mil-
lion; COFAVI, 8.2 million; and ACESITA, 1.1 million. The very high 
deficit for COSIPA was related, on one hand to the fact that the 
company was operating at less then' 70% capacity; and on the other, 
to the high financial committments it had contracted and to invest-
ments still in progress. In spite of the low sale prices USIMINAS 
had already achieved a situation where gross sales income was almost 
enough to pay current operating expenses. Its deficit was due mainly 
to interest and amortization charges on loans taken out. for the 
construction phase. At CSN, which was already well established, sa-
les income was enough to pay operating expenses, but not enough to 
cover its financial obligations and non-postponeable investments/^ 
With respect to production costs, the GCIS pre-
sented a series of observations based on a table prepared by BAHINT 
which compared Brazil's cost structure with that of Europe and the 
USA. As can be seen from the table, which is reproduced below, Brazil 
had a relative advantage in raw materials and in labor. It should 
be noted, however, that the requirement to use 401 national coal 
imposed by Government fiat increased costs by more that seven US. 
dollars a ton - five percent of current sales prices - because not 
(1) Approximately one-third of the total deficit corresponded to non-postponea-
ble investments which were necessary for the completion or improvements of 
the production lines at the enterprises. According to the GCIS's report, 
the forseen deficit would disappear if the value of sales for the five 
firms would increase 45% over the sales estimated for the depressed 1967 
demand at.current prices. Such a high increase in prices would not be ne-
cessarry if demand increased to normal levels. Under that hypothesis the 
GCIS estimated that a real price increase of 25% would be almost enough to 
permit the companies to wipe cut their deificits in 1968. To that end it 
recaim|inded that the Government authorize such an across-the board price 
increase over the May 1967 levels. 
oily was it twice as expensive as imported coal, but of inferior 
quality. Also, the GCIS pointed out that even though labor costs 
were a lower percentage of total costs, Brazilian steel firms em-
ployed more workers than they actually needed and could reduce 
labor required per ton of steel even further by operating plants 
at greater scale. With respect to the item, other costs, which 
corresponded to electric energy, fuel oil, maintenance, etc.(and 
had a higher incidence in the Brazilian case), the GCIS doubted that 
much could be done to reduce it. There was a general impression 
though, that the item administration and sales could be reduced 
partly through several rationalization measures but mostly by an 
increase in the tonnage produced and comercialized. Depreciation 
and interest were supposedly higher in Brazil because investment 
costs per ton of steel were higher than in other.countries. Never-
verthless, the GCIS was hopeful that as the plants were expanded, 
Figure 5.4 
% Incidence by country or region 
COST COMPONENTS BRASIL EUROPE USA 
Raw Materials 31 44 37 
Labor 10 18 35 
Other Costs 22 17 14 
Administration and Sales 10 07 05 
Depresentation 07 05 05 
Interest Payments 11 04 01 
Taxes 09 05 03 
TOTAL 100 100 100 
Source: Programa Siderúrgico Nacional, Plano Siderúrgico Nacional 
Vol. I, 1967, p.418. 
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approximating an optimum production capacity, such burdens would 
be naturally reduced. Finally, with respect to taxes, the GCIS 
pointed out that the situation in 1967 was different. BAHINT's 
estimated had been made in 1966 based on the IVC (Imposto de Ven-
dás e Consignagoes-Tax on Sales and Consignments) which had avera-
ged about 5.5%. However, as a result of a general tax reform, star 
t m g at the beginning of 196£ a new tax, the ICM (Imposto de Cir-
culagao de Mercadorias - Tax on. the Circulation of Merchandise) 
was applied at the rate of 15%. With the addition of the ICM to 
the old IVC which was named the IPI (Imposto Sobre Produtos Indus-
trializados - Tax on Industrialized Products) the tax burden was 
more in the order of 20%. 
5b1.3. The GCIS Recommendations 
According to the GCIS, measures to reduce production 
costs could be divided into two groups: those dependent on general 
policies of the Government, , and those related to the own organiza-
tional arid administrative capabilities of the enterprises. With 
respect to the first group, the GCIS suggested that the Government 
raise prices, uniformize tariffs eliminate the IPI tax on steel products and 
lighten the burden of using national coal through the use of a subsidy. 
With respect to the second group, the GCIS pointed 
out the even though these measured depended on the individual en-
terprises, they were related to the expansion plans and speciali-
zation in specific product lines. The GCIS maintained that i-t would 
be difficult for the enterprises to make these plans without the 
intervention of the Government as a catalyzing agent to coordinate 
production and sales programs and the specialization of producers 
in order to avoid wasteful duplication and to get the maximum be-
nefits out of the specialization. 
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The GCIS therefore recommended that a Commission 
of Steel Development be created (Comissào de Desenvolvimento da Si-
derurgia) to formulate and implement national steel policy and es-
tablish the necessary coordination of the investment plans of both 
the private and state firms in the sector.^ In addition^the GCIS 
pointed out that in 1967 the Government had majority control of 
five firms which together represented 631 of the steel production 
of the country and an investment valued at three billion new cru-
zeiros. Further, it emphasized that while the Government had taken 
the initiative only in the creation of CSN and what while only in 
the case of USIMINAS among the rest has it started out with the ma-
jority of capital, it had been forced to assume majority ownership 
of the others because the private sector had not béen able (or wil-
(21 
ling)v J to raise the amount of capital required for such an en-
terprise. It pointed out that the joint administration of the five 
state enterprises would permit the coordination of production, sales 
and investment programs which could bring significant resource sa-
vings and reduction in costs. Therefore, it recommended that the 
five state firms be incorporated into a state holding company -
to be called BRASSIDER - with the purpose of assuring the impro-
ment of efficiency in those firms through coordination of their in-(31 vestment, production and commercialization plans. 
With respect to the elaboration of a National Steel 
Plan the GCIS projected the demand of rolled steel products on a 
(1) The CDS was to be presided by the Minister of Industry and Commerce and in-
tegrated by the Minister of General Planning and Development; The Ministers 
of State, Mining and Energy, Transport; The Chiefs of Staff of the Armed 
Forces, The Presidents of the BNDE^BRASSIDER, and IBS; and a General Secre-
tary. As will be seen below, the Government created, a steel council in 
1968, but it was not until 1970 that it gave it the structure and represen-
tation suggested in the GCIS report. 
(2) The Government put up ACESITA for sale during 1968 but it found no buyer. 
(3) After a long delay, the Government created SIDERBRAS in 1973 but it was 
not oily until 1975 that it came to have the role originally envisioned 
in the GCIS recanmendation. 
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growth rate of 101 per year. 1 Based on these estimates it calcu-
lated that if supply was to remain at 901 of 1967 capacity of 
4*640^000 tons there would be a deficit of two million tons in 1972 
and of 5.7 million in 1977. In order to cover these deficits and 
to be able to export the equivalent of 900,000 tons of semi-fi-
nished products in 1972 and 1.800.000 tons in 1977(which it consi-
dered desireable), capacity would have to be increased from 4.6 mil-
lion tons/year in 1967 to 8,1 million tons/year in 1972 and to 13.4 
million tons/year in 1977 - an increase of 8.8 million tons of 
capacity in ten years. 
After studying the proposed BAHINT expansion plan 
as well as the plans presented by the individual firms, and compa-
ring them with its demand estimates, it elaborated a National Steel 
Plan. There were two basic guiding principles behind this plan. The 
first was to obtain the maximum of productive capacity with the 
minimum of investment, favoring whenever possible the completion or 
expansion of existing facilities such as to balance or to specialize 
(1) BAHINT based projection of the demand for rolled propucts through 
1975 on a growth rate of 8.51 per year. It also presented an "op-
timistic" projection based on a 101 per year growth rate, and a 
conservative projection based on 81 per year. In elaborating 
its plan, the GCIS adopted the optimistic 10$ projection.In the 
group's opinion it fit the desires and perspectives of the coun 
try which included becoming an important steel exporter. In de-
fense of their choice the GCIS pointed out that the difference 
between the 8.5$ "most probablfe" hypothesis projected by BAHINT 
and the 10% "optimistic" hypothesis only amounted to 2.7% of 
the total in 1970 and would give enough time to readjust the 
projections before 1975 when the differences would be 12%. As 
it turned out even this optmistic projection fell short of 
actual growth rates. 
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pxoduc-tion lines rather than the construction of new plantsv 1 .The 
second was to improve the operating conditions of each plant, try-
ing to give it the maximum efficiency and profitability with res-
pect to its existing and future installations and its specific lo-
cation. Despite these general guidelines, though, it recommended 
that it would be advantageous to set up two small size plant (USINOR 
and COSIMAT) in two periferous regions in order to stimulate regio-
nal development, and to set up a new plant oriented for export of 
(1) That the guiding principle was adhered seems to be dramatically 
shown the case of CSN's expansion plans. CSN presented a plan 
biased on studies done by McKee-for expansion from 1.4 million 
tons to 3.5 million tons during the period 1965-1975 at a total 
cost of US 558.8 million (1965 prices) to be done in two sta-
ges: I (1965-71) for 2,340 thousand tons, and II (1972-75) to 
reach 3,500 thousand tons. BAHINT found it incompatible with 
economic conditions of the country given the scarcity of Govern-
ment resources and dictated that it would be more efficient to 
have USIMINAS and COSIPA expand because the investment cost per 
ton of increased capacity would be lower for them since they 
already had excess capacity in their rolling sectors. BAHINT 
asked CSN to submit another plan more compatible with the eco-
nomic situation of the country. CSN submitted an alternative 
stage I plan to reach 2.5 million tons at a lower investment 
cost, but BAHINT also found it unacceptable because not only 
was it incompatible with the market but also, it did not pre-
sent adequate profitability. BAHINT then elaborated a plan for 
CSN to increase production to 2.5 million tons suggesting among 
other things that CSN rennovate rather than purchase a new con-
tinuous hot rolling mill which alone would save 43 million dol-
lars. The GCIS however, found that not only was that plan too 
costly (representing 59% fo its total fixed investment budget), 
but that it did not yield adequate profitability. Also, invest-
ment cost per ton of increase of non-coated flat product capa-
city was US$ 299 ton, which was almost two times that for an 
expansion carried out through USIMINAS and COSIPA. As a result 
the GCIS proposed that CSN divide its plan into two stages, 
leaving the second for a more opportune moment, and concentra-
ting its production in coated flat products. GCIS recommendation 
for the first stage was an increase of 250,000 tons and specia-
lization in coated flat products, leaving the non-coated pro-
ducts expansion to COSIPA and USIMINAS.(Plano Siderúrgico Nacio-
nal, Sintese, 1969, pp. 83-87 .) 
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semifinished goods with an initial production of 1.5 million tons 
(Tubarao). 
The expansion program recommended by the G C I S ^ 
was divided into two five year plans. Only the first was carefully 
worked out since it was expected that changes in economic conditions 
(1) It is interesting to compare the expansion programs prepared by the GCIS 
far the first five year period with that which had been prepared by BAHINT. 
The fixed investment required under the two plans was almost identical,but 
the increase in capacity under the GCIS plan was 3.4 million tons versus 
2.2 million tens for BAHINT plan, a relation of 1.54. This made the fixed 
investirent cost per ton of increased capacity US$ 153 under the GCIS program 
as compared with US$ 238 under the BAHINT sheme. Although the average pri-
ce per ton of capacity under the GCIS program was only 83$ of that under 
the BAHINT program,, because of the different product mix produced under each, 
the former was more profitable because the capacity increase was 154$ of 
the latter, which more than compensated for the lower average price. 
One of the nain causes for the difference between the two programs was that 
the GCIS plan relied more cn the righting of capacity imbalances with-in 
the plants. Ths GCIS strategy was to eliminate the large excess rolling 
capacity in USIMINAS and COSIPA through the expansion of their blast fur-
nace and steel sectors rather than through a simultaneous expansion of all 
sectors which would be necessary in a plant that was already balanced, as 
would be the case for thé CSN. The GCIS1s plan was to increase CSN's capa-
city only in coated rolled products (a product line in which it was only 
producer). Besides permiting a lower investment cost per ton of increased 
capacity, this strategy by encouraging specialization had the advantage of 
reducing the risk of oversupply and dangerous price competition in non-
coated flat products. The savings achieved in this way would finance Tuba-
rao which had a planned production of 1,200;000 tons and which roughly 
accounted for the capacity difference between the two programs. 
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might substantially modify detailed plans for the period 1973-1977. 
The total cost of the first five year expansion 
program (1968-72) proposed by the GCI$ amounted to US$ 655 million 
including interest payments and increase in working capital. Fifty 
six percent were expected to be spent locally. Of the fixed invest-
ment total of 556 million, over 81!, was to be spent by the State 
controlled firms. In terms of the sources of the total funds, the 
GCIS calculated that only about 20! could come from self-financing 
an the part of the firms themselves, less than 5! from the private 
capital markets,and 38! from foreign sources (mostly equipments sup-
pliers willing to extend long term credits )'.This meant that the 
Government would have to provide the remaining US $ 244 million 
(38!). 
The GCIS suggested that the Government should provide the 
additional funds directly througt the budget. However, it warned that a system 
based on such annual budget allocation would not work for more than 
a year because of the discontinuities which were typical of such 
processes. Therefore, it suggested that the Government resources 
should be contributed through an alternate mechanism such as com-
pulsory savings by means of something like an additional tax over 
the IPI, or through the capitalization of the consumer by offeiring 
a 10! reduction in the IPI if he spent a corresponding amount on 
stock or obrigations of BRASSIDER. 
The estimated costs of the second five year plan 
(1973-77) were of the order of US$ 1^595 million, making the total 
investment necessary for the decade something in the order of US$ 
2,200 million, to increase capacity 8;8 million tons. This would 
give an average investment cost of US$ 250 per increased ton of 
capacity. It should be noted that the GCIS did not tackle the pro-
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blem o£ how to raise the necessary finance for that second part of 
the plan which was three times larger that necessary for the 
the first half« To date, financing the steel expansion remains one 
of the most crucial problems for the future of the Brazilian steel 
industry. 
5.2» The National Steel Plans And The Greater Role of Govern-
ment In The Steel Sector. ' 
5.2.1. The 1968-1971 Mini Expansion Plan 
At the beginning of 1968, based on the GCIS plan, 
the Government approved a three year plan 1968-1971. The basic ob-
jective of this mini-expansion plan was to establish the planned o 
development of the sector whose expansion was to begin in 1971 by 
which time it was expected that the steel enterprises would have 
regained their economic and financial stability after the crisis 
of the sixties. 
The guiding principles of the plan were ^  : 
1) The expansion should assure the supply of 
common products. Imports of special products 
which could not be economically produced at 
the small scale demanded by the domestic 
market were allowed 
2) The export of iron ore should be gradually 
substituted by that, of semi-finshed iron or 
steel products. 
3) No help was to be given to any plants whose 
capacity was below that considered economical-
ly justifiable and which required excessive 
time to achieve such a size. 
4) An increase of 1.8 million tons of capacity 
should be installed by 1970 in order to ac-
company the previsions of short term inter-
nal market demand growth. 
The expansion was to begin by the increase in ca-
pacity of the plants which presented the most favorable conditions 
(1) BANAS, Brazil Industrial 1968/69, pp. 85,88. 
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(i.e. required smallest investment and yielded the greatest return 
on the investment). All plants were to be oriented, as much as pos-
sible, to specialize in the production of specific groups of pro-
ducts of better quality, higher unit values, and easier placement 
on the market. 
Through the mini-plan capacity was to increase 
from 3,329,000 tons in 1967 to 5,200,000 tons in 1971 at an esti-
mated cost of US$ 300 million. This was basically the GCIS plan 
for the state plants. 
Specifically, capac ty was to increase 1,871,000 
tons broken down as follows: CSN, increase of 250,000 tons; USIMINAS 
increase of 776,000 tons; COSIPA, increase of 385,000 tons; others 
increase of 460,000.^ 
o 
The mini expansion plan of 1968-1971 was just a 
temporary plan while the government prepared its real medium term 
plan. This plan known as the First National Steel Plan was presen-
ted in 1971, and will be discussed in section 5.3. 
Thanks to government approved price adjustments 
by 1968 proper price cost relationship were reestablished. From' 
1968 on authorized increases in steel prices were above the evo-
lution of the industrial price index. This was immediately reflected 
in stock market quotations for steel companies and their profitabi-
lity. As fi result, the 1970 annual reports of most companies we-
re very optimistic. Looking specifically at the big three the pros-
pects in 1970 were quite good. CSN's profits were two times those 
of 1969, COSIPA presented the first positive balance after a long 
series of deficits, and USIMINAS was finally making a real prof it.(2) 
(1) Banas, Brasil Industrial, 1969/1970 
(2) For the three year period 1968-1970 net profits for the 14 main steel enter-
prises(CSN,USIMINAS,COSIPA,ACESITA,MANNESMANN, BELGO MINEIRA, INDflSTRIAS VIL-
LARES, BARBARA, SIDERURGICA RIOGRANDENSE,. FERRO BRASILEIRO, Ago NORTE, and 
HIME) increased fron Cr$ 63.9 million in 1968 to Cr$184.1 million in 1969 and 
to Cr$429 million in 1970.(Banas, Brasil Industrial, 1972, pp.76-77).It should 
be note«3 that 1968 was the first year for which USIMINAS showed'a profit (see 
figure i.l) although it was scmewhat artificial given the changes in depre-
ciation methods involved. Taking those into account USIMINAS probably did 
not really make a profit until 1970. 
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5*2.2. Fiscal Incentives and Price Structure 
As part o£ the program to help the development of 
the steel sector the government passed a whole series of incentives. 
To understand the basic strategy behind these incentives and to get 
an idea on the price structure and competiveness of Brazilian steel 
it will be useful to made a quick break to examine this issue. 
Since 1969 there were the following series of ex-
port incentives: exemption from the IPI tax on industrialized pro-
ducts, credit for the IPI of a certain percentage of the value of 
export transactions subject to income tax, exemption from special 
taxes such as iMerchant Marine Tax. In general such fiscal incenti-
ves for exports were in the order of 35% of the e-xported v a l u e ^ . 
In 1969 the Government also passed a series of 
additional general incentives among which were: an increase of the 
payment period for the IPI and ICM taxes, a three fold increase in 
credit available for the sector at low interest rates, concession 
of fiscal credit for"intermediate materials used in production, 
(l) exemption from import duty for 30 months for semi finished products 
In 1971 related to the First National Steel Plan 
(to be discussed below) the Government enacted two more incentives. 
(21 
First, it prorograted the temporary excemptionv J of import duties 
and of the IPI and ICM taxes on imports of raw materials, equipment 
and spare parts for the steel industry. Second it increased the 
percentage level of the IPI credit for exports from 5% to 10%. 
(1) Banas, Brasil Industrial 1969/1970, p. 30 
(2) Banas, Brasil Industrial 1972, p.156 
(3) Decree Law 569 which had originally been passed in May, 1969. 
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Figure 5.5 below gives a quick idea of the signi-
ficance of the import incentives using figures for the period 1971-1973. 
Figure 5-, 5 „ I M p 0 R T INCENTIVES FOR STEEL INDUSTRY" (1971-1973) 
(millions of current cruzeiros) 
Amount of Taxes 
Excempted 
1971 , 1972 1973 
IPI Tax 4 20 36 
Import Tax 10 90 181 
ICM Tax 17 41 75 
TOTAL 31 151 292 
{ 
Source: CONSIDER,Anual Reports, 1971-1973 
Notice the rapid increase in the total exemption 
from 197l to 1973 as the expansion of the, 1970s got underway. Accor-
(2) 
ding to BANASV J , steel projects approved by the National Industrial 
Development Council between January 1973 and June 197 4 (not in-
cluding those of the large three steel firms) totalled Cr$ 946 
million, of which 29! corresponded to fiscal incentives. 
(1) BANAS, Brasil Industrial, 19.7 5 , p. 22 
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The magnitude o± export incentives is difficult to 
quantity because of changes in the incentives and variations in the 
impact on different products. However an idea can be obtained by 
an example taken for the general case of a product in 1971. (Use fi-
gure 5.6. to follow the discussion). Taking the price for a ton of 
steel with-out taxes as a base of 100 the price paid by a domestic 
customer was 122.8 (including the ICM tax and the IPI tax which are 
14.5% and 5.0% respectively of the sales price with ICM). The FOB 
price paid by a foreign buyer was just 100 because he is not affec-
ted by the ICM and IPI taxes. The producer received a tax credit for 
the ICM and IPI taxes paid on intermediate products. Ch average these were 2.51 
of the sales price( with IPI) for the ICM, aid 0.5% of the sales price (with IPI) for 
the IPI. For domestic sales the producer must turn over to the go-
vernment the ICM and IPI taxes collected. When the product was ex-
ported, on the other hand, the producer received, in addition to 
the ab ove, an ICM credit and an IPI credit which were calculated as 
10% of the sales price. As a result the producer received 103.5 for 
domestic sales and 123 on export sales. Therefore, a foreign sale 
at the same price as a domestic sale without taxes gives an 18.8% 
higher return which in effect implies that he can sell abroad at a 
correspondingly lower price and still get the same net income. 
(1) This example taken from the study Pregos de Produtos Siderúr-
gicos commissioned by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce 
and CONSIDER in 1972 and elaborated by the Brazilian firm Tec-
nometal with the colaboration of all government organs invol-
ved in the process. 
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Figure 5.6 
"COMPARISON OF DOMESTIC SALES VERSUS EXPORT SALES" 
Internal Market % External Market % 
A. Sales Price without I CM (85.5 of C) 100.0 100.0 
B. I CM (14.5% of item C) 17.0 Exempt 
C. Sales Price with ICM 117.0 100.0 
D. IPI 5.0% of C 5.8 Exempt 
E. Sales Price with IPI (what is paid by 
custurner) 122.8 100.0 
F. Recovery of ICM (2.5% of C) 2.9 2.5 
G. Recovery of IPI ( .5 % of E) 0.6 0.5 
H. Credit of I CM for export - 10.0 
I. Credit of IPI for export - 10.0 
J. ICM Tax paid by producer 17.0 -
K. IPI Tax paid by producer 5.8 -
Net value received by producer 103.5 123.0 
Source: MIC/CONSIDER, Preços de Produtos Siderúrgicos, Volume VII, 
Sintese, Rio de Janeiro Tecnometal, 1972 , p.35 
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This did not include various other export incenti-
ves such as: excemption of income tax on the proportion of profits 
relating to exported products (which could amount to 1% of the sa-
les, value); financing for exports (which taking into account the 
interest difference could signify an additional incentive of 3$ 
on the value of sales; exemption and restitution on fuels and 
energy sources, etc. 
Several studies have been done on the general in-
ternal price level and structure of Brazilian products as compared 
to that foreign countries. The first study covered the period: 




COMPARISON OF EVOLUTION OF AVERAGE WEIGHTED STEEL PRICE WITH VARIOUS PRICE INDEXES 




S t e e l P r i c e 
A 























1962 62 62 62 62 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1963' 11S 111 109 113 103.6 101.8 98.2 
1964 192 211 207 208 91.0 101.9 101.4 
1965 296 343 325 335 86.3 105.5 102.4 
1966 346 38S 448 444 89.7 86.6 87.4 
1967 435 497 575 558 87.S 86.4 89 .1 
1968 570 666 714 727 85.6 93.3 91.6 
1969 684 765 862 874 89.4 88.7 87.5 
1970 925 987 1052 1021 93.7 93.8 96.7 
1971 1027 1170 1258 1200 93.8 93.0 97.S 
Source: MIC-CONSIDER Preços de Produtos S i d e r ú r g i c o s . Volume V I I S in t e s e ( R i o de J a n e i r o : Tecnomet? ! . 1972) pp .167 . 
Between 1962 and i971 the mix of rolled products 
shifted in favor of those of greater value and within those pro-
j 
duct groups to those of higher c-ost and quality. In spite of this 
the evolution of weighted prices were somewhat below the price 
authorized by the government and significantly below the 
general and wholesale price indexes. Note that this was particular-
ly true during the 1965-19fr$ crisis years and thart the authorized 
price levels themselves were below the general and wholesale price 
indexes. 
In 1970 and 1971 the authorized prices were increa-
sed faster than the price indexes such that it was possible to 
partly compensate the previous price compresion suffered by the 
industry. 
In 1971 when the internal price structure of steel 
products in Brazil was compared to that of various foreign coun-
cil triesv J it was found that the "nobler" products had a relatively 
( 21 
higher price than more common steel products'- '. In part this was 
because the smaller production runs of the "nobler" products in-
crease production costs, but it was also because of a series of 
extra charges which were traditionally added on to such products. 
In general the more common steel products had the 
same or lower prices than the corresponding products in the in-
f 31 
ternal markets of other countries. Figure 5.8. presents the evo-
lution of the nrice of steel in Brazil, the U.S.A., and German ^ . 
(1) USA, England, France, Germany and Japan. 
(2.) Consistent with this, import duties en the nobler products were relatively 
higher than those on more canmon nroducts. 
(3) MIC-CCNSIDER, Op. Cit., Volume VII, pp. 25-34. 
(4) Exchange rates used in the study were based on the June 1961 quotation (which 
was generally accepted was the proper parity value)adjusted annually by the 
wholesale price indexes in the respective countries. 
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Figure 5.8 
"COMPARATIVE EVOLUTION OF STEEL PRICE INDEXES 1962-1971" 
(indexes: 1967 =100) 
YEAR BRASIL W. GERMANY U.S.A 
1962 130 106 98 
1963 133 106 98 
1964 121 105 98 
1965 118 105. 99 
1966 105 106 99 
1967 100 100 100 
1968 103 102 102 
1969 107 109 104 
1970 128 111 117 
1971 134 117 122 
Source: MIC-CONSIDER, Op. Cit., Vol. VII, p.38 
Notice that the Brazilian series is U-Shaped with 
the lowest prices corresponding roughly to the crisis period while 
W. German and U.S. prices are more or less stable through 1967 after 
which they show a rise. In 1971 average Brazilian prices were some-
what higher than U.S. and German prices due to the higher relative 
price of "nobler products" in the product mix. 
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A recent study compared the pre tax prices of 
Brazilian products with the internal trices of steel products in 
the U.S., Japan, W. Germany, -France and England for Dec. 1976 ^ 
The eomparis-on, which was based -or 12 respresentatives products^ 
.showed that: I) when c-onverted at the official exchange rate Bra-
zilian prices were the lowest in 8- of the 1-2 products and never 
among the highest in the remaining four products. ^  2) When 
converted at a parity exchange rate based on the July 19-61 exchange 
xatjs adjusted by the relevant price indexes, Braziliar prices were 
substantially inferior to internal prices in the U.S., Europe and 
Japan. 3) Prices in the international market are substantially in-
ferior to internal prices in the exporting countries and have very 
little to do with real production cost as the international price 
varies with demand and supply and are heavily subsidized. 
In summary the material in this section shows that the general 
Brazilian policy has been to keep prices as low as possible and 
close to internal prices in the advanced countries. The reason for 
this is that steel is a basic imput for the industrialization 
effort which is being fostered . As will be developed below rather 
than promoting the steel sector through a high protected price 
the Government has chosen to help it by direct capital participation 
in the larger expansion projects and through large subsidies for 
capital investments which meet its guidelines. 
(1)IBS. Comissao Técnica de Sconomia, 0 Prego dos Laminados de 
Ago no Brasil e no Exterior: Estudo Comparativo (Rio de Janeiro, 
1977). 
(2) The four products where the Brazilian price was not the lowest 
were nobler products, showing the persistence of a slightly 
higher relative price for such products noted earlier. 
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5.2.3. The Creation of CONSIDER 
In 1968 following in part the recommendation of 
the GCIS report, the Government, through Decree Law 62.403 of March 
14, created the Conselho Consultivo da Industria Siderurgica -
CONSIDER- to serve as an advisory council to the Government on 
iron and steel policy. In its first two years CONSIDER was not very 
active or powerful as its functions were limited to an advisory 
role^-1} The five resolutions which it passed during that period 
dealt mostly with internal organization and laid down some ground 
rules for the commercialization of steel products from the large 
three state enterprises. 
Decree Law 66 579 of July 19, 1970 restructured 
CONSIDERS^ , making it an agency of the Federal Government presi-
ded by the Minister of Industrv and Commerce and with the Minister 
of Finance, Planning, and Mines and Energy as vicepresidents, and 
changed its status from a consultative organ to a deliberative bo-
dy with executive powers. Its main objectives were to:^^ 
1) Formulate and coordinate national steel policy 
2) Fix criteria for the concession of government 
incentives; 
3) Concede priorities to the projects for the crea-
tion of new steel mills and to expansion or 
modernization projects of existing steel enter-
prises for the purpose of financing by official 
credit entities. 
(1) The GCIS report has recommended the creation of a Council on 
Steel Development to formulate steel policy with the responsi-
bility of not just advising but of establishing the basic direc-
tives of the planned development of the sector. 
(2) CONSIDER was restructured once again through decree n9 74 361 
in Dec. 1974, which expanded its scope to non-ferrous metals. 
It is thus the Council of Non Ferrous Metals and Steel. 
(3) BANAS, Brasil Industrial, 1971, p.209 
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4) Establish tire general drrective of commercial 
and financial aspects Jror the stee?l enterprises cons-
trolLed by the State. 
5) Authorize the application of accelerated depre-
ciation of priority steel p-rojects in terms of 
Decree 61.08Z of July 22., 1967. 
6) By delegation" to the Council of Customs- Policy 
concede exemptions of Import Duties for the Ca-
pital Goods destined to projects considered 
prioritary in terms of item 3. 
7) Program the investments of the steel sector and 
coordinate the raisine of the necessary public 
-resources tmonriesj . 
8) Execute or contract sectoral studies necessary 
for the planning of the national steel industry. 
Technical support for CONSIDER's guidelines and 
recommendatioos comes from its executive secretary. That group re-
views and evaluates independent reports from the various steel en-
terprises as they relate to the country's overall industrial deve-
.lopment plans- According to Aluisio Marins, CONSIDER's executive se-
cretary, each report is evaluated in terms of technical and enginee-
ring plans, market involvement, economic return, financial requi-
— rements, etc. Besides the above evaluations, CONSIDER recommends 
to the CIP (Government Price Control Commission) the prices which 
shall be charged for steel products, and acts as an adviser on im-
port and custom policies 
Every steel enterprise considering any capital 
improvement or expansion must first submit a detailed plan to 
CONfrtDER.-for-its-approval. If CONSTDER approves the plan the com-
pany is eligible for a number of financial incentives. These in-
clude a fuli or sliding scale exemption from import taxes^^;other 
(1) Once approved by CONSIDER the project is reviewed by the Brazi-
lian Industrial Commision which actually sets the rate of exemp-
tion. The purpose of this is to make sure that Brazilian manufac 
turers have not been excluded, although it seem that a local 
producer can be excluded if he cannot deliver on schedule 
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exemption are in terms of industrial products tax and sales tax, a per 
centage rebate on income tax if the company invests in a develop-
ment project such as reflorestation or in underdeveloped region 
such as the Northeast; generous benefits in financing (terms usual-
ly includes a 15 year note with interest ranging from 2 to 8$ if equip-
ment or materials are purchased from a Brazilian company)^ 
If CONSIDER does not approve the plan the company 
still has the option of going ahead with its projects, but it will 
not receive the incentives. This can almost double the cost of the 
( 2) investment.K J 
5.2.4. The Creation of SIDERBRAS 
The State's holding company for steel enterprises 
under state control, which had been recomended by the CGIS' report 
in 1967 was not created until six years later under the name 
SIDERBRAS, through Law 5.919^. Its objectives were to: 
1) Promote and administer the interests of the 
State activities except in the case of already 
existing enterprises. 
2) Program the necessary State resources for its 
subsidiaries or associates. 
3) Promote the execution of activities related.to 
the steel industry in Brazil and abroad. 
Its initial capital was fixed at Cr$ 100 million 
which were t'o be integrated by the end of 1974 with State parti-
cipation of at least 51!. 
(1) Financing is through the BNDE's FINAME( Finànciamento de Maquinas 
e Equipamentos ) which finances purchase of all Brazilian equip-
ment for the Brazilian steel industry. Normally the interest 
rate declines as Brazilian participation increases. If foreign 
participation is too high the company may be inegible. 
(2_) 33 Magazine (June, 1976) pp.44 
(3) Che of its main objectives was to concretize National Steel Po-
licy which called for a large Brazilian participation in the 
international steel policy. 
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SIDERBRAS could have been created much earlier. 
Xft fact^ a project, for the creation of such a holding company which 
would assume stock control of all the steel firms with majority 
State capital had been elaborated some years earlier. However, the 
Government gave priority to the expansion programs of its three 
large firms instead. It also seems that opposition from the BNDE 
who controlled USIMINAS and COSIPA and which would have had to turn 
over control to the proposed holding company, was also responsible 
for the long delay. It should be noted though that whereas the 
•original GCIS recommendation also called for the holding company 
to be responsible for the coordination, compatibilization and 
administration of production, sales and investment of the five 
companies wnere the State had majority control,-SIDERBRAS was to 
he concerned onlv with _new projects in which the Federal Government 
was going to participate. 
Through Decree Law 6159 of December, 19 74 the Go-
vernment altered the original law^ creating SIDERBRAS and gave it 
stock control over the existing steel enterprises whose roting 
stock belonged in its majority to the state or to entities of .the 
indirect Federal Administration such as the Bank of Brazil and the 
BNDE . Such enterprises would'become its subsidiaries. The justi-
fication was the need to centralize control .in order to maximize 
the results of public investments in the steel sector given that the in-
ternal demand was still significantly above national steel produc-
tion and that the State was responsible for'more than 50$ of pro-
duction. 
By the end of 1975 six of the seven steel enterpri-
ses controlled by the State had been integrated into SIDERBRAS.^ 
(1) The exception was ACESITA which is still controlled by the 
Banco do Brasil. 
- 99 -
The enterprises and their percentage of national production in 
1975 were USIMINAS (21.7%). CSN (18.3%), COSIPA (9.7%), COSIM (2.2%) 
USIBA (1.3%), COFAVI (1.2%), and PIRATINI (0.9%); giving SIDERBRAS 
effective control over 55.5% of total Brazilian production. In 1976 
SIDERBRAS also acquired majority control of the AgOMINAS and TUBA-
RAO steel projects (which were to be built by 1980), and minority 
participation in the Mendes Junior steel project (which was also 
to come on stream by 1980). 
The shares of SIDERBRAS are held by various direct 
and indirect agencies of the Federal Government. In 1976 the dis-
tribution of shares was as follows National Treasury 84.4%; Cai-
xa Economica Federal (7.1%), Petrobras (4.7%), Banco do Brasil 
(1.9%), Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (1.7%), others (0.2%). The to-
tal capital was 4,238 billion cruzeiros on December 31, 1976. 
To give an idea of the kind of resources, SIDERBRAS 
controls it may be noted that during fiscal year 1976 it obtained 
funds totalling Cr$ 3.126 billion (capital increase of Cr$ 1.489 
billion, increase in long term debt of Cr$ 1.571 billions and 
Cr$ 66 millicois from operations)..Of these Cr$ 3.090 billions were 
invested in its subsidiaries and associated companies, Cr$ 25 • 
millions in fixed assets and Cr$ 11 millions in other items inclu-
ding studies related to the Master Steel Plan. 
(1) 73% of this was invested in the big three Companies. 
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So2.5. The First National Steel Plan (1971) 
According to the four ministers who presented the plan 
in 1973,, the steel industry had overcome the financial difficulties 
which had been compromising its growth and was prepared to fullfill 
its role in development under the guidance of CONSIDER which had 
recently been reorganized and presented with the instruments neces-
sary for that purpose. In 1970 steel production had been 5.37M.t.a. 
while consumption had been 5.80 M.t.a. Steel plants were operating 
at capacity whereas consumption was increasing at 500.000 tons per 
anumn. As the Government felt that it would be convenient to export 
at least 10$ of production in order to earn some foreign exchange 
and to maintain a->£©othold in the foreign market, a deficit of about 
one million tons was expected in 1971. This would have to be cove-
red through imports. Following the Presidents's goal of creating a 
steel industry with 20 M.t.a. installed capacity by 1980 in order 
to completely supply the national market and have the necessary 
reserve capacity to fill demand peaks, the plan called for an incre-
ase in installed capacity at a rate of 12$ per year. This would 
involve investments of approximately Cr$ 15 billion through 1980 
at 1970 prices. The expansion would permit an increase in per ca-
pita consumption from 63 kilograms in 1970 to 125-30 in 1980. Du-
ring the period when demand was greater than supply^the deficit 
would be covered by imports. CONSIDER was to import all the pro-
ducts» which were to be further elaborated by the state firms. 
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Increase in the capacity of the flat sector was 
given priority by CONSIDER. The capacity increase was to be full-
filled by the expansion of the big three state companies. The plan 
included a new blast furnace for each of the three to bring capa-
city in 1980 to 4 M.t.a. for CSN., 3.5 M.t.a. for USIMINAS and 3.4 
M.t.a. for COSIPA adding up to a total capacity of almost 11 M.t.a. 
During the first five years of the plan capacity was to increase 
1001. The budget for this period was Cr$ 2,050 million for CSN, 
Cr$l,500 million for USIMINAS,and Cr$ 1,950 million for COSIPA, represen-
ting altogether almost one-third of the total budget (investment, 
financial costs, and increase in working capital) planned for the 
whole decade. USIMINAS and COSIPA, which had suffered adverse effects 
from their large initial investments in relation to production, 
were to regain financial health through a consolidation and resche-
duling of their debts in order to establish adequate relationship 
in their composition. Furthermore, begining in 1971 all steel 
enterprises of mixed economy were to present consolidated balance 
sheets and adopt standard costs according to studies being reali-
zed under CONSIDER's coordination. 
In the non-flat sector, production was to be in-
creased through the expansion of existing enterprises and the 
creation of new ones through projects that presented "solid techno-
logical and financial bases" presumably as determined by CONSIDER. 
This sector was to continue under private initiative although it 
would receive Government support through credit stimuli for the 
execution of expansion plans and the creation of new plants. The 
plan also provided that the Government might participate as a mino-
rity shareholder in order to viabilize projects requiring such 
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major- investments that the private sector could not handle by it-
self. CONSIDER studies indicated the necessity of having capacity 
of common non-flats be 4,650,000 tons of ingots by 1975. That re-
presented an increase of 2,5 million tons over current capacity. 
By 1980 capacity was to reach 8 million tons of ingots. The special 
steel sector was supposed to expand capacity 60% by 1975 when it 
was to reach almost one million tons. At the time plan was announ-
ced projects were already under way for the production of stainless 
steel whose demand was increasing rapidly due to the expansion of 
the chemical and petrochemical industries. 
The 1971 Steel Plan also specified that ClP^re-
solution n9 19, which assured adequate profitability for the steel 
industry through price cost margins which were compatible with 
increased investments required by the large expansion plans, was to 
be maintained as a guideline in setting steel prices. Additional 
financing for the plan was to be done primarily through the BNDE 
which was to be given appropriate budgets by the Union and the 
National Monetary Council to fullfill that purpose. 
Long term planning was to be based on a market and 
technical studies. The first of these, which was already under way 
under auspices of the IBS, was to become known as the MBA-1 (Merca-
do Brasileiro de A£o-l);it shall be discussed below. Such studies were 
to be updated annually and were to provide the basic imput in 
defining the specific rolling capacity to be installed in the expan-
sion plans.^ 
(1) CIP is the Conselho Interministerial de Presos, the Government 
agency in charge of setting prices. 
(2) As can be seen from the preceding summary of the plan, in this 
first stage the main objectives of the Government were to put 
its steel companies at adequate levels of costs and production, 
consolidating their expansion plans before undertaking new in-
vestment projects of its own: and to begin to lay down guide-
lines and incentive schemes to control the development of the 
private sector. 
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5.2.6. Market Demand Estimates and Planning 
To conclude this brief survey on the increasing 
role of the state in the steel a quick sumary of the various market 
demand studies and expansion plans is in order. 
There have been five market studies since launching 
the First National Steel Plan in 1971, and a final Master Steel 
Plan which was to be completed by 1977 is still in the works. The 
projections of all five plans as well as those of the earlier 
BAHINT and CGIS studies are presented in figure 5.9. Notice that 
the BAHINT, CGIS and MBA I ^plans all underestimated actual 
consumption levels. On the other hand, the MBA II and MBA III 
studies (announced in 1972 and 1975 respectively) over-estimated 
demand and it was not until the RAM-I (1976) and RAM-II (1977) 
studies that the estimates were reduced to more realistic levels. 
The change between the MBA-I and MBA-II/MBA-III 
studies had a marked impact on expansion policy. Because higher 
than expected growth in steel consumption between 1970 and the 
beginning of 1972 made the results of the MBA-I study obsolete, 
CONSIDER commissioned MBA-II in 1972. 
(1) The MBA-1 plan was the first commissioned by CONSIDER and it was the basis 
for the First National Steel Plan launched in 1971. It was massive study 
which involved the elaboration of a matrix of steel products and steel 
consuming sectors for the year 1969 and its projection through 1980 using 
both historical series and surveys of future consumption estimates by the 




"STUDIES PROJECTING * BRAZILIAN CONSUMPTION OF ROLLED PRODUCTS" 
(millions of tans) 
N . Name 
Products^^^ 














1966 1.269 - - - - -
197D 1.795 1.843 - — 
1975. 2.696 3.099 S.561 4.287 t 5.085 -
1977 3.693 4.325 . 5.354 7.111 5.361 
1980 - - S. 738 7.454 10.328 7.904 
19&5 - - -18.785 15.355 
Nan-Flat Pro-
ducts 
1966 1.383 - - -
1970 2.006 2.087 - - -
1975 2.899 3.251 3.548 3.992 4.357 -
197-7 - 3.947 4.276 5.050 5.725 5.164 
1980 - - 5.658 7.210 8.201 7.052 
1985 - - 14.674 13.814 
ratal Rolled . 
Products 
1966 2.652 - - - - -
1970 3.801 3.930 - - - -
1975 5.591 6.350 7.109 8.27b1 9.442 -
1977 - 7.640 8.601 10.404 12.836 10.825 
1980 - - 11.446 14.664 18.529 14.956 






















Sources: Studies cited 
Actual consumption fran MBA n9 2 and RAM studies 
(1) Taken from IBS Comissâo Técnica de Econania "A Industria Siderurgica Brasileira Fa-
ce a Conjuntura Mundial do Ago" (8th. Annual Brasilian Steel Congres: Rio de Janei-
ro, April 4, 1978) 
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The revised estimates of the MBA-II implied that 
if Brazil wanted to supply its internal market needs as well as 
to export 20% of its production it would have to expand to more 
than the 20 M.t.a. capacity originally set as the goal for 1980 in the 
1971 Steel Plan. As a results in 1973 the President of Brazil an-
ticipated the completion date for the fase III expansion of CSN, 
COSIPA and USIMINAS from 1980 to 1978. This fase III expansion 
program provided that these three state enterprises increase ca-
pacity to nearly 11 m.t.a. The new plan was to produce 20 m.t.a. 
in 1978 and 25-77 m.t.a. in 1980.^In some circles it was 
even expected that installed capacity would reach 32 M.t.a. in 
1980 and official enthusiasm reached the point of announcing that 
by 1977 Brazil would become a net steel exporter. 
It was widely quoted in both offical media and 
domestic press that there was a steel shortage in the world market. 
Estimates were that the world would have to increase installed ca-
pacity by 300 M.t.a.by 1980 which represented a more than 50% incre-
ase. Nevertheless, some specialists shrewdly pointed out that 
such perspectives of shortage were due to the increased commercia-
lization in steel which was caused by speculative forces, not real 
increases in demand. 
(]) In 1973 three large Government sponsored projects for export oriented plansts 
were being negotiated. The Usina de Tubarao (in Espirito Santo), whose con-
ception _ dated back to the BAHINT and GCIS reports, had already passed the 
prefeasibility stage and was already canstitued as a pilot plant. Its basic 
project was to be elaborated starting in March, 1974. Stock was to be dis-
tributed as follows: SIDERBRAS, 51%, Kawasaki (Japan) 24.5%; FINSIDER(Italy) 
24.5%. The initial stage was for a capacity of 3 M.t.a. of semifinshed 
products at an investment cost of Cr$ 5.2 billion. It was to begin operation 
with that capacity in 1977 and to expand to 6 m.t.a through a second stage 
to be completed by 1980. The usina de Itaqui was a project to use iron ore 
extracted from the newly discovered Carajas deposits (in the state" of Ma-
ranhao). It was at the stage of signing preliminary agreements between Nip-
pon Steel (Japan) and SIDERBRAS. Fifty one percent of the capital to be held b> 
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The oil crisis which had a different effect in 
the short and medium runs, significantly affected the estimates 
and the planning. In the short run, as a result of the crisis 
there was an immediate run in demand for steel products which lead 
to a substantial increase in prices as can be seen in figure 5;10 
below. 
In Brazil apparent consumption of rolled products in 1973 increa-
sed 19.1% over the previous year. In 1974 it increased 27.7% more. 
Such a rapid increase in consumption led to an increase in imports. 
Whereas imports as a percentage of apparent consumption had ave-
raged less than 11$ for the preceeding 10 years, this ratio jumped 
to 22$ in 1973 and to 43$ in 1974. The bulk of the increase in 
demand was in flat products where apparent consumption increased 
46.6$ in 1974, making flat product imports account for 60$ of do-
mestic flat product consumption whereas the average for the pre-
vious 10 years period had been less than 15$. (See figure 5.2) 
Footnote 2 continued from the previous page. 
SIDERBRAS, the rest by foreign groups led by Nippon Steel. The first stage -was 
to be 4 m.t.a. of semi-finished products to ccrne on the market in 1980 at a 
total investment costs of Cr$ 6 billion. The final size was to be 16 m.t.a. 
after passing through an intermediate stage of 12 m.t.a. The third project 
was a hot_strip rolling mill in Espirito Santo to finish billets supplied by 
the Tubarao plant. Pre-feasibility studies has been conpleted by CONSIDER and 
Klockner during 1973. Its first stage was to give it a rolling capacity 1.5 
m.t.a by 1977. A second stage would increase that to 3 m.t.a. in 1980. Total 
cost through 1980 was forseen at Cr$ 1.416 billion. SIDERBRAS was to hold 
50$ of the shares„ Klockner 40$ and Tubarao the remaing 9$. In 1973 CQNSIDER 
also approved the creation of private integrated steel mill in Juiz de Fora 
(Minas Gerais), by the Mendes Junior group. The cost of the first stage (1-.2 
m.t.a) to be conpleted by 1978 was estimated at Cr$ 4.3 billion. It was to 
reach 2 m.t.a in 1980 and a final capacity was to be 4.5 m.t.a. Capital was to 
be controlled by Mendes Junior with the participation of SIDERBRAS, the Govern-
ment of Minas Gerais, the Prefeitura of Juiz de Fora, he BNDE, Nippon Steel, 
and the Mitsubishi Co., (Banas, Brasil Industrial 1975, pp.22) 
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Figure 5.10 
"EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL PRICES OF STEEL PRODUCTS 
1973-1976 
Source. CONSIDER, Relatorio Annual 1975, p.9 
Production of steel ingots which had been growing 
at an average rate of slightly over 12% since the end of the Bra-
zilian steel crisis in 1968 only increased 4.9% in 1974. This was 
the lowest recorded since the steel crisis of the mid sixties. 
Production of flat rolled products actually fell 6.9% that y e a r ^ 
•which helps to explain, in part, why imports of flat products in-
creased so dramatically. 
The MBA-III projections which were completed in 
1974 (see figure 5.9.) showed that if only fase II was completed 
for the large three steel companies, there would be a deficit of 
2.1 M.t.a. in 1977 which would increase to. 8.6 in 1980. (Notice 
that the MBA-III. demand projection for 1980 was 2.8 m.t.a. greater 
than MBA-IIs) 
Figure 5.1L 
INSTALLED CAPACITY AND DEMAND PROJECTIONS (MBA-3) 
(million tons of steel in ingot equivalents) 




























NOTES: (1) With completion of Phase II (CSN: 2.5 m.t.a., USIMINAS: 2.4 m.t.a. 
COSIPA: 2.3 m.t.a.) which would require U.S.$1.7 billion in addition 
to U.S.$ 772 million already applied. 
(2) The non-flat sector presented investment plans totalling U.S.$ 83.8 
million during 1974 and U.S.$817 million during 1975. This would 
increase capacity 1.3 m.t.a. by 1977. 
(3) With acceleration of Phase III (CSN: 4.5 m.t.a., USIMINAS: 3.5 m.t.a 
COSIPA: 3.5 m.t.a.) which was estimated to cost U.S.$ 3.2 billion 
(4) Non-flat capacity estimated to increase 1.9 m.t.a. with additional 
investment of U.S.$ 1.3 billion. 
Soiree: Banas, Brasil Industrial 1975/6,-pp.38 
Til Production fell because the energy crisis led to a coal shortage 
which severaly affected the coke based flat product producers like USIMINAS. 
Notice|however that overall production increased thanks to an increase from 
the non-flat sector which is not dependent on coal, ^ figure 5.1) 
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In order to reduce those deficits, in late 1974 
Consider approved the Phase III expansion plan for the three flat 
product ¡producers which would increase their capacity to 11.6 mil 
ill ~~ lion tons per annum by 1978v J. Non-flat productive capacity was 
estimated to increase 1.9 million tons per annum with additional 
•investments of U.S.$ ^333 million. In mid 1974, the steel plan 
then under elaboration foresaw production of 20-25 M.t. of steel 
in 1978 and an installed capacity of 32 M.t. in 1980, the last 
(21 year for which fixed goals were set. J 
In 1975 total world production fell 8% from the 
1974 peak of 710 M.t.a.However, even with that reduction in produc-
tion prices, which had increased in the order of 200-3001 as the 
immediate result of the crisis, started a downturn in late 1975 
and fell throught 1975. By the end of 1975 they were almost back 
to pre-1973 levels. The steel industry thus reflected the world-
wide economic recession. This has led many large producers to shut 
down complete plants or part of large plants. As a result some 
of the foreign partners for the big Brazilian expansion projects 
have had second thoughts about investing in such export oriented 
plants and have withdrawn. This was the case of U.S. Steel, British 
Steel, Nippon Steel and Usinor in the case of the Itaqui project, 
fl) Banas, Brasil Industrial 1975, p.124 
(2) The II National Development Plan (II PND) covering the period 
1975-1980 which was launched, in September 1974, foresaw steel 
ingot production at 22.3 M.t.a in 1979 based on projects known 
by June 30,1974. 
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and that of Kobe Steel in the case of rolling project for Tubarao,t1) 
The year 1975, therefore caused a detour in the 
plans. GNP growth was only 4.3$ . While steel ingot production 
and rolled steel production grew at 10.7% and 10.8% respectively, 
apparent consumption of steel products actually decreased slightly 
over 6% . imp0rts of rolled products fell 42%. This downturn led 
(1) These included the Sepetiba project in Rio de Janeiro(production 
capacity of 10 M.t.a. by stages); the Itaqui project in Sao 
Luiz de Maranhao (Production Capacity of 12 M.t.a; and the rol-
ling mill in Espirito Santo for Tubarao (1.5'M.t.a. of rolling 
capacity). 
It seems that as a result SIDERBRAS decided to^concentrate its 
efforts on the Tubarao project in Vitoria (Espirito Santo) and 
to freeze the other large projects. Apparently the Government 
established a Cr$ 20 billion limit for investment in steel bout 
70% of these are earmarked for the third phase expansion of the 
large three "state firms which is to raise their capacity to 
11.6 M.t.a. Of the remaining 30%, Cr$ 2.2 billion are for Tuba-
rao (although its original budget had been set at Cr$ 3.3 bil-
lion) and Cr$ 3 billion are for Agominas. The remaining .6 bil-
lion cruzeiros are to be spent on smaller enterprises. In 
effect, SIDERBRAS cut back Cr$ 15 billion in investments by 
deciding to reduce the future steel ingot capacity of COSIPA 
from 3.4 M.t.a. to 2.4 M.t.a. and that of USIMINAS from 4.6 
M.t.a. to 4.1 but maintaining their rolling capacity. Under 
the new scheme the 1.5 M.t.a. difference would be supplied by 
ingots from Tubarao. Thus, Tubarao has been changed from the 
purely export oriented project that was originally presented, 
to a 50/50 mix of exports and production for the national 
market. This mix roughly reflects the composition of capital 
SIDERBRAS 51%, FINSIDER (Italy) and Kawasaki (Japan) 24% each. 
(2) The following table serves to illustrate at least shematically 
the downturn in economic activity which occurred in 1975 
as compared to previous years. 
PERCENTAGE RATES OF GROWTH 
1973 1974 1975 
GNP growth 11.4 9.6 4.3 
Industry growth 15.0 8.2 4.2 
Construction 
Industry 15.2 7.8 3.8 
Source: CONSIDER ANNUAL REPORTS 19-73-1975 
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Consider IBS-SIDERBRAS-to.restudy the 1974 projections and submit 
a. 10 year plan called the Master Steel PlanP^ 
This is supposed to be a comprehensive plan invol-
ving 18 major studies with the participation of CONSIDER, SIDERBRAS 
and the Secretariat of Industrial Technology of the Ministry of 
f 21 
Industry and Commerce. J The plan was to go through three conso-
lidations stages yielding a-final report in 1977. Unfortunately at 
the time of this writing (August, 1978) the definitive plans-has 
not been announced. 
The delay seems to :>e related in part to the uncer-
tainty resulting from the prolonged effects of the world rece-ssion. 
Through out the 1975-1978 period there have been various different 
rep-orts of the goals of the plan.. ^ 
(1)However in mid 1975 CONSIDER was still talking in terms^a mini-
mum production of 46.5 m.t.a. in 1985. See MIC/STI, Industria 
de Bens de Capital, Sao Paulo, Setembro 1975, p.499 
(2)Besides a general planning document to be called "The Steel 
Industry in the Context of the Global Planning of the Brazilian 
Economy :Definition, Directives and Planning" there are to be 
studies on: the market, production, prices, raw materials, trans-
portation, energy, production structure, research and technology, 
engineering, ecology, equipment manufacture, legislation, human 
resources, a data bank, related industries, economic-financial 
analisis, and expansion of the steel industry until the year 
2000. 
(3)Banas, Brasil Industrial 1975(p.l21) for example claims that the 
1975-1985 plan hopes to guarantee Brazil an installed capacity 
of 40 m.t.a. of steel products by 197,5. The plan is supposed to 
be based on a strategy of self suficiency (demand estimated at 
20 m.t.a. in 1980) plus a significant role in exports which are 
supposed to amount to 9 m.t.a. in 1980. Even as late as 1977,an 
article by Sidon'io Cardoso Naves, the representative of the Se-
cretary of Planning of the Presidency of the Republic to CONSIDER 
discussed the Master Steel Plan in terms of producing 60 M.t.a 
by 1987/1988. See Planejamento e Desenvolvimento Ano 5, Numero 50 
(Julho 1977) pp. 14-19. 
- 112 -
The latest news^howeveij is that the goal for 
production in 1980 has been reduced to something in the order of 
15 M.t.a., more consistent with the revised demand estimates of 
the RAM-I and RAM-II studies. 
The main difficulty has been and continues to be finan-
cing such expansion projects. The plan of the previous government 
of building capacity up to 32 million tons by 1980 was taken during 
the euphoria of 1973. It demanded more than 20 billion dollars of 
investment which was much more than the country could handle without 
giving up other major investments. 
During the trienium 1971/1973 investments in the 
steel sector averaged US$ 300 million per year. In the trienium 
1974/1976 they averaged US$ 1 billion. In 1977 investments were 
close to US$ 1.5 billion. For the period 1978/1981 are estimated 
at annual averages above US$ 3.5 billion^1^2^ 
With the withdrawal of foreign capital the steel 
industry turned to the Government for greater help in financing 
through the creation of some type of automatic mechanism to tap 
financial resources. In April 1977, through Decree Law 1542} the' 
Government gave steel enterprises a new fiscal incentive for ex-
pansion plans. It gives steel enterprises the right to use for 
investments in expansions and modernization programs 95% of the 
IPI tax they would have had to pay as long as such expansions and 
modernizations receive approval by CONSIDER. It affects operations 
which take place between May 1,1977 and Dec. 31.1986. In 1977 this 
incentive generated Cr$ 1.4 billion. It is estimated to generate 
Cr$ 3.3 - 3.5. billion in 1978 ( 2 ) 
(1) Speech of Minister c£ Planning Reis Velloso at the 8 ^ Brasilian Steel 
Ccngress, Rio de Janeiro, April, -1978. 
(2) This would represent 8% of Brazilian yearly gross capital investment. 
(2) IBID. 
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At the moment all the large plans are behind 
schedule, except for USIMINAS. The latest estimates are that CSN 
and COSIPA, will not complete theiT Phase III expansions plans 
until 1980.^ Tubarâo (3 M.t.a) and Mendes Junior^ will only (31 
enter into production in 1981 or 1982. Finally Açominas 1 (2 M.t.a) 
which was finally made possible by the injection of State money, 
will only start production in 1981. 
(1)According to an article in Tendencia (III n* 33 June 1976,p.38) 
thé flat steel producers will only reach a capacity of 8.8 M.t.a 
in 1980 rather than the originally planned 11.6 M.t.a in 1978. 
However, as the revised demand is only 7.9 M.t.a. Brazil should 
achieve self-suficiency in this sector. In non-flats revised 
demand is 7.9 M.t,.a. and self suficiency will also be guaranteed 
through Mendes Junior and Açominas. 
(2) Although initially planned as a small private plant,. Mendes Junior ended up 
receiving substantial state participation because the State forced the plan 
to be much larger than was planned by the private group, but the latest 
news is that it will finally to produce only 600,000 tons as originally 
planned. 
(3) Açominas received one billicn cruzeiros in government funds. This raised 
crises of protest from the private sector because not only did it mean 
a change in the rules of the game (i.e. State entering the non-flat sector 
which had been reserved for private initiative) but it also meant compe-
tition for Mendes Junior. The private sector wants the State to define its 
degree of statitization in the steel industry and to define the scheme for 
the allocatioi of funds for the sector. 
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-Ih3.The Development And Strategy of USIMINAS In the Macro and 
Market Context. 
5o"3.1. Start of Production And Emphasis On Exports 
USIMINAS was planned for the production of thick 
plates for- the naval industry (which were not currently produced 
in the internal market),cold rolled sheets for the automobile in-
dustry (which was in a stage of constant expansiom); sheets (for 
large liquid reservoirs needed by PETROBRAS, the government owned 
oil company); and storage silos(for agricultural products). 
The original equipment of the plant conisted of: 
2 coke oven batteries of 50 ovens each 
1 Dwight Lloyd type sintering machine 
2 blast furnaces 
1 steel shop with 2 ED converters of 50 tons each 
1 reversible slabbing mill 
1 P-late mill ^ 
1 Hot strip mill 
1 Cold strip mill 
The start of production was done in two stages. 
In -the first s-ta-ge whieh was f in-i-sh-ed in- 1963 only plate was pro-
(2) duced until 1965 when the hot and cold strip mills were finished. J 
The company produced its first rolled products 
in 1963. Its thick plates received approval from Lloyds register 
of London which permitted USIMINAS to start supplying the naval industry 
(!) -The plate mill could be used either for the production of plate or for des-
caling and reducing the thickness of slabs to be used in the hot strip mill. 
Switching from cne use to the other involved a step in production for read-
justments . 
(2) This was part of the original plan.Until its finishing facilities were com-
pleted USIMINAS was to supply part of its semifinished products to COSIPA 
and Ferro and Ago of Vitoria which had greater capacity installed for fi-
nishing than for producing steel. 
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Figure 5.12 
EXPORTS OF USIMINAS 1963-1972 
EXPORTS 1563 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
• 
1971 1972 TOTAL EXPORTS Ì963-1&72 Total- Value 
usi 1.0Ò0 
TOTAL 48 126 743 109,136 87.450 182,355 150,751 124,252 97,000 50,288 92.094 1,067,445 106,523 
LAFTA 34 497 103,274 41.606 82,801 71,208 na na 36,881 18,890 592,284 6S.2S? 
Argentina 33.996 103,204 38,958 77,467 65,715 na na 30,993 15,399 537,641 57,865 
Bolivia - - - - - na na - - 75 12 
Colombia 8 - - - - na na S/118 694 
Paraguay § - - na na 1,395 2,26] 546 
Uruguay 1 .501 70 2,648 3,936 4,542 nä na 4,519 3,491 36,347 4^ 507 
Venezuela 1 - 1.398 951 ha - 1 10,842, 1,608 
Argélia 1 - - - na na 1,873 286 
.Belgium I - - - - - jia na 4^ 580 574 
Japan 40,363 - 39 21,291 - na na - Î 109,187 •M16 
i Puerto: Rico - - - - - na na - | 1.793 2,801 38.3 
U.S.A. Sil, 383 5.862 .45.805 78.263 79.543 na na 13,407 7M11 356.720- 34.942 
Scurçe: USIMIN'AS Annu.a,l R^ por.ts ,1968-1973 
and PETROBRAS. In 1964 its equipment and plates received approval 
by the "Veritas" Bureau of Brussels. In 1964 when the first signs 
of weakness were already evident in the internal market USIMINAS 
started exporting thick plates to Argentina, the U.S., Uruguay and 
Japan, immediately making it the record holder for export of Bra-
zilian flat products, a position it still holds today. 
In large part this seems to have been possible 
because of the quality of its products. From the beginning USIMINAS 
put an emphasis on quality. The philosophy adopted was that since it 
could not start out the biggest given CSN's existence, it would 
try to be the best. As early as 1964 technical studies were under-
taken to improve the quality of its thick plates. In 1964 already 
49$ of its production was structural sheet for the naval and boi-
ler industries, 27$ was general structural sheet and only 24$ was 
for general use. (1) ( USIMINAS' policy of greater product diversification 
and quality improvement will be covered in more detail in chapter seven.) 
During 1965 the firm concluded the stage destined 
to give it a capacity of 500,, 000 tons per annum with the entrance 
into operation of its hot and cold strip mills and second blast 
furnace. As was noted, 1965 was right in the middle of the steel 
crisis affecting the whole industry. 
Because of the weakness of the domestic m a r k e t ^ 
the company placed a greater emphasis on exports. This can be seen 
in figure 5<12. which shows its exports for the period 1963-1972. 
Notice that exports were greatest precisely during the years mar-
king the steel crisis (1964-1968). The peak was in 1967. That year 
(1) USIMINAS; Relatorio Anual 1964, p.7 
(2) In 1965, for the first time in the history of the Brazilian 
steel market, production of rolled products was greater than 
apparent consumption (see figures 3. and 6.1) This was most 
marked in the flat products sector. 
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Brazilian production of flat rolled products fell only 4.2% while 
apparent consumption fell 18.5% so''it'was necessary to export the 
excess. Because of the size limitation of the LAFTA market USIMINAS 
actively studied the U.S. market and in spite of disadvantages in 
transport costs was able to increase its sales to the U.S. 71% 
with respect to 1966, thanks to the quality of its products.^ 
5.3.2. Internal Financial Difficulties And Proposed 
Expansion Plans 
At the same time that the steel market in gene-
ral was in crisis, USIMINAS was undergoing a several internal 
financial crisis because its actual construction costs had turned 
out to be much greater than planned due to rapid inflation, large 
(1) Exports in 1971 were considerably reduced due to increased de-
mands by the internal market. The 1963-1971 anual average was 
103 thousand; in 1971 exports were just 50 thousand. The avera-
ge price per exported ton was 38% greater in 1971 than the 
average for the whole period, due to an increase in the per-
centage of finished products exported. In 197 2 exports increa-
sed again particularly to the U.S., but they had to be reduced 
to a total of 48 thousand in 1973 due to a sharp increase in 
domestic demand which led' the Government to regulate exports, 
In 1974-1975 Brazilian imports of flat products were 32% and 
60% respectively of apparent consumption as a result of spe-
. culative demand resulting from fear of the energy crisis, (see 
figure 5.1 and 5.2) State controlled Companies such as USIMINAS 
became net importers under,a program whereby they were allowed 
to import in order to provide- an orderly supply to the tumul-
tead internal market. In 1974 -1975,and 1976 USIMINAS imported 
198,000, 269,000 tons and 158,000 tons respectively.. 
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currency devaluations, and some alterations in the original pro-
jects. ^  In 1965 it was already obvious that firm would reach the 
break even point only when it attained a minimum production level 
of one million tons per a n n u m ^ . 
(I) Thé original budget elaborated in 1957 had calculated the total 
cost of the plant at Cr$ 12.3 billion which was to be financed: 
4 billion capital stock, 2.95 billion from the BNDE and 5.358 
billion frùm foreign credits. By June 1961 the costs were being 
reestimated at Cr$ 43 billion. By the beginning of 1962 the es-
timated were for a total cost of Cr$ 80 billions and stockhol-
ders agreed to increase the capital stock to Cr$ 18 billion 
with the.Japanese maintaining their share at 40$. The firm ob-
tained substantial advances from the BNDE, Nippcn USIMINAS, 
the National Treasury, and the Banco do Brasil. By the end of 
1962, however it was again obvious that the estimates were be-
low actual costs due to a high inflationaly increase in materiaç 
and labor costs and a further depreciation of the exchange rate. 
After lengthy negotiations between the Brazilian and Japanese 
partners, which went from July 1964 to the end of January 1965, 
agreement was reached on increasing the capital stock to Cr$ 
150 billion, this time the Japanese did not increase théir 
share in proportion to the capital increase so their participa-
tion fell to 21.5$ and it never increased above that again. 
However, the Japanese debt due in 1964 and 1965 and 70$ of the 
European debt due in 1965 were rescheduled for payments star-
ting in 1968. (Information taken from Company Annual Reports 
1957-1965) 
(2) USIMINAS. Relatorio Anual 1965. p.16; Relatorio Annual 1966, 
p".40. In fact, according to the latter it was recomended that 
production be increased to two M.t.a. 
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An expansion plan to attain one M.t.a. capacity 
was drawn up in 1965, It was estimated that investments of close 
to 70 million dollars would be necessary to implement it. The plan 
was submitted to an international financial agency which did not 
approve it. In 1966 a complete study for the one M.t.a plan and 
a preliminary study for an expansion to two M.t.a. were completed. 
Both were submitted to the BNDE - Booz Allen Hamilton group.^ 
However,they were not approved. In 1967, the GCIS report suggested 
that USIMINAS increase its capacity to 1.4 M.t.a. USIMINAS' Tech-
nical Department immediately prepared the 1.4 M.t.a.^ expansion 
plan suggested by the GCIS. This plan was approved in the 1968 
National Steel Plan a launched by'the President of Brazil ^  . The 
plan foresaw the installation of a new coke plant, new sinter plant, 
a remodeling of the blast furnaces, installation of a 3rd BOF con-
vertoij a new continous cold tandem mill, and various complementary 
oven installations.^ ^  
(Ct) USIMINAS, Re 1 at or i o Anual 1966 , p. 40 
(2) USIMINAS, Relatorio Anual 1967, p.17 
(3) The 780.000 tons increase approved for USIMINAS represented 55% 
of the expansions authorized for the 3 large steel producers. 
(4) USIMINAS, Relatorio Anual 1968, p.18. The basic engineering 
for this plan was prepared by a joint Brazilian-Japanese Team. 
The Japanese team was sent by the Yawata Iron and Steel Co. to 
Brazil to gather the necessary preliminary information. Sub-
sequently a Brazilian team travelled to Japan to work on the 
studies which were actually beingdeveloped in that country. 
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There were considerable delays in the implemen-
tation of the 1.4 M.t.a expansion plan. In large part they were 
due to various difficulties in arranging the financial scheme for 
ill 
the plan.1 •'It was not until the second semester of 1970 that the 
first parts of the new equipment entered into operation. 
In March 1970 the Ministry of Industry and Com-
merce asked USIMINAS to present a 3 year expansion plan to cover 
the period until 1973. USIMINAS used the invitation to present a 
10 year expansion plan to cover the period 1970/1980.^ Its jus-
tifications were that such a plan would make possible an analisis 
of the expansion to 1.4 M.t.a. then in progress in relationship 
to future expansions of the company and permit a broader vision 
of the possible contribution of the firm's own internal resources 
for an expansion to 3.5 M.t.a. by 1980.The 10 year plan suggested 
(1)Most of the imported equipment for the plan was financed through a tied loan 
with the Japanese. There were sane difficulties in obtaing Brazilian Govern-
ment approval for the financing scheme as well as additional financing 
fran the BNDE because of the very high debt sales ratio of the company and 
the fact that US$ 75 million owed to foreigners would be due within the 
period 1969-1974. This problem, which also seems to have been the reason why 
previous expansion plans had not received approval, was finally solved when 
the National Treasury agreed to absorb a major portion of these obligations 
in exchange for shares in the company as it had done sane years before for 
' CSN and COSIPA. It was not until late 1969 that the BNDE decided to extent 
USIMINAS the cruzeiro credit or guarantee the company's loan from the Japa-
nese. The evolution of the companies debt/sales ratio between 1966 and 1971 
is given below: 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
5.23 3.53 3.48 2.66 2.01 1.00 
(Figures taken from company annual reports) 
(2) USIMINAS, Piano Decenal (Maio, 1970) 
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that because of the delays which had occurred in the execution of 
the 1.4 M.t.a. plan and that because of imbalances which had re-
sulted between the programmed capacity of the metal producing sec-
tions and the rolling section it was advisable to reformulate the 
plan to 1.8 M.t.a in order to maximize the utilization of the in-
vestments.^ It proposed that instead of reforming the second 
blast furnace as originally planned, a third, new generation blast 
furnacej with a useful internal volume of 2.500 m*^  should be ins-
talled. It would not only fullfill the needs of the 10 year ex-
pansion plan, but also satisfy the modern scale conception of such 
productive units. It would also eliminate the shortage of pig iron 
that would be caused by the stop of blast furnace n9 2 for reform 
in 1973 which would adversely affect the production plan and create 
a need to import US$ 22 million worth of products. This stage was 
to be concluded toward the end of 1973. A second expansion to pro-
duce 2.4 M.t.a. would be executed between 1974 and the end of 1978. 
The main objective to be achieved was righting the result defici-
ency in rolling of thick plates which resulted from the expansion 
of metal producing capacity and which was coherent with provisions 
of shortage for that product. To that end a new plate mill was to 
be installed. The necessary increase in steel capacity was to be 
met by a substitution of the three BOF convertors by some of greater 
size. A third expansion to reach 3.5 M.t.a was to be executed between 
1977 and 1980 to meet market needs forseen for 1981-1985. It would 
utilize to the limit the pig iron producing capacity of the three 
blast furnaces and would require a new steel shop with continous casting equip-
ment to supplement the plant's slabbing capacity. In the rolling section to ca-
pacity of the cold rolling mill would be doubled through a remotorization to 
(1) The poor financial performance of the company described in p. 
stemmed in part from high investment to the actual capacity 
of the plant. The dramatic improvement which were achieved in 
the ratio of capital output value .was shown in figure 1.1. 
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increase its speed. 
CD 
This expansion plan was approved by CONSIDER 
and the BNDE ^  which qualified USIMINAS to receive the various 
fiscal incentives which subsidize capital investment explained before. 
Due to an overlap between the 1.4-M.t.a. expansion in course and 
the intermediate 2.4 M.t.a. plan, they were consolidated both 
technically and financially into one which was to be finished by 
December of 1973. 
5.3.3. USIMINAS' Actual Production And Expansions 
USIMINAS has in fact gone through with the 10 
year plan. In order to help orient the analysis of technical chan-
ge which will developed in the next chapter Figure 5.13 presents 
a flow diagram of what the initial integrated plant looked like in 
1966 and figure 5.14 presents a flow diagram of what the plant 
will look like by next year when it completes its expansion to 
3.5 M.t.a. Figure 515 provides a summary of the sequence in which 
the equipment was installed in each section of the plant as well 
as the annual production of each of the five sections. 
Two major points can be drawn from figure 5.15, 
the first is that the main equipment units of the expansion plans 
did not start to enter into operation until 1973. As was noted 
above since 1965 the firm was aware that it had to increase pro-
duction to a minimum of one million tons per annum in order to 
break even. It drew up various expansion plans involving the pur-
(1)As was developed in the previous section the First National 
Expansion Plan which was launched in 1971 called for an increase 
of Brazilian Steel Production to 20 M.t.aby 1980 and it programed an 
expansion for COSIPA identical to USIMINAS, and one slighty 
larger for CSN which was supposed to reach 4.0 M.t.a instead of 
3.5 M.t.a in 1980. 
(2) In 1971 the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment and the Inter American Development Bank sent an appraisal-
mission to USIMINAS which approved the expansion plans to 2.4 
M.t.a and led to credits from.these two financial institutions 
covering 105 million dollars out of an estimate total cost of 
US$ 576 million dollars. As will, be developed below, partici-
pation by these Banks affected the purchase of equipment in 
that they require the borrower to adopt a system of open inter-
national bidding for equipment supply. 
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Figure 5.13 
USIMINAS - INITIAL PRODUCTION FLOW PROFILE - 1966 
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chase o£ new equipment, but it was not able to raise the financial 
resources necessary for them either in Brazil or abroad because 
o£ its very high debt/sales ratios and because of the poor demand 
conditions in the Brazilian Steel market. The firm was thus forced 
to decrease costs and expand production with virtually no invest-
ment in new equipment.. ^  As can be seen in figure 5 J.5 and will 
be detailed in chapter six it was able to increase output to almost 
1,200,000 tons by 1972 with basically the original equipment.This 
was part of a conscious strategy to squeeze as much as possible 
out of the existing equipment. The 1969 anual report for example, 
commenting on 22% increase in production of steel ingots achieved 
in 1969 over the 1968 level states: 
Such efforts represent the effort which our 
enterprise is developing to improve its pro 
fitability through the reduction of costs 
by way of an increase in production.(1) 
It should be noted that the firm did not seem to know how much 
it could ultimately squeeze out of the equipment. In 1969 for exam-
ple the same anual report claimed that with the 790,000 tons it 
had been able to produce that year it practically attained its "ma-
ximum probable production" and that additional improvements in 
profitability would come through greater sales receipts from the 
maximum production of the"noblest"and highest quality steel which 
f 2") 
gave greater returnsv .The next chapter will explain how the maximum 
probable production was continually increased in the various sec-
tions . 
(1) USIMINAS, Relatório Anual 1969, p.8 
ci fl 
(2) IBID, pp. 8-9. The term noblest refers to higher priced steel 
which is usually associated with greater processing or higher 
qualities. 
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The- second major point is the magnitude and capital 
intensive nature of the second expansion. It should be remembered from 
the discussion in section 5.2 that such an expansion was part of an 
ambitious, Government orchestrated expansion of the country's steel 
producing capacity. It should also be noted that the expansion re-
ceived significant fiscal incentives which considerably subsidized 
the -use of capital*. The firm was thus operating in a different eco-
nomic context. While the period until the turn of the decade was 
primarily one of a depressed market and a scarcity of investment 
funds, the first half of the 70"s was characterized by a booming 
market-and-cheap capital for expansion. Such macroeconomic and mar-
ket factors have put a definite mark on the technological develop-
ment of the firm. 
It is important to keep in mind that the rising produc-
tion levels presented in figure 5.15 and the rising technological 
indexes which shall be presented in the next chapter are the re-
sults of something else which was happening within the company. 
Behind them was the development of an elaborate organizational and 
control structure. In addition the planning and implementation of 
the formal expansion plans led to important changes in the organi-
zational structures of the firm. Both these changes will be dis-
cussed in chapter seven which focuses on the organizational changes 
behind the technological development of the firm. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
6. TECHNICAL CHANGE IN THE PLANT 
Now that the background on the creation of the 
firm and the context in which it has operated have been laid out 
this chapter examines in detail the technical change which has 
taken place. This shall be treated in five parts: the strategy 
behind'the start-up of the plant, an overview of some aspects of 
technical change; main technical changes in each productive sector, 
the possibilities opened up by the large capital intensive expansion 
plans of the seventies, and the impact of the energy crisis on 
technological and productivity parameters. 
6.1. Start-up Of The Plant 
By way of introduction to a description of the modifica-
tions and learning which took place in the first 15 months or so of 
the plants operation it is instructive to describe some initial pro-
blems with raw m a t e r i a l s . ^ 
The plant had been projected to receive iron ore with a-
maximum size of 30mm with 65$ below 10mm. Because it was impossible 
to obtain ore with those specifications and because it was decided 
to use 100$ sinter, the plant passed to use fines from Itabira. For 
proper sinter operation the plant specified certain standards for 
the chemical and physical properties of the materials with fixed to-
lerance for deviations. Unfortunately the mineral supplied to the plant 
by the Companhia Vale do Rio Doce did not fall within the permissi-
ble tolerances, particularly with respect to the Si0 2 level^Varia-
ci) The material in this section it based or Moacélió Mendos and Jose 
Barros Cota- "Preparagào dos Materias Primas e seu Efeito no Alto 
Forno da USIMINAS" METALURGIA ABM Vol. 21 n* 91 (Junho.1965) pp. 
471*"477 « 
(2) When the plan was designed there was no certainly of thè exact 
composition of the raw materials which would be supplied. 
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tions in the SiO^ level produced parallel variations in blast furnace 
-operation and high consumption of expensive lime. For that reason, 
©yen though the installations had not been projected for homogeniza-
tion; the plant was forced to develop homogenization techniques in 
the raw material yard and preparation stages. The need for homogeni-
zation plus the problem with the granulometric distribution of the 
mineral actually received versus that for with the installations had 
been projected caused several difficulties and bottlenecks in the raw 
material receiving, handling and preparation sectors. These are dis-
cussed in more detail in Appendix II»It should be noted that in a multi 
process operation such as steel production succeding sectors are 
dependent on the -preceeding ones so pioblems in the. raw materials 
sections have repercussions on the whole operation. 
The homogenization operations carried out in the raw mate-
rials yard turned out not to be sufficient to control the SiO^ va-
riations so it was accessary to carry out secondary homogenization 
using four storage silos from which equal percentages came to be 
withdrawn. All of these modifications, of course, represented technic 
cal changes whose purpose was to control the physical and chemical 
characteristics of the raw materials^ We would have like to have stu-
died these changes in more detail, particularly with respect to -how, 
and by whom they were conceived, but we were not able to obtain that 
sort of information. The ones that we have identified seem to have 
been carried out mostly by the Japanese, for as we have already noted 
they were initially responsible for the operation of the plant. 
(1) Iron ore frcm Itabira is hematitic and is characterized by a high degree of pu-
rity, but presents a difficulty for sinterization in terms of resistance. In 
order to increase the resistance it is common to add various components, such 
as sands, Tolling scarf, lime, blast furnace dust, slags, and even iron poor 
minerals. After various preliminary laboratory tesns, USIMINAS opted for the 
use of granulated slag plus lime. Considering that USIMINAS's furnaces are coke 
based, that Itabira ore is very pure, and that about 340kgs of slag have to be 
produced per toi of pig ircxi for dessulfurizarian purposes, it is necessary to 
tidd^a certain percentage of fluxes in order to produce the necessary slag. The 
^addition of granulated slag provided slag forming elements already in a chemi-
cal-physical state which would otherwise have to be obtained in reactions of 
ordinary fluxing agents that would involve high fuel costs. This also meant 
- 130 -
USXMINAS did not seem to encounter any problems ,at least 
initially , related to quality of or variations in lime or maganese 
supply. However, it has had considerable problems with respect to 
both the quantity and the quality of the coal which it can use. In 
part the problem has to. do with th-s instability of foreign supply, in part 
to the Government requirement that coke based steel firms use 40$ na 
tional coal which is of much lower quality and much higher c o s t - ^ 
Footnot continued from previous page 
that part of the CaCL which would have to supplied by the lime was substituted 
by a much cheaper material. Granulated slag was also added to maintain the per-
centage of SiCL constant in the sinter which is necessary for maximun operatio-
nal results. Tne addition, of CaCL to the sinter rather than directly in the 
blast furnaces brings advantages in blast furnace operation not only through 
a better distribution of CaCL in the charge,but also by transfering to a previous 
process (sinterizaticn where it can be dene at lower cost) the dissasociation 
of CaCL, giving the blast furnace a greater specific volume and saving fuel 
cost. Addition of CaO to the sinter causes a fall in resistance but yields an 
overall favorable effect. 
(1) The problem with Brazilian coal is a very high ash content and a 
high sulfur content. The higher the percentage of ash in the coke 
the lower the productivity of the blast furnace and the higher 
the coke rate. Lowering the ash content,therefore, gives a double 
benefit—less coke is necessary per ton of pig iron produced, and 
the productivity of the blast furnace itself is increased as the 
re is a more efficient use of its volume. The graph below shows 
how using decreasing proportions of the high ash Brazilian coal 
effects: 1) the cost of coke per ton of pig iron, 2) the price of 
pig iron produced, 3) the production of pig iron, 4) the amount 
of the ash content in the coke, and 5) the coke rate. 
The source of the graph is Naoto Na 
kamura, "Desenvolvimento da Tecnica 
de Produgao de Gusa e Situagao da 
USIMINAS" METALURGIA ABM Vol. 21 
n 9 87 (Fevereiro 1965) p. 115 
AO SO ZO 
Proportion of Brazilian Coal in 
Mixture 
It should also be noted that besides being of poorer quality,Brazi^ 
lian coal is more expensive than imported coal. In 1 9 6 6 ^ ton of 
Brazilian coal delivered at USIMINAS was twice as expensive as im-
ported American coal delivered at the plant. 
Appendix III- treats the coal problem in more detail. 
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6.1.1 iThe first 15 months of the sinter plant ' 
When the sinter plant started operation }very little was 
known about the characteristics of the. Itabira fines or of their beha-
vior in the production of sinter. Initial operation was based on pre-
vious tests on pilot plants and on the experience of Japanese techni-
cians from the Yawata Iron and Steel Co. Production started with a mi-
nimum of inuputs which were later increased in order to control and 
improve certain characteristics. As more intimate knowledge of the ore 
was acquired based on operational results, doubts were reduced and tho-
se which remained were tested in the .pilot plant. In that way it was possi^ 
ble to obtain data which permitted modification of initial criteria in 
order to better attend to the demands of the blast furnaces. During 
the first 15 months of operation there were four distinct phases as 
s.hown below. 
PHASE I: Characterized by no homogenization and by the addition of gra-
nualted slag (February 1 - June 3, 1963). 
This period was characterized b y great variations in the 
chemical and physical characteristics, high resistance, high FeO con-
tent and satisfactory productivity-at 25.5 tons per cubic meter-which 
was slighly above the nominal rating of 25 t/m . 
PHASE II: Characterized by homogenization and the addition of granula-
ted slag. (June 6-August 12, 1963). 
In this period there was a fall in the variation of the SiC^ 
content of sinter even though there was greater variation in that of the 
raw material received. This permitted use of less percentage of coke 
(1) Mendes and Cota Op Cit pp. 478-481. 
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in the mixture which resulted in less FeO content. There was a fall in 
production. That was due not to reduced effici ency, but to the necessi 
ty of making many stops to adjust the equipment. 
PHASE III: Characterized by homogenization and the addition of lime. 
In order to improve the efficiency of blast furnarce opera 
tion^part of the lime previously added directly at the blast furnace 
was mixed in with the sinter. This caused larger variations in all the 
characteristics of the sinter, a fall in resistance, and an increase 
in the FeO content. All of these changes indicated the need for coun-
termeasures. 
PHASE IV: Characterized by homogenization and the addition of lime and 
granulated slag. (November 20, 1963-April 20, 1964) 
To maintain stability in the characteristics of the mixture 
particularly the Si0 2 level, granulated slag was added and better con-
trol was established over the feeder scales from the supply silos 
for better measurement of proportions. A reduction in coke comsumption . • • - , 2 
and of FeO were obtained and productivity was increased to 30.2 t/m /day. 
As far as we could tell the plant started operation with 
only one shift per day and gradually moved to a three shift basis by 
1965." 
6.1.2. The fii;st 15 months of blast furnace n 9 
The strategy of operating the equipment in the simplest 
way possible in order to master its basic characteristics and then to 
start varying additional parameters in order to improve its performan-
ce can be seen clearly in the case of the operation of the first blast 
(1) The main sourccs for this section are Mendes and Cota, Op Cit, pp. 
481-485and Nakamura On Cit pp. 116-121. 
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furnace. This furnace entered into operation in October, 1962. In the 
% 
first four months only mineral ore was used in the charge and resulted 
in poor operating stability due to numerours slips and "hargings"a switch 
was then made to 100% common sinter. After approximately nine months of 
operation with common sinter^ a switch was made to 100% lime sinter. 
In both cases a more gradual change was desired in order to compare the 
influence of different percentages of the sinter on the productivity 
with the object of choosing the mix that gave the best results. That was 
not possible, however, for reasons beyond the blast furnace section's 
control. Taking the last two months of each of the subperiods in order 
to allow some time for the training and adaptation of the inexperienced 
staff to the change, the results are given in the figure 6.1 below. 
Throughout this period the blast furnace was only working 
at 60% of capacity using only 8 of its 16 tuyeres. 
The average daily production increased 17% from the first 
period to the second when ordinary sinter xvas used, but it fell about 
4%when common sinter was substituted by lime sinter. Notice however that 
with latter substitution the amount of coke used per ton of pig iron 
produced, which had fallen 100 kilograms with the first change, fell 
another 76 kgs. Notice too how the average amount of dust produced per 
ton of pig iron fell from 60 kilograms to less than seven with the 
switch to sinter. Although average daily production was .65 tons per 
cubic meter of blast furnace volume in February/March of 1963, accor-
ding to the chief of the blast furnace section, it was close to 1.0 
by July 1 9 6 4 ^ . The objective was to eventually reach 1.5 tons, per 
cubic meter. According to him USIMINAS was considering adopting oil 
injection in 1965 when they started operating the second blast furnace 
if the price of oil was still relatively cheaper than coal. However, he 
pointed out that if USIMINAS was able to acquire coal at a lower cost 
(1) Naoto Nakamura . O n Cit pp. 121-124. 
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Figure 6.1.: Main Results of First 15 months of Operation 
of Blast Furnace n9 1 
¡100$ HEMATITE 
¡(dec.62-jan.63) 
100$ COMCN SINTER 
(jul/aug. 63) 
100$ LIME SINTER 
feb./mar.64) 
COKE CONSUMPTION PER 
TCN OF PIG IRON 738 kg/t 638.5 kg/t 562.5 kg/t 
BUST PER TON OF 
PIG IRON 60 kg/t 7 kg/t 4 kg/t 
SLIPS 136 5 4 
"HANGINGS 0 0 0 
AV: DAILY PRODUCTION 596 t 594 t 573 t 
ÂV. DAILY PRODUCTION 
PER VOLUME OF FURN/CE. .572 t/m3 .671 t/m3 .648 t/m3 
% SI .96 .72 .80 
1 S .034 .029 .031 
SLAG PER TON OF PIG 
IRON 367 t 416 t 338 t 
Source: Mendes and Cota,Op Cit p. 482-^485 
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they would delay the adoption of oil injection until later, unless for-
ced to because of inadequate coal supplies. 
6.1.3- T h e £ i r s t 1 2 Months of The Steel S h o p ^ 
For the steel shop in addition to the technical information 
we also have some information or training which we have included for 
the light it throws on what was involved in starting a steel plant 
at a time where there was still relatively poorly prepared manpower. 
The first slep was a selection of workers which was done through inten 
sive interviews and standardized tests. The workers selected in this 
way went through a three phase training program under the supervision 
and orientation of Brazilian engineers and technicians. The first pha-
se started in July 1962 with practical classes in arithmetic and indus-
trial security with periodic tests. According to the results, in Decern 
ber, 1962, fifty nine operatiors were picked for the second phase which 
consisted of classes on steel works, security and the operation of the 
rolling cranes. In February, 1963 workers were divided according to 
the functions they were to execute. The third phase consisted of clas^e' 
on steel production, security and practical instruction on the work si th-
under close to normal operating conditions. Depending on their particu-
lar functions operators were then worked on by Japanese technicians in 
a final finishing phase. By March, 1963 the first shift had been trai-
ned. The second shift was trained by May 1963. It should be noted that 
601 of the personnel selected had no industrial experience. 
Figure 6.2 below summarizes the results of the first 12 
months of operation of the LD shop in USIMINAS covering the period June 
1963 to June 1964 and compares them to those for the start of a similar 
(21 
LD shop in Japan (1958-1959). The data is actually for the number of 
runs which closely parallels production as the output per run is more 
of or less the same (the average increased from 53.7 tons the first 
(1) Valo'rio S. Fusaro, Et. A1 "Resumo do um ano de Produgao na Aciaria 
LD da USIMINAS" MKTALURGIA ABM, Vol. 21 n* 9, Julho, 1965)pp.459-4(>n. 
(2) This was a comparison done by USIMINAS own personnel. 
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asonth to 57o3 tons the 12 th month) 
Figure 6.2 
STEEL SHOP: AVERAGE NUMBER OF PUNS PER MCNTH 
Months 
Source: Fusaro, Op. Cit p.465 
Operation started in June with only one converter. The se-
cond converter started operation the next month, but work was still on 
ly on a one shift basis. Two shift operation started the following month 
Three shift operation did not start until April 1964. In both the 
USIMINAS and the Japanese case, after the third month the number of 
runs per day more or less stabilized. Note though that while the.Japa-
nese plant reached an average of 27 runs per day by the fourth month, 
USIMINAS stayed an average of only 12 runs per day and reached a maxi-
mun of only 20 by the 12th month. One reason for the much higher number 
of runs in Japan, apart from its longer experience and greater volume 
of production (Japan was already the sixth largest steel producer in 
the world in 1953 and has been the third largest since 1963) it that 
the Japanese workers were selected mainly among personnel with pre-
vious experience in S M and electric arc steel furnaces, while in 
USIMINAS very few had any steel experience. 
In terms of actual production, by the 12th month USIMINAS 
.was operating 18 shifts , per week, as a whole day was still 
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being reserved for preventive maintenance. Production was still only 
621 of the nominal capacity rating of 42.000 tons per month. An inte-
resting point is that between June 1963 and May, 1964 thirty nine dif-
ferent types of steel were produced. The degree of reproduction (de-
gree of attainment of the targets set) since the begining of production 
is given in figure 6-.3. .As can be see there was a continuos improvement 
ih that index. 
Figure 6.3— 






Source: Fusaro, Op Cit, p. 465 
• 1 • i n 'u a I j i 4 * nu I«« 
Figure 6.4: AVERAGE LIFE OF LD CONVERTERS 
C 0 N V E R T E R N? 1 





1 201 54.8 11.024 10.0 
2 250 56.6 14.156 7.9 
3 357 56.3 20.118 5.03 
4 374 57.4 21.335 5,27 
5 370 63.5 23.506 5 ,77 
-
C 0 N . V E R T E R N* 2 
1 207 53.0 10.970 8,4 
2 301 56.0 16 .851 8,2 
3 361 56.8 20.512 4,80 
4 3.25 57.1 18.570 4,96 
Source:. Fusaro, Op. Cit. » p. 466 
r - 1 3 8 -
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6,1.4. Conclusion- Start:---up 
In all three cases we were able to obtain information on it 
is evident that the -strategy was to start with the very simplest level 
with the fewest number of parameters and below capacity. As the basics 
were mastered more turns were gradually added and progress was made toward 
reaching the capacity levels- of the equipment. Notice too that in both 
the sinter and furnace cases, where productivity is more dependent on 
the physical and chemiral characteristics of the raw materials attempts 
were made to learn more about the effect of those characteristics on 
the operation and productivity of the equipment, and to control those 
characteristics in order to improve performance and quality. 
In all three cases it is possible to see a learning effect 
not only in terms of increase in overall production, but also in terms 
of some parameters such as productivity per relevant equipment area or 
volume and decrease in specific consumption of key raw materials. 
Although we have not been able to identify how this learning occurred, 
and how it came about it seems that at least in part it was accomplished 
due to the Japanese guidance, in part to the operational experience it 
self. 
It is also evident that a lot of the modifications did not 
result from mere chance or accumulated operational experience, but 
were the results of carefully controlled tests and studies apart from 
the production line. Unfortunately,it has be3n impossible to clearly 
separate the origin of the various changes or to distinguish which 
." seemed to occur naturally as experience was obtained from direct pro-
duction, and which resulted from the specific separate studies or ex-
periences. This was not only because our information is not detailed 
enough, but also because the two seem to be closely interrelated.Ope-
rational experience seemed to lead to separate tests whose results we 
re sometimes adopted into operational practice which in turn was the 
basis from more tests arid so on in a dynamic evolution. 
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6.2. Overview of Some Aspects of Technical Change 
Figure 6.5. presents a set of aggregate series 
which give an indication of some aspects of technical change which 
have taken place in USIMINAS. Essentially^the series consists of . 
steel production; employment] industrial costs as a percentage of 
salesj and three rough proxies for the productivity of the labor, 
capital, and raw material imputs. The productivity of capital is re-
presented by the capital output (sales) ratio; that of labor by 
output per man employed; and that of raw materials by the coke rate^1 
Examination of the series reveals that there are two distinct periods 
with the break occuring roughly at 1972. 
6.2.1. The Period Until 1972 
As noted in the previous chapter one of the most 
notable characteristics of the technical change which took place at 
USIMINAS was the stretching of the capacity of the original equip-
ment. Figure 6.6. shows: 1) the initial nominal capacity of the 
original equipment, 2) the approximate time it took to reach the 
nominal capacity of the equipment since the start of operations, 
3) output for the year before new units entered into production, 
4) production in that year as a percentage of original nominal capa-
city. In the case of coke ovens and blast furnaces,where there were 
two units,we have calculated the time taken to reach nominal capa-
city from 1965, the year both units started operating in each section 
rather than from when the first unit started up. 
The table shows that the greatest capacity increase 
occurred in the blast furnace section where production increased to 
237% of the initial capacity level in seven years. It was followed 
(l)The cost of coke represents approximately 70 % of the raw mate-
rial costs of the production of steel in USIMINAS.(Naoto Nakamura 
"Desenvolvimento da Tecnica de Produgao de Gusa e Situagao da 
USIMINAS", Metalurgia ABM, Vol. 21, N 9 87(Fev., .1965), p.113 
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B5URS6.3. AGGREGATE SERIES ON SOME ASPECTS OF TECHNICAL CHARGE 
F ——(O?:G:>CAI £3U:FM;NT PHASE>- YF- (CAPTO. INTENSIVE EXPANSON PHA£?>—^ . 
2000 
1262 63 64 65 66 67 68 S9 7071 7 2 7 3 74 75 76 1977 YEAR 
Figure 6.6. Capacity Stretching With The Original Equipment 
SINTER COKE PLANT 1 BLAST FURNACES 2 STEEL SHOP 
NOMINAL CAPACITY 770,000 t.a. 507,000 t.a 504,000 t.a. 500,000 t.a 










PRODUCTION OF YEAR BEFORE 









% INCREASE OVER THE INITIAL 
NOMINAL CAPACITY 101% 25% 137% 1341 
TIME TAKEN IN YEARS SEVEN YEARS THREE YEARS SEVEN YEARS SIX YEARS 
NOTES: 1) The coke plant actually consists of two batteries with an initial nominal capacity 
of 725 tons per day each (253,750 ton). The first entered into operation in 1962, 
the second in 1965. 
2) There are actually two blast furnaces with an initial nominal capacity of 
700 tore per day each (252.000 t.a.). The first entered into operation in 1963, the 
second in 1965. 
by the steel shop where production increased to 234% in six years, 
tiher. by -sinter section- where" ^ it -i'nfrreasecT- to 201% in seven years 
and finally by the coke ovens where .it only increased to 125% in 
three years. The different sections had-the same ranking in terms 
of the time it took to reach nominal capacity. The blast furnace 
section took only about one year, the steel shop about three, the 
sinter plant about. four and the coke pliant about five. These cal-
culations were not done for the rolling -Section because of the dif-
ficulty of computing any capacity measure in view of the influence 
of:product mix and auxiliary ovens On capacity, and the lack of 
disaggregated data by different pieces of rolling equipment. It 
should be noted that these figures-are to be interpreted with cau-
tion because nominal capacity is à somewhat nebulous concept in 
practice because it depends on auxiliary equipment, raw materials, 
and specific operating c o n d i t i o n s . ^ 
The main reason for this capacity stretching was 
that the firm could not reach a break-even point unless it attai-
ned a minimum production of one million tons through a plant expan-
sion which was estimated to cost roughly one quarter of thé origi-
nal investment. The firm was unable to obtain funds to finance that 
expansion so it was forced to increase the capacity of the original 
(l)In particular it should be noted that although the blast furnaces 
had.an initial rated capacity of 700 tons per day, they were 
based on project characteristics similar to those of blast furna-
ce n 9 2 of the Fukoaka plant in Japan which was producing at 
the rate of 1175 tons per day. Nevertheless, the USIMINAS furna-
ces suposed even the Japanese, rate, as will be seen in figure 
6.11. 
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equipment with virtually no new investments. 
That it was able to squeeze more out of the initial 
capital invested can be seen not only from the data in figure 6.6. 
but also from the evalution of the two différent capital/sales 
ratios in figure b.5. Regardless Of whether the depreciated or the 
undepreciated capital values are taken thërë is the same more or 
less continous decrease in that ràtio between 1967 and 1972 which is 
thé last year béfore major new units wére installed,^^ The decrease 
in the capital output ratio was between 2.7 and 3.4 times depending 
on whether the latter or the former series is used. It should be 
noted that part of the reduction in the capital output ratio may have 
been the result of a shift in the composition of the product mix 
to more valuable products. As will bé séen in chapter seven such a 
shift was part of a conscious product diversifying strategy which is 
a type of technical change itself. 
The two series on output per man show a more than 
fourfold increase in productivity between 1965 and 1972. As there 
was very little investment in auxiliary machinery during that pe-
riod, the productivity increase retiects greater efficiency in the 
use of labor and equipment since this is a capital dominated indus-
try. By referring to the steel output and employment series it is 
possible to see that the 4.5 times increase in productivity between 
1965 and 1972 was the result of the combined effects of a three-fold 
(1)1967 was used as a base year in these series because before that 
year it was not possible to obtain values for the equipment which 
were adjusted for inflation. It is possible that the inflation 
-adjtistment-m^ed to revalue the stock of capital was lower than 
thé actual- rate of inflation, but it should be remmembered from 
the preceding chapter that,in general^ the pricesof steel products 
were not allowed to rise as fast as the general rate of infla-
tion. 
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increase in output and a reduction -of about one-third in the num-
ber of people employed. (The reasons behind the reduction in the 
labor force shall be discussed in chapter ¿even.) 
The improvement in the -efficiency of capital and 
labor reflected in the series is also due to technical change con-
nected to the selection, control and efficient use of raw materials.. 
The series on the reduction of the coke rate for blastiurnace n 9 l 
-serves as a rough proxy for this type of improvement. Notice that 
it has fallen slighly over between the start of production and 
1972. 
In terms of the evalution of costs a very rough 
proxy is the percentage which industrial c o s t s ^ ^ represent of the 
total sales value. This is a very indirect proxy because^as was 
noted in the previous chapter ;the price of steel in Brazil is con-
trolled by the Government and the price, of steel was not allowed 
to rise as fast as costs for a substantial portion of the period 
in question (see figure 5.8 ). However^the fall from roughly 95$ 
of sales in 1966 which was the first full year of integrated ope-
ration to 50$ in 1972 would seem to indicate some improvement in 
manufacturing costs. 
6.2.2. The period after 1972 
The most notable feature in the series in the post 
1972 period is the sharp trough which most of the series which 
(1) These do not include depreciation or amortization charges but that is not 
too serious a problem because the series on capital output ratios indirect 
tly help to fill this gap. In fact the substantial fall in the capital out-
put ratio imply that depreciation charges per unit have also fallen subs-
tantially 
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were ascending ((except number of people employed) show between 
1973 and 1975. In part the rough in the series was due to dis-
ruptions caused by the large capital' intensive expansion plan 
which went into full construction during that period. ^  However 
as will be seen below when we look in more detail at the operation 
of the blast furnaces >to a large extent it was also a repercussion 
of the energy crisis which led to a coal shortage that affected not 
only the quantity but also the quality of the coke available»This 
is reflected in the increase in the coke rate for blast furnace n 9l 
which can be seen in the series presented. Because steel production 
is a multistage operation such a disruption in the coke oven and 
blast furnace section has repercussions, all the way up through the 
finishing stages. In fact the severety of the crisis could be seen 
at the macro level in that as is shown in figure 5.1 the output of 
flat rolled products (which are produced by coke based plants) suf-
fered a fall. Note too that industrial costs as a percent of sales 
show a rise during this period. 
The fall in output per man in the 1973-1974 period 
parallels the fall in production but is much more accentuated be-
cause of the large increase of the number of people employed. In 
fact, between 1972 and 1977 employment almost doubled as a result 
of the more than two fold expansion of the plant. 
(1) At the MIC-CONSIDER Technology week cited earlier, then Presi-
dent Lanari stated that one .of the greatest costs of an expan-
sion plan like USIMINAS' was the disruption it caused in 
normal operations. He estimated that these could be in the 
order of 20%. 
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6.3. Main Technical Changes In Each Productive Sector 
Although in general this section will present 
series for production and technical parameters throughout the 
whole period of operation of the plant, the emphasis will be on 
that part relating to what was achieved with the original equip-
ment. The following two sections will develop the post 1972 period 
sinter section is presented in figure 6. As can be seen from the 
production series on sinter, output fell in 1974 which was the year 
the new sinter machine came on stream. We have not been able to 
determine what extent this was due to the introduction to the new 
sinter plant. It is known that USIMINAS like the rest of Brazilian 
firms, faced a severe coal crisis in 1974 which not only affected 
the amount but also the quality of the coal which it could obtain. 
The decrease in quality of the coal had a significant negative 
effect on the productivity of the various units. Notice that while 
there was a continous increase in the productivity of sinter ma-
chine s-9 1 between 1965 and 1973 at an average rate of 8.6% there 
was a fall of 6.6% in 1974 and of 48.5% in 1975 with respect to 
the maximum reached in 197 3. 
pacity of 7.200 tons per day incorporated some modifications and 
adoptations based oil the experience with the first machine. It 
entered with a productivity 70% of machine n 9 l's level and although 
it increased 17% to 81% of that machine peak in 1973 it saffered 
small fall in 1976. 
(1) The data on which this graph ancl other such grophs was based 
are in Appendix 8. 
6.3.1. Sinter Machines 
The basic production and erational data for the 
The second sinter machine which was rated at a ca-
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figure 6.7 BASIC SERIES _ SINTER MACHINES 
The original sinter machine was rated at a nominal 
capacity of 2.220 tons per day (770.000 t.a.) based on a producti-2 
vity of 25 tons/day/m . It was based on a Mackee design but manu-
factured by Mitisubishi Ship-Building and Engineering Co. Ltd, who 
introduced some innovations of its own in the equipment having to 
do with the cooling system and the air blocking system. The machine 
was also partially adapted to Brazilian conditions in relation to 
the higher percentage of fines in Brazilian minerals. 
The increase in production of sinter machine n 9l 
during the period 1963-1973 was due not only to an increase in the 
operating index, but more importantly to increases in productivity 
per square meter of machine area. Notice that although the sinter 
machine was operating at only 56$ of nominal capacity in 1964, that 
was due to low operating rates, not to low productivity, as the 
latter was already at 100$ of the 25 t/day/m3 specified in the pro-
ject. 
The increases in operating rates and productivity 
were in large part the result of changes in type, quality and con-
trol of raw materials. As indicated in section 6.1.1., the basic 
strategy was to start operating with the simplest combination of 
imputs, master the basic operational techniques and then try to 
refine the techniques and the process as more experience was accu-
mulated as a result of operation and various studies. 
Figure. 6.8. 
SINTER MACHINE N' 1: SPECIFIC CONSUMPTION OF 
RAW MATERIALS (kgs per ton of sinter 1963-1973) 
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For the first four years (1963-1966) only three main types 
of raw materials were used - iron ore fines, blast furnace slag, and 
lime. As can be seen from the table presented in figure 6.8 by 1967 
the number of raw materials had more than doubled. In 1968-9 the num-
ber dropped to eight although the proportions were significantly al-
tered and there was some substituion. 
From 1970 on the number of•raw materials used increased 
continously to 13 by 1973. 
Mineral ore fines are the main raw material of sinter. It 
contributes approximately 60% of the iron and 60% of the silica. Vari-
ations in its physical and chemical qualities significantly affect the 
performance of sinterization. The quality, chemical composition and 
physical characteristics (granulometric distribution) of the mineral 
ore fines received by the plant have varied significantly over the 
years as can be seen in figure 6.9 . The introduction of new mate-
rials has become necessary to correct the granulometric curve of the 
mineral as well as to give the mixture the physical and chemical cha-
racteristics needed for the sintering process to have a high produc-
titity index with the= best characyeristics for its use at the blast 
furnace stage. As can be seen in figure 6.8 the consumption of mineral 
ore fines per ton of sinter produced has gradually fallen from 928 kg 
in 1963 to 596 kg in 1973 due to the introduction of and substitution 
by other raw materials. 
We do not have detailed information on. who was responsible 
for the conception of the Changes or on how they were decided. All we 
know is that was considerable experimentation including testing on a 
pilot sinter plant which USIMINAS seems to have had from the very 
beginning although it is now part of the recently created research 
center. 
- 150 -
Figure 6 * 91: Variations in Quality and Size of Ore 
Received by USIMINAS 
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is should be noted that increases in productivity to aug-
ment the capacity of an installation usually result, in a deteriora-
tion of the quality of the product. In the case of sinter machine 
the increases in productivity were concurrent with an increase in the 
quality of the sinter. 
In order to maintain the proper content of FeT, FeO, CaO, 
SiO a and Al^O^ in the sinter it was necessary not only to change the 
methods of control of the raw materials and the process, but also to 
develop new methpds. These methods included not only machine related 
operations such as improving the dosage systems of raw materials on 
the feeding tables, or the size of the sinter, but also to more orga-
nizational aspects such as paying periodic visits to the raw material 
suppliers, perfecting the system fo blending mineral ore fines in the 
raw materials yard, introducing new forms for the annotation of addi-
tional control information, training of personnel (particularly of 
those, tied to the collection of samples) and development of new ways 
to control basidity. 
For example^ in relation to the control of basidity, until 
June 1972 the control of (increase in) SiC>2 content was done through 
addition of blast furnace slag. However, the slag contained 17% 
which had adverse effects on the performance of the sinter in the 
blast furnace. In July, 1972 the technology of using fine quartzite to 
attain the content of Si0 2 desired in the mixture was introduced. After 
realizing several tests and obtaining access to sufficient fine quart-
zite, it was possible to to stop using blast furnace slag and to switch 
to the use of fine quartzite (November, 1972) which did not have the 
negative secondary effects. To reduce the content of Si0 2 when it was 
too high,in 1973, USIMINAS developed a system of adding mineral ore 
±rom Barantinha whose Si09 content is very low. 
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With respect to control of the size of the sinter a new 
system of screening was introduced in-Austust 1967 in order to reduce 
those fractions below 5mm which are not recommeded for blast furnace 
operation. In addition ;a roll crusher which was available as a result 
©£ some of the modifications in the coke charging operations for the 
blast furnace was installed for the preparation of sinter. After variou 
tests, in December 1972 it was installed in the sinter preparation cy-
cle. With these two measures the average size of the sinter was redu-
ced to the desired levels. 
In addition to changes in the type, quality, and control 
of raw materials, a second general type of change which was responsi-
ble for the increase in productivity was increases in yield. These we-
re primarily related to reducing the amount of return as a large part 
of sinter produced usually has to be recycled through the machine agair 
because it does not fullfill the size characteristic required. The fac-
tors which contribute to an increase in yeild are intensity of ignition 
control of coke, and control of screening. 
Until 1969 the conditions of ignition of the mixture to be 
sintered were not satisfactory. In fact,there was no rigorous control. 
However, from 1969 on, due to the increased need to augment productivi-
ty in order to satisfy increased demand from the blast furnaces, atten-
tion was focused on obtainning maximum burning efficiency in order to 
reduce the amount of material which did not attain the required size. 
Initially, this was attempted through a cha.ige in the diameter of the 
gas pipes and of the gas jets in order to increase the volume of gas 
supplied. In spite of these modifications the desired intensity of ig-
nition was not achieved, particulary considering that an increase in 
the velocity of the conveyer sheet was planned. To increase the inten-
sity of ignition to the desired level a second ignition oven had to be 
introduced in August 1973. 
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Together with the increase in ignition intensity better 
control of the coke fuel was sought in order to reduce it to the minimum 
for the maximum of efficienty. The proper granulometrie distribution 
of the coke is fundamental for this optimization. Both the proper pre-
paration of the coke and it proper distribution in the sintering machi-
ne are essential-Tests were conducted to chose the ideal granulometric 
distribution. As the distribution is a function of the coke preparing 
equipment more rigorous control of that stage as well as several modi-
fications in the equipment were necessary. 
Studies also showed that a large part of the material which 
returned contained a high percentage of sizes which could be used. To 
solve this,the size of the screens was changed to more adequate dimen-
sions and closer control of their condition and wear was set up. 
Through these measures, which started taking place in 1971, it was pos-
sible to obtain a greater yeild o>f the process due to a reduction of 
the volume of the return. 
More details cn the evolution of sinter machine n9 1 before the intro-
duction of the new machine are available in Appendix II. The purpose of the material 
included here has been to show three basic points. First of all, the evolution has been 
piecemeal and gradual with the focus of attention passing from one as-
pect to another. Second, most of the initial effect was devoted to le-
arning about the basic process itself , particularly the influence of 
various physical and chemical qualities of the process. As these were 
learned greater efforts were directed at controlling the basic charac-
teristics of the raw materials. In large part this involved reaction to 
the variations in these qualities in the raw materials received.(Reac-
tions to external fluctuations). Third, as more experience was gained, 
better methods were developed, including not only changes in raw mate-r 
rials used, their handling preparation, weighing, etc., but also of the 
process itself. To do this it was necessary to not only modify or add 
various pieces of equipment but to develop new organizational methods 
involving training, learning, and studying various aspects of the pro-
cess. 
- 154 -
6.3.2» Coke Plants 
In the coke section, USIMINAS* project called for the use of 
two 50 oven coke, oven batteries based on the type used by the Japan Iron 
and steel Co. They were each supposed to have nominal capacity of 
725 tons per day* The first battery entered into operation in 1962. The 
second battery was not able to enter into operation until 1965 due to 
an insufficient supply of coal caused by inadequate unloading facili-
ties at the port of Vitdria through which USIMINAS received both do-
mestic and imported coal. A third coke plant entered into operation 
in 1974 with nominal capacity of 1345 tons per day. A fourth coke 
plant similar to the third plant is supposed, to enter into operation 
sometime during 1978-79. • 
For the evolution of the coke plants we have no information 
except for the series presented in figure 6.10. Compared to the impro-
vements achieved in the other sections those in the coke plants have 
been relatively modest. Nevertheless>the operating index of the coke 
batteries has always been 100% and they always worked at close to the 
international standards. 
' Note that output of the first plant fell the year the se-
cond plant entered into operation. 
6.3.3. Blast Furnaces 
The basic series on the evolution of the blast furnaces is 
presented in figure 6.11. As explained in section 6.1.2. only blast 
furnace n* 1 was used initially. The second blast furnace did not en-" 
ter into operation until 1965 due to coal shortages caused by defici-
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A third blast furnace entered into operation in uecciiiuwi 
1974. It had an initial rated capacity of 5.900 tons per day (2,100,000 
t.a.) which apparently is going to be increased to 6.500 tons per 
day through the addition of . fourth Cowper type regenerator. Once 
this large blast furnace entered into operation USIMINAS stopped 
blast furnace n 9 2 from December 1974 to March 1978 for a complete 
3 3 
reform to enlarge its internal volume from 885 m to 1090 m . Notice 
that as in the case of sinter, production fell the year the third 
blast furnace entered into operation/Once again we have not been able 
to separate' out the effects of the coal crisis from any related to 
the preparation for and initial operation of the new blast furnace. 
In terms of both production aad coke rates^ there has been 
considerable jocking back and forth of the performance of two ori-
ginal furnaces which are identical except for their different start 
up dates. When the second blast furnace entered into operation in 
1965 the re was a fall in the output and a worsening of the coke 
rate of blast furnace one which did not recover until 1968. It has 
not been possible to identify to what extent this was a result of 
problems in the availability or quality of coal as opposed to initial 
disraptions caused by,- the simultaneas operation of the two furnaces. 
Unfortunatelyj we do not have any information of how produc 
ti on was increased 17.81 between 1968 ^  and 1969 or of how the coke 
rate was further reduced from the low levels attained for blast 
furnace n^ 1 in 1964. However}we do have information for the changos 
which took place during the four year period 1 9 7 0 . 1 9 7 3 F o r t u n a -
(1) 1968 could be considered the normal level as it is close to that 
achieved in 1965 with the first blast furnace. 
(2) This is based on Lauro Ce'sar dc Abreu, Ht. A1. "Evolugao da Pro-
dutividade dos Altos Fornos da USTM1NAS" Contribuigao ao XXIX Ton 
gresso Anual da Associagao Brasileira de Metais, Porto Ale^re, 
R.G. do Sul, julho 1974. 
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tely this is a very interesting period as it covers the first reform 
of blast furnace n 9 1 and the dinamiting of the deposits (scaffold) 
which built ap inside both furnaces. 
To show the effect of various of the measures the period 
between 1970 and 1973 has been divided into four sub-periods. The first 
neriod (January 1970 to January 1971) was characterized by the irregu-
lar operation of the blast furnaces both of which had built up scaffold. 
The irregularity of operation can be seen by the high average number 
pf average slips and "hangings" during this period. (See figure 6.12 •)• 
This was attributed to use of coke of lower mechanical resistance due 
to the lack of low-volatile coal in the mixture and to lower quality 
mineral. I;t should be-notedjhoweve^ that production (and productivity 
per volume) for each of the blast furnaces was more twice the maximum 
that had bjee.n reached by the first blast furnace during its first 15 
months of (operation. The highest then reached, (July, 1963) had been 
18.414 t. versus an average of 30,217 t. for blast furnace n ? 2 and 
the slightly higher average of 33.395 t. for blast furnace n 9 1 .This 
indicates that there must have been significant technical changes du-
ring the intervening period of which we^unfortunately,have no knowedge. 
Notice though that average coke consumption in 197 0 was not signifi-
cantly different from the levels achieved by the end of the first . T 
15 months of operation of the first blast furnace. To the extent 
that coke consumption can be taken as an index of costs since it usu- ; ; 
ally accounts for 53% of costs, thi.s would seem to indicate that 
•average material production costs had not changed too much unless 
other operation or raw material costs had been significantly reduced. 
'WA-rall costs may well have decreased in view of the better utiliza-
tion of the- equipment and labor which is implied by the much greater 
production per furnace. 
During the 13 month sub-period in question various measu-
res were taken to try to improve the operation of the blast furnaces t 
particularly of blast furnace n 9 2 which had more irregular operation 
leading in fact to various stops. Among the measures taken to improve 
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Figure 6.12e : Sumary of Operation of the 
Blast Furnaces-1963-1974. 
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(15 months ) 
August 1< 
December 15 
( 5 months' 
Coke consumption 
Per ton of Bfl 639 565 546 458 424 
"ig Iron Bf2 580 544 446 414 
Oil Rate Bfl - - - 39 60 
Bf2 - - - 44 57 
Ox ¡¡en Injection Bfl - - - - 2.280 
Bf2 - - - - 1.949 
Average Slips Bfl 5 260 240 2 1 
Bf2 - 174 56 3 13 
Average "hangings" Bfl 0 55 62 0 0 
per month Bf2 - 176 8 0 0 
Average Monthly • Bfl 18,414 33,395 40,977 48,278 53,000 
production Bf2 - 30,217 40,839 47,534 53,107 
Av. Daily 
Production per Bfl .67 1.45 1.40 1.69 1.81 
cubic meter Bf2 - 1.29 1.51 1.76 1.96 
Average Operating Bfl - 97.0 97.9 97.2 97.1 
Index Bf2 — 97.7 97.0 97.5 97.8 
Source: 1963 - Figure 
1970-1973 - Computed frommonthly data in Abreu Et Al, Op Cit 
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control and results were modifications in the sampling and analysis 
of raw materials, use of 1001 sinter, increase in the coke base and a 
reduction in the ratio of ore to coke, change in the dimensions of the 
coke screens, and alteration in-the level of the charge and in the 
charging sequence.Nevertheless none of thes measures were very effec-
tive. 
In March and April 1-971 blast furnace n 9 1 was stopped for 
a major programmed overhaul. A commision for the reform of the blast 
furnace had been created as far-back as 1967 with the participation of 
members of the Department of Engineering, Coke, and Blast Furnaces.This 
commission coordinated and accompanied the reform work and wrote the 
final report on the reform. It relied on support from the technical 
department and on technical assistance from Nippon Steel and Ishika-
wajima Harima Heavy Industries (suppliers of the furnaces) and others. 
The purpose of the reform was to increase the productive capacity of 
the blast furnace which was necessary to balance existing equipment 
capacity in various sections in order to meet the production goals set in 
the first expansion plan. The reform consisted of a substitution of 
the whole refractory lining of the furnace which permitted an increa-
3 3 
se in useful volume from 885 m to 957m . Various pieces of auxiliary 
equipment and facilities were also modified or substituted by others 
with better performance or greater capacity. Workers were subcontrac-
ted' through Montreal Engenharia S.A., a local engineering firm. Unfor-
tunately, <we were not able to obtain any figures on the cost of the re-
form or on the relative participation of USIMINAS versus foreign per-
sonnel in the various phases of the project from conception to imple-
mentation. However^ it seems that the foreign participation was relatively 
high at least in the planning phase. 
It is interesting to note that for the second period.al-
though average production of the blast furnace increased as a result 
of the expansion in area, the productivity per cubic meter did not change much, which 
is striking in view of the significant increase in the productivity 
per cubic meter of blast furnace n 9 2 during the same period. 
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With respect to blast furnace n 9 2, the lack of sucess of 
the various measures described led .USIMINAS personnel to conclude 
that the most viable alternative to increase productivity was to eli-
minate the scaffold by dinamiting. A preliminary investigation done 
by drilling through the walls of the furnace showed that the build-
up of deposits was indeed very serious, particularly in view of the 
fall of production which would result from the stoppage of blast fur-
nace n 9 1 for reform. The need to eliminate all the deposits plus the 
highly dangerous nature of removal operation led USIMINAS to contract 
the Japanese firm Nishinkogyo' KK which had long experience in that 
type of work and had done almost all the dinamiting for Japanase blast 
furnaces. The dinamiting was carried out in March and April of 1971 
while the furnace continued in operation. The removal of the deposits 
by dinamiting resulted in a dramatic reduction of the slips and "han-
gings'* and in an increase in the blast rate which resulted in record 
indexes of productivity as can be seen in figure 6.13 . According 
to USIMINAS the cost of the dinamiting operation was repaid by the 
increase in production (about 301) which was obtained in 35 days after 
the first dinamiting. 
Data on the second sub-phase (June, 1971-January, 1972)., 
which starts one month after the reform of the first blast furnace 
and the dinamiting of the second, showed an increase in average mon-
thly production of 23$ for the first furnace and of 35% for the se-
cond. After some months of operation, however, blast furnace n 9 1 star 
ted showing irregularities in operation (see the higher average number 
of slips and "hangings" for that period in figure 6.12 )which were 
identified as beening caused by new deposits inside the furnance even 
though it had just been relined.These deposits were very different in 
terms of type, size and localization from those which had been remo-
ved from blast furnace n 9 2. They were removed through various prolon-
ged and repeated stops in the months of February, March, and April of 
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Figure 6*. 13 : Productivity, Volume of Air, Hangings and Slips 
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1 
19^2 As far as-we can tell these were carried dot by the USIMINAS per 
soaoel themselves based on the experience they had learned from the 
technical assistance contract with Nishinkogyo KK for the dinamiting 
of the first blast furnace a year earlier. 
The better performance in the second period was not the 
result of just the two reforms already mentioned. A series of other 
measures were also taken during this period. Among them were various 
changes in raw materials and raw materials p r e p a r a t i o n s ^ , introduc-
tion of a ten year plan for the blast furnaces which permitted greater 
standarization of operation reductions in variation in charging 
proceedure, improvement in auxiliary equ p m e n t ^ , and the introduction 
of new equipment.^^ 
Data for the third sub-period (May, 1972-July 1973),which 
starts after the dinamiting of the deposits m the first blast furna-
ce, showed a normalization in the operation of both blast furnaces. 
During this period a number of technical changes were implemented.One 
hundred per cent of the sinter was screened which permitted greater 
control of the granulometric distribution of the sinter. Also based 
on various tests which showed that the use of pellets increased produc-
tivity per volume and reduced the Coke rate, pellets started to be 
used to complement the metal charge. A central operation control was 
introduced which permitted probing, the gas conditions of the oven and 
made possible alterations in the weight of the charge and other para-
meters affecting the distribution of the gas Through the use of up 
to .50% coke oven gas in the regenerators, the blast temperature was 9 
increased 100 C which permitted greater thermic efficiency. Various • 
improvements and adaptations were made in the operation of the char-c 
(1) Introduction of screening of 50% of the sinter in the silos of the blast furna-
ces, use of non-calcinated carbonate in the mixture fbecause studios done by 
USIMINAC «showed that greater use of non-calcinated carbonatcs reduced the coke 
rate). 
(2) This involved the introduction of various controls such as of the State of the 
blast furnace profile, the tuyeres, etc. 
(3) Improvement in the refrigeration of the valves, in the refractory etc. 
(4) Coke gas mi*cr for the regenerator5 vibrating screcms for the sinter, 2 vibra-
ting screcnl for the cokc. 
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ging equipment which significantly improved control, reduced irregula-
rities arid increased capacity. Also, various new pieces of auxiliary 
equipment were i n s t a l l e d ^ whic.h permitted greater control of the 
physical characteristics of the charge. The most significant tech-
nical 'change , however, seems to have been the installation of a sys-
tem for oil injection. These measures permitted a reduction of about 
90 kgs. in the coke rate with the use of about 40 kgs of fuel oil. 
in addition average monthly production for this period increased 18% 
and 16% for blast furnace n 9 1 and blast furnace n 9 2 respectively, 
as compared to the previous period. Unfortunately^we were' not able to 
obtain any detailed information on the costs of the various modifica-
tions, their cost, or how they came to be implemented. Oil injection 
was adopted with the technical assistance of the J a p a n e s e ^ , and 
it is estimated to have led to a reduction of 404 million cruzeiros 
per year in the cost of pig iron p r o d u c t i o n ^ 
The fourth sub-period (August-December, 1973) was also cha-
racterized by normal operation of the blast furnaces and by the in-
crease in productivity per cubic meter of furnace volume. Average 
monthly production increased approximately 10% for blast furnace n9 1 and 12% for 
blast furnace n9 2. The coke rate fell about another 30 kgs. , although oil 
injection increased by about 20 kgs. (See figure 6.12 ). The tech-
nical change which was in large part responsible for these changes was 
the introduction of oxygen injection which started in August with up 
to 2.5% oxygen enrichment . This permitted oil injection to increase to 
•60 kg.with ¿l consequent reduction in the coke rate. For each 1% of oxygen 
enrichment there was a close to a 5% increase in production with an 
increase in oil consumption in the order of 8 k g s a n d a reduction 
(1) Five more vibrating screens plus a secondary crusher for the sin-
ter. 
(2) This was through the general technical assistance contract USIMINAS 
had with Nippon Steel (see Chapter 7) 
(3) We could not determine which year the monetary value referred*©. 
- 165 -
of the coke rate of 12 kgs. Besides the introduction of the auxi-
liary equipment for oxygen injection, various improvements in 
existing equipment ^ and in the preparation of the charge were 
made. 
A quick sumary index which is a good indicator of the 
improvements achieved in the use of raw materials and in the intro-
duction of auxiliary technologies are the indexes tons product per 
square meter per day and output produced per day. Until 1971 the 
2 2 improvement in the tons/m /day which rose from 13.1 tons/m /day 
2 2 and 17.7 tons/m /day to a plateau of 28.7 tons/m /day and 32 tons/ 
2 
m /day for blast furnaces n 9 1 and n* 2 respectively w e r e almost 
exclusively due to the effort to improve raw materials. The intro-
duction of oil injection in 1972 lead to a jump to 36.2 and 39.4 
2 
tons/m /day respectively. This was further increased in 1973 with 
the introduction of oxygen which permitted an increase in tempera-
ture and a greater amount of oil injection. That led to a produc-
tivity of nearly 43 tons/m /day. 
Although there are serious gaps in our knowledge of what was 
done during part ot the period, and although we do not know much about the actual 
conception and implementation of the changes, several points do stand out in the 
information we have gathered. First of all, as in the sinter section, 
the proceedure has been to start slowly, trying to keep control and 
operating proceedure to the basics and then to slowly build up from 
that base as that phase is mastered and experience indicated which fac-
tors should be controlled or improved. Second, technical change seems 
to have occurred gradually but continously, steadily improving the 
average monthly productions possible with each furnace. As was shown 
above,the production of the blast' furnace n 9 1 increased more than 
200% between the best figure for the first 15 month start-up period and 
1970, the first year for which we again have disaggregated information. 
Then,in the three years beween 1970 and 1973, as a result of innumera-
n New oil injection lances were tested, external refrigeration for 
the shields of the furnace was adopted, thermocouples were adop-
ted to accompany the wear on the walls. 
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ble technical changes, average monthly production steadily increased 
further such that by the end of 1973 it was 591 greater for blast 
furnace n 9 1 and 76% greater for blast furnace n 9 2. With respect to 
the highest level of production reached in the first 15 months of blast 
furnace ri9 l's operation, this represents an increase of 188%.Third, 
from the more detailed analysis spanning technical change during the 
four years 1970-1973, it was evident that technical change proceeded 
simultaneously among many fronts involving the preparation of the char 
ge, greater control of the process, modifications of auxiliary equip-
ment, substitution or addition of new equipment , and changes in operating 
procedure. Fourth, it is also evident that in a process as complex as 
the operation of a blast furnace, it is difficult to separate out 
the effect of just one change due to the strong interdependence among 
various operational parameters and to their constant and everchanging 
evolution. 
Fourth, it can be seen that pressures to keep up with the 
capacity expansions of other departments have been important in sti-
mulating productivity in the blast furnace section. The important of 
pressures for overall sectional balance will be discussed in further 
detail with respect to expansion plans. Finally, the example of con-
tracting specific technical assistance such as dinamiting the scaf-
fold which had formed in the second blast furnace and learning from 
that experience such as to be able to do the process independently 
the second time around shows an excellent absoptive capacity. 
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6.3.4. Steel Shops 
In the steel section USIMINAS started with two BOF conver-
ters with a useful volume of 48 cubic meters and a capacity of 50 tons 
per 'charge.They gave the steel section an initial nominal capacity 
of 504.000 t.a.. In September 1973 a third BOF converter with a use-
ful volume of 62 cubic meters and an 85 ton capacity per charge was 
added. In September 1975 USIMINAS added a second steel shop with 
two BOF converters, each having a useful volume of 143 cubic meters 
and a capacity of 160 tons per charge. The capacity of this second 
steel shop was initially set at only 1.000.000 t.a.•probably because 
of bottlenecks with the continous casting section which started with 
just two casting machines although a third is to be added in 1978-
1979 as part of the current expansion to 3.5 M.t.a. 
Figure 6.14 presents the evolution of the main series for the 
steel shops . As indicated in section 6 .'2.3. the first year of opera-
tion o± the original steel shop was devoted mostly to getting the sec-
tion going with three shifts per day with'the two converters. The 
first year of operation also showed .that the' steel shop was going to 
be one of the main p r o d u c V i ^ bottle-hecks.' By 1966 it reached nominal 
capacity. From then o^we' have been .able to identify four stages in 




t o G> ro 
8-
oa O O 
o o o 
PRODUCTION 
8 o 
N O O 
3 






li 33 f 
% fc INCREASE S ACHIEVED BY f f.T-Oi-iCATlONS IN -b "TR'CTOftY LINING 
y a;o r.-.nor equipmi 
i AOJUSTN'.INTS 
s INTRODUCTION OF THREE 








M m 30 
r»i w 
(A H m m r 
cn ac o •o 
. i VARIOUS O-JECUIPNENT iOPTlNRATIVE 
-sj ».INCREASE IN AVERAGE ""/RUNS PER DAY 
S J 
- 4 , 
-J. m 
d> 
a o <o i i 11 1 1 i i r-I t f N N W O I O I W O I U I M I O - W O I S » RUNS PER DAY (R/D) 
« ^ « ^ ^ u m — us w •H «© — w 
® o 
I I I I » I I I 1 uiu>u>o> 0iOi<n<n->i W S IO - W UI S (O - w (ii 
TONS PER RUN ( T / R ) 
O OPERATING INDEX 
Nominal capacity was increased to 600.000 t.a. by June,1967 
That was achieved mainly through the increase of the average runs per 
converter from 56 t. to 58 t. and by an increase in the amount of 
oxygen injection. The increase in tons per run was achieved by a purely 
organizational change. The initial criterion of fixing the weight of 
the run at 56 tons meant that the charge had a weight varying from 
59.5 to 63.0 depending on the type of steel to be produced. This meant 
that the full volume of the converter was not always adequately used 
The change involved fixing the weight of the charge at 63 tons regar-
dl ess of the type of steel to be produced, which meant that the weight 
of the runs was different for each steel, but that more steel could 
be produced as the equipment's capacity was been utilized more effi-
ciently. 
In a second stage, capacity was increased to 700.000 t.a. 
by April 1969. USIMINAS first studied how its converters compared with 
those of 16 U.S. plants in terms of characteristics and production.The 
study showed that greater production was possible with only minor mo-
dificat ions in the refractory lining of the convertors and a change in 
the relationship between the height of the oxygen lance and the steel 
in the converter. To handle the larger production resulting from the-
se changes, however, it was necessary to modify certain other auxilia-
ry installations such as the power of the tilting motors, the gearbox 
the brake, the capacity of the steel laddie, and to increase the speed 
of ingot pouring in order to maintain the operational equilibrium bet-
ween the cycle time of the ingot casting crane and the tap to tap of 
(1) This is based on Antonio Augusto de Andrade Oliveira and Joao Au-
gusto Machado Caldcira "Etapas de Desenvolvimento da Capacidade dc 
ProduQao da Aciaria da USIMINAS (Aciaria n* 1)" USIMINAS REVISTA 
Ano 1 n9l(1969)pp. s - 14-s. 20 . 
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the converter. Although we do have any details on who was responsible 
for this idea^it might have been an American consulting firm (Booz 
Allen Hamilton International) and not a Japanese firm since the study 
was based on data for American firms. The study of the actual modifi-
cations which would be necessary to carry through the project seem to 
have been done by USIMINAS*Department of Engineering and the Maintenan 
ce Division of the steel section. 
The capacity increase achieved in this second stage was 
sufficient urttil the beginning of 1969. During that period the rapid 
increase in sinter production allied with other measures taken in the 
blast furnace section permitted a pioduction of pig iron above 720.000 
t.a. Within that context, the steel section studied the possibility of pro-
ducing 850.000 t.a. The planning for that new stage required more in-
depth studies that had been necessary for the previous two stages 
because a new increase- in the charge would create operational difficul-
ties not only in terms of reprojecting the installations, but also 
because of repercussions on various equipments in the flow of produc-
tion as some had already exhausted their possibilities for capacity 
increases. One solution which was conceived was to take advantage of 
the increase in the effective volume of the converter which resulted 
from the wearing away of its refractory throughout its 1ifetime.This 
would involve increasing the tonnage of its charge as use gave it 
greater volume. In that way greater average tonnage per run could be 
obtained. After various studies, the Department of Production Control 
established the feasibility of such an approach and identified thé 
major changes in auxiliary equipment which would be necessary. These 
included an increase in the capacity of the scrap charging equipment, 
the ingot casting equipment and 'the steel laddies; reinforcement of 
the converter's brakes; and a speed-up of the ingot casting cycle so 
that it could handle the steel produced under the new system without 
causing a problem of balance between the two cycles. It seems that the 
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modifications which were necessary in the ingot casting equipment were" 
such that it was not feasible to increase its capacity for the time 
being, so the plan was not workable in the short run. 
All of these studies had been based on the utilization of 
a one.channeloxygen lance, which was the conventional equipment. USIMINAS 
was able to overcome the impasse described above by adopting a three-
channel oxygen lance. It seems that the idea and the guidance 6 for this 
technical innovation came from Nippon S t e e l ^ with which USIMINAS had 
a general 10 year technical assistance contract. The use of the three 
holed lance made unnecessary the modifications in the ingot casting 
crane,the ingot casting cycle,and the a scrap charging equipment. The 
only modifications which were necessary with the introduction of the 
new lance in order to increase capacity to 850.000 t.a. were: 
1) increase of tonnage per run fron 62 to 67 t., 
2) increase of the maximums oxygen charge from 900 Nm^/h 
to 11.000 Nm 3/h average 
3) reductions in the stop times, 
4) scrap cannals of greater volume. 
In addition to these changes four other factors were influencial in 
reaching the higher productivity levels: a) constant and gradual impro 
vement in the efficiency of all personnel, which reduced operating ti-
mes and operational loses; b) improvement in the system of cleanning 
the convertor, through a process developed by USIMINAS' own team; 
c) reduction in the time taken for the repair and exchange of damaged 
converters; and d) better preventive maintenance which permitted an 
increase in the index of operating time/calendar year from 65.2% in 
the first semmester of 1967 to 87^ in the second half of 1969. 
Unfortunately we do not know for sure how USIMINAS was 
able to increase production from 850.000 t.a. in 1969 to 950,000 
trons in 1971 added. We do know that in November, 1969 they were 
(1) Leuschner, Op. Cit., p.41 
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thinking in terms of increasing the production to 950.000 t.a. by : 
a) the modifications conceived for the original third phase which we-
re not carried out when the new oxygen lance was introduced; b) incre-
ase in tonnage per run from 67.to 70 t. c) redimehsioning the ingot 
molds; d) adopting special refractory bricks for the- scrap and steel 
run sites, which would further reduce costs and time spent on those 
operations; e) introduction of a new system of inventory of spares to. 
reduce costs and increase the speed of substityion ; f) increase in 
the amount of oxygen injection from 11.000 to 12.500 Nm /h including 
an increase in the storage capacity for oxygen (as its production is 
continous while its use is discontinous);g) minimization of stops due 
to lack of pig iron by assuring that pig iron production is greater 
than demand and using any resulting excess for ingot molds; h) purcha 
se of a communication system to improve the speed- of communications 
i) improvements in calcination to increase production and quality and 
to reduce oxygen blowing time. 
The increase from 950,000 to almost 1.200,000 in 1972 was 
achieved by an increase in the average number of runs per day from 
42,9 in the first semester to 49,2 in the second.This was possible 
through the greater availability of oxygen (resulting from the mstal 
lation an additional oxygen plant) and operational changes which made 
it feasible to operate the two converters simultaneously except when 
one was being relined. ^  
Although once again we have not been able to cover the who it 
period orto analyse the changes which have taken place in detail, the 
material collected provides several interesting insights it into what 
went on in the steel shop in terms of technical change. First, there 
was a period of familiarization with the equipment and basic operating 
conditions which took about three years until nominal capacity was 
achieved. Second, the increase in capacity from then until 1969 was 
(1) The source of this information is the 1972 Annual Report pp 11-12. Usually a 
two converter operation only has one converter operating at a time. One conver; 
ter is used while the second is relined. That USIMINAS was able to operate both 
simultaneously implies that it must have reduced maintenance tin« and or in-
creased the life of the refractory by better control of the refining process. 
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achieved in three stages. The first two were much simpler that the 
third one originally conceived. The third one actually realized was 
based on an innovation imported from abroad. It seemsjneverthe less, 
that apart from such special- boosts which may be obtained by utili-
zing special technological "breaks" developed elsewhere, there was 
increasing difficulty in stretching capacity as successively higher 
levels were reached that they required more experience and more in 
depth studies. This suggests that there are saturation effects to 
the amount of capacity increasing technical change which can be 
squeezed out of given equipment. Third, the successful changes were the 
fruit of the coordination of various departments including operation, maintenance, 
and engineering, and the efficient utilization of external technical 
assistance. Fourth, the steel sector constantly received pressure to 
expand capacity to keep up with the capacity stretching occuring in 
the rest of the plant. This suggest that there are various push and 
pull pressures accross the different departments of the plant as they 
develop or are forced to develop their capacity stretching potential, 
and that these forces shift from one area to the next, for the proces 
is dynamic and the bottleneck is continually moving from one area to 
another. In relationship to the bottleneck it is interesting to noti-
ce that it also shifts within a sector, and that some changes in main 
equipment usually require numerous auxuliary changes which may or may 
not be feasible at a given time given the configuration of the exis-
ting e q u i p m e n t . ^ 
(1) This is a clear example of the type, of focusing mechanisms 
which N. Rosenberg is refering to in his article. "The Direction 
of Technological Change: Inducement Mechanisms and Focusing 
Divises" Economic Development and Cultural Change: Vol. 18 
n' 1 Part" 1 (October 1969) 
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6.3.5. Rolling Sections 
In the rolling section USIMINAS originally instal-
led a slabbing? mffl-l with a capacity of 1-.500.000 t»a. which was 
initially set up with the auxiliary ovens and cooling beds to han-
dle SO-0,0(HJ- t.a. Its capacity was to be increased by addition 
of iiKire ovens and cooling "beds as required by subsequent expansion. 
"Hie mill, a Two High Reversible High Lift Slabbing Mill was sup-
plied by SACK Ishikawajima and started operation in June 1963. After 
pas-sing through the slabbing wills the plates went through a two 
Jfigh Reversible Broad Side Mill and through a Four High Reversi-
ble Plate- Mill which entered i-nt-o operation in July 1963. The semi-
©ni'nshed pr-oduc-ts made in tl>i-s initial stage were sold to COSIPA 
and to Ferro and Ago of Vitoria which had excess finishing capacity 
while USIMINAS oomp-l-e-ted installing its hot and cold rolling mills 
vfoic-h only entered into operation in 1955 thus completing the in-
tegration of the plant. 
Our information on the technical changes which took 
place in section is limited to the following main details. Original-
ly the plate mill served alternatively for the production of thic 
plates or for the preparation of plates for the hot strip mill. 
With the entrance of the new 4,100 mm plate mill* the old plate mill 
passed to be used exclusively to prepare the plates for the hot rol-
ling mill. That change permitted the old semi-continous hot strip 
mill to became a continuous mill. The slabbing mill underwent seve-
ral reforms including an increase in the power of its motors which 
permitted an increase in its capacity from 1.5 M.t.a. to 2.0 M.t.a 
for Phase II. In the case of the hot strip mill, production capaci-
ty is directly related to the auxiliary equipment, particularly 
the reheating ovens, and to the production program. 
(1) The minimum efficient size for slabbing mills is around 1.500.000 
t.a. so steel firms oftei install mills of that size and equip 
tìhem to handle asmaller volume of production. As production ex-
pands, the auxiliary ovens and other equipment are added on until 
the capacity of the mill itself is fully utilized. 
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Successive production capacity increases were achieved in large 
part through the installation of more reheating ovens. The jump 
from 1.7 M.t.a. to 2.2 M.t.a is to be achieved by the addition of 
a fourth walking beam type Yeheating oven. For Phase II a remoto-
rization and the installation of an automatic thickness control 
(AGC) similar to that installed in the 4 iOO plate mill was pro-
gramed, besides a new laminar type codling system. In the cold 
strip mill, with the installation of the tandem cold mill the old 
mill was transformed into a skin pass. The doubling of the capacity 
of the tandem mill was programed for Phase II through various re-
forms including doubling the rolling speed. Another change/ the 
switch to chroric acid from sulfuric acid in the pickling line is 
supposed to a occur sometime in 1979/80. Besides the various 
physical changes already noted a major change is the adoption of 
a production programming system linked to orders considerably in-
creases efficiency and improves productivity and quality and 
should probably reduce costs. 
Figure 6.15 gives a break down of total production 
by main product group which is graphed in figure 6.16. Notice that whereas the 
percentage of plates in production has fallen, that of hot and cold rolled coils 
has increased. Cold rolled products represent a more processed 
output which in general commands a higher price. It should also 
be noted that within the general products group USIMINAS has 
constantly sought to improve the quality and types of steel pro-
duced. This type of product diversifying technical change has 
been accomplished in part through a long term technical assistance 
contract which is discussed in section 7 . 6 . 
Figures 6; 17-16.22 ' give the evolution of various yield 
parameters for some operations in the rolling section. Figure 
6 . 1 7 traces the evolution of the yield in the transformation of 
slabs of killed steel to thick p l a t e s . ^ The yields increased 
(l)Yields vary according to type of steel 
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Figure 6.15 
EVOLUTION OF BREAK DOWN OF USIMINAS* PRODUCTION 1963-1977 
•ot Produc 
t e n s i o n PLATES % 
Hot .Rolled 
Sheets % Hot Rolled Coils % Cold.Railed Sheets Of * 
Cold Rolled' 
"Coils % Total 




• ** - • 
84214,2 
1965 
m — 84214,2 
139624,8 87,7 7137,1 4.5 12387,9 7.8 - - _ 159149,8 
1966 145100,4 ' 48,3 53017,8 17,7 63378,3 21 ,1 35782,6 11.9 2972,0 1.0 . 300251,1 
196 7 145901,8 42,6 62907,3 18,4 61483,4 18,0 41011,8 12,0 31133,8 9.0 342437,5 
1568 143353,5 36,0 86234,6 20,9 76617,0 18,6 67110,0 16,3 33680,1 8,2 411995,2 
19f9 208212,9 40,7 93372,7 18,2 99663,0 19,5 86944,6 17,0 23560,0 4,6 511753,2 
197 0 239647,5 39.6 94562,3 15,6 141798,0 23,4 99036,6 16,4 30222,3 5,0 605296,7 
1971 261707.9 36,9 138832,7 19,6 145581,0 20,5 125893,7 19,1 28066,7 3,9 710087,0 
1972 348778 ,1 33,8 174301 19,4 226796,5 25,2 109697,8 12,2 38637,5 « . 4 898211,0 
197^. 339591,8 33,6 210266,7 20,8 290936,4 28,8 133550,6 13,2 35560,4 3,6 1009905,9 
1974 333141 ,4 35.8 196262,4 21 .1 188527,4 20,2 166276,0 17,8 47588,5 5,1 931795,7 
19 75 35 9390,5 27,8 247429,8 19,1 270950,8 20,9 195519,4 15,1 221234,3 17.1 1 294564 ,8 1976 249520,5 15,3 300653,7 18,4 515878,3 31 ,6 227164,8 13,9 339399,1 20,8 1632616,4 
1977 642095,3 28,8 299969,5 13,5 656947,0- 29,4 236325,3 1 0,6 
I 
394848,1 17,7 2230189,2 
Source- Information provided d i r e c t l y by f i rm. 
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rapidly between 1965 and 1972 after which they suffered, a small 
fall before leveling off»Figure 6.18 shows how the yield of first 
quality plates has evolved. Once again,there is a continous incre-
ase until 1972 after which there is a leveling off. A similar 
pattern is presented in figure 6.19 for the yield in the inspec-
tion of hot rolled coils. 
Figure 6.20 shows that in the evolution of the yield 
from cutting hot strips into plates there has been a gradual im-
provement of about three percentage p o i n t s ^ . Figures 6.21 and 
6.22 on the yield of inspection of hot rolled sheets and first 
quality cold rolled sheets respectively show a somewhat more er-
ratic performance although there is a c l e a r upward trend particular-
ly after initial operation. 
In general then as can be seen by the series pre-
sented, there is evidence of significant improvement in the yield 
of various of the rolling operations. 
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6o3.6. Conclusion 
Even though we have not been able to collect complete da-
ta on the techncial changes which have taken place with the original 
equipment, we have shown that considerable change has occurred. Al-
though the main focus has been capacity stretching it is evident that 
technical change has also involved quality changes and cost reductions. 
It is also evident that particularly in the more raw material domina-
ted sections such as sinterization and blast furnaces, the bulk of the 
technical change has been with respect to control and preparation of 
raw materials and that in large part it has been the reaction of the 
firm to fluctuctions in the chemical and physical quality of those raw 
materials. 
Our analysis has also shown that the changes which have 
occured have generally been gradual and evolutionary, that they have 
involved many fronts from control of raw materials to product and pro-
cess control, that they involve not only changes in the raw materials, 
or in the adaptation of existing equipment or,the utilization of au-
xiliary equipment, but also changes in organization and production flow 
i 
and control methods. 
A 
It was also evident that equipment' of a given vintage was 
able to take advantage of auxiliary technologies such as fuel 
injection and oxygen enrichment in the case of blast furnaces, and 
the three hole oxygen lance in the case of tihe J steel shop. Al-
though we did not have enough information to corroborate the impre-
sión, it was suggested that despite these boosts given by the utili-
zation of auxiliary technologies there may be decreasing improvement 
possibilities as the more obvious modifications are made. In a sense, 
there seems to be a limitation to how much can be done with a gi-
ven equipment or a given layout. The possiblilites opened up by being 
able to change the lay-out, to ask for special features in new cqui-
ment in order to a better adapt it to local conditions and to the rest 
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of the plant's structure and the advantage of having new technolo-
gical advances built into it are tne topic of the next section. 
6.4. Technical Change Possible With Large Expansion 
As was noted in chapter five starting in the early-
seventies USIMINAS entered into a phase of large capital intensive 
plant expansions. These expansions will elevate the plant's produc-
tive capacity to approximately three times what it was able to 
achieve with its original equipment and will make the plant's pro-
duction about seven times its originally planned capacity 
Although the products are still non-coa'ted flats, their di-
mensions and quality grades have changed. The first two steps of the basis steel-
making technology still remain the same - ccke based blast furnaces and LD steel 
shops - but the failicities have been considerably expanded. There are going 
to be four coke batteries rather than two, three sinter machines 
instead of one, three blast furnaces instead of two, the first steel 
shop received a third converter, and a whole new steel shop with two 
larger converters was added. A major change has been the adoption of 
continous casting for part of the production of the new steel sliop.in 
addition to conventional ingot casting. There have been significant 
modifications in the rolling section. It now has continuous hot and 
cold rolling mills, as opposed to the old semi-continuous ones; an au-
tomatic scarfing machine rather than manual scarfing as before; new 
hot and cold skin passes to improve the quality of the hot and cold 
strip; the pickling process has been changed from a sulfuric acid ba-
se to a hydrocloric acid base; eletrolitic cleaning has been instal-
led; and a new, large dimension plate mill has been added which has 
permitted USIMINAS to switch its plate production to the very marketa-
ble wide plate which it could not produce before. In addition a major 
adaptation has been to turn the old plate mill to the first part of a 
continous. hot rolling line-. 
(1) In 1976 USIMINAS was the largest producer of non-coated flats in Brazil. It sup-
plied 96% of the plates consumed in the naval industry, 53% of the Brazilian pla 
tes consumed in the automobile industry, 64% of those used by the railroad indus 
try, 70% of those in the heavy capital goods industry and 40% of those, m the 
electric-electronic industry. It is also Brazil's leader m steel exports. 
It should be noted that by and large all the changes 
mentioned above with the exceptions of the change in the pickling 
process and electrolitic cleaning involved either the adoption of lar-
ger scale units (coke batterieswith twice the capacity as original 
ones, steel shop with converters almost three times as large as those 
in original plant,sinter machine with twice the area of the old one, 
blast furnace with output three times that of each of the old ones, 
new wide plate mill) or an expansion of the product run (switch from 
semi-continous to continous mills, use of old plate mill as first 
step in hot strip mill line, automatic scarfing). 
In part this reflects the general tendency discus-
sed in chapter four for many new technological developments to be 
embodied in capital equipment of ever increasing scale. 
It was our original intention to compare the types 
of savings which could be achieved by the adoption of such larger 
scale and newer vintage equipment units . However it was not pos-
sible to obtain cost data disaggregated by equipment units. Also 
significant distortions in the cost structures derriving from the 
energy crisis have coincided with the entrance of the new equipment 
units making more difficult any such analysis. 
In particular it would have been interesting to 
use the historical data to calculate how much a given increase in 
capacity with the old equipment had cost as compared to a similar 
increase through the installation of newer vintage units. This type 
of analysis would have very interesting implications for rennovation 
versus modernization strategies. 
Abstracting for a moment from differences in varia-
ble operating costs a very rough aggregate calculation could be as 
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follows. The original plant was estimated to have cost U.S.$ 261 
millions for a capacity of 500,000 tons. The expansion from 1,400,000 
2y 40&,000 was estimated to cost U.S$ 961 millions, and the expan-
sion from 2 t 4 M.t.a. to 3.5 M.t.a is expected to cost U.S.$ 1061 mil-
lions this give-* the following average .cost per ton: 
original 261/500 U.S.$ 522/ton 
1.2 to 2.4 961/1200 U.S.$ 800/ton 
2.4 to 3.5 1061/1100 U.S.$ 964/ton 
This calculation has not been adjusted for inflation 
wnich would tend to make the real covt difference less favorable 
or even reverse the advantage of the original investment. However 
it most be remmembered that the capacity of the original equipment 
was raised to close to 1.2 M.t.a. Assuming foT the sake of argument 
that the cost of achieving that was the $ 30 millions dollars inves-
ted in technology contracts and the $ 10 millions invested in trai-
ning (not all those sums should be counted as costs because the 
expenses were more heavily concentrated in the post 1972 period, 
but on the other hand probably other expenses were incurred) the 
marginal cost of the expansion from 500,000 tons to 1.2 M.t was 
just $ 57 dollars. This would compare very favorably with the capi-
tal intensive expansion even after taking account of an inflation 
adjustment and granting a 50$ capital subsidy. 
This however has also abstracted from among other things 
the problem of saturation effects to rennovation or capacity stret-
ching type strategies which is related to the issue of what is 
the optimum amount of such stretching. 
In practice such issues of scale are likely to be 
very important and it is precisely there that new vintage equipment 
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may have the advantage. Nevertheless it should then be kept in mind 
that the new vintage type strategies may be constrained by the rate 
of growth of the market which is what may determine what type of 
scale expansion is possible. In the Brazilian case the size of the 
market and its rate of growth are more likely to permit such larger 
scale expansions than in most other' Latin American countries where 
the market and perhaps also its rate of growth are likely to be smal-
ler. 
Returning to the USIMINAS case an interesting 
aspect about the technological possibilities opened up by expansions 
has to do with the possibility of embodying the technical experience 
learned from operating the original equipment into the new equipment 
through the specifications for it. This was done in the case of the 
new sinter machine. 
In order to focus on this aspect the rest of the 
section will develop what kinds of activities which are involves "in major 
equipment purchases by citing the examples of the third blast furna-
ce and the second steel shop. 
6.4.1. The Purchase of Blast Furnace n9 3 ^ 
The background to the installation of the third 
blast furnace was as follows. In the original expansion plan to pro-
duce 1.4 M.t.a. the the first part of the expansion was to be a 
(1) The information for this section is based on USIMINAS, Superinten-
dencia de Iingenharia de Projetos "Alto Forno 3: Desenvolvimento 
Projeto e Construyo" USIMIÑAS REVISTA Ano 5, n' 10 (December, 1974) 
pp. 54-78. 
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reform of the two original blast furnaces. These included an in-
crease in the internal volume of blast furnace n9 1 from 891 m 
to 957 m by modififing the refractory lining; and reconstruction 
of blast furnace n9 2, in order to increase its internal volume 
to 1090 m 'which would involve not only a change in the refracto-
ry but also in a modification of the carcass and substition of 
the blowers by some of greater capacity. The first reform of blast; 
furnace n9 1 was carried out as planned. The reform of blast furna-
ce n9 2 was to have been finished in February 1974 in order to sa-
tisfy the goal of 1.4 M.t.a expansion plan. The cost, including 
changing the regenerators was estimated at nine million U.S. dol-
lars. A paralyzation of its production for a minumum of five months 
involving a production loss of close to 19 million U.S. dollars 
would also be necessary. In view of these high costs, plus the spee-
dup of the expansion plans, USIMINAS decided to carry out the re-
form of the second blast furnace within the same bases adoped for 
the first - a simple change of the refractory lining without a mo-
dification in the carcass and to build more capacity into the blast 
furnace which was to be installed for the 2.4 M.t.a phase. This 
new blast furnace was to have a internal volume large enough to per-
mit it to produce enough pig iron in conjunction with the other, 
two to satisfy the needs of the 3.5 M.t.a plan. Furthermore the new 
blast furnace was to be ready for production when blast furnace 
n9 2 was stopped for reform. 
Studies on the dimensions of blast furnace n9 3 began to be 
done as far back as February 1971 in the operation section of the plant 
with the cooperation of a study team from Nippon Steel. As a result of 
the preliminary studies it was considered most convenient to construct 
a new blast furnace with an internal volume of approximately 2.500 m 
Based on the productivity u s u a l l y reached in such large furnace*with 
the use of top pressure", it was estimated that a value 2.2 t/day/m 
could be reached by using good preparation of the raw materials anu 
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good quality coke. Based on the experience of USIMINAS it was also es-
timated that coke consumption could be in the order of 520 kg/t with 
up to 90 kg of fuel oil injection. The plan which emerged was to :1) adopt 
the most advanced techniques currently used in modern steel plants , 
2) consider specifications such that auxiliary equipment could be meca-
nized and automatized, 3) adopt new techniques recently employed in 
the tapping and in the structure of the furnace, 4) consider cowper 
type regenerators for a maximum blast temperature of 1150 C and 5)pro-
vide means of setting up a system for computer control which could be 
installed in the future without major modifications in the equipment. 
The equipment for the blast furnace was dissagregated into 
nine basic packages^ and international bids were called for as requi-
red under the conditions of the IBRD which was lending some money for 
the expansion program. An average of 37 bids were received per equipment 
package, and an average of 11 were found to be prequalified based on 
(2) 
the qualification criteria USIMINAS had worked out with-Nippon Steelv 
Competing suppliers were invited to meetings at USIMINAS where the 
specifications and other details for the project were explained. To 
give an idea of what this involved it can be noted for the blast fur 
nace package alone the meetings required 51 man/days of USIMINAS' 
(Superintendency of Project Engineering) and 35 man/days of Nippon 
Steel advisors to answer questions formulated by 32 man/days of ques-
tions from the competing suppliers. The evaluation of the bids for that 
package required approximately 700 man/days from the Superintendency of 
Engineering, and 350 man/days from Nippon Steel. Ishikawajima Harima 
Heavy industries was selected the winner as a result of a considera-
(1) The packages , their distribution as a percent of costs and their na-
tionalization index (in parenthesis) were: blast furnace and auxi-
liary equipment, 45.0?o (29.8); refractory (two packages ): 18 .1 %(24 . 9) 
blowers, 8.4S (0); water recirculation system, 7.71(0); furnaces 
for the blowers, 13.1°s (32.8), torpedo car 6.61,(100); cranes 1.11 
(0); and electric distribution system on which there was no specji 
fic cost data but is estimated to have cost about 2.2$ and to have 
been all imported. The total cost of the equipment was approximate 
ly 32.5 million dollars of which 28.8% v.as bought in Brazil. 
(2) In the case of the blast furnace, the prequalification requirements 
were having experience in projecting or supplying at least two 
blast furnaces with an internal drameter of more than 10 meters. 
Eight firms representing 5 countries met the requirements. 
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tion of both the technical arid financial aspects. Close to 110 meetings 
were made with Ishikawajima to discuss the technical details which 
required an additional 260 man/days from USIMINAS, 330 from Nippon 
Steel and 550 from Ishikawajima and its subcontractors. 
The principal projects of the equipment were executed by 
the equipment suppliers. The remaining projects ("foundations, lighting 
electricity, finishing of the control room) which required over 70, 000 
manhours were projected" by Brazilian firms with the coordination anc 
orientation of the Superintendency of "Project Engineering. Civil works 
were carried out by Brazilian firms and required almost 6.7. million 
man hours. The basic project engineering for the units however, was 
done by the corresponding equipment suppliers. Detail engineering was 
done by Montreal Engenharia,a local Brazilian firm. Civil works and 
mounting of the equipment were done under the supervision of the Su-
perintendency of Construction with technical support, from the Superin-
tendency of Projects. Various local construction firms were subcontrac 
ted for the project. A local Brazilian engineering firm was contracted 
for the mounting of equipment and setting of the refractories. It 
received 72,00 manhous of technical assitance from* Sankyo of Brazil 
and the supervision of 60 technicians from the various equipment' 
suppliers who were contracted by USIMINAS to provide technical assis-
tance during the construction. Nearly 6 9 million manhours were requi-
red for mounting the blast furnace and its. auxiliary systems and 1.5 
million for its refractory. For the orientation and coordination of 
the mounting USIMINAS received nearly 17,600 manhours of assis-
tance from Nippon Steel and 88/000 manhours of supervisory assistance 
from the various equipment suppliers. 
. The total costs of blast furnace n 9 3 ^ .excluding administrative 
Costs -and -the costs of the national and imported technical services 
was approximately ,6:6.5 million dollars, distributed as '"follows: fabri-
cation of equipment and structures, • 9$ ; ' supply of refractory, 9..5 
civil works, 16.9%; mounting 20.9V; setting'of refractory, 3.9V, 
various others, 8. 0% .• Of this total .64 .4 "a was spent in Brazil. 
(1) Based on study done by the Supervision of the Budget of in' Octo-
- ber, 1974.; •.•'•.. . A, •• 
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6.4.2. The Purchase Steel Shop 2 ^ 
A new steel shop was the other main unit in the second ex-
pansion plan. This plan foresaw the adoption of a Continous casting 
line for the second steel shop if technical studies showed that to be 
feasible. The main factors which determine the feasibility of a con-
tinous casting facility are the product line and the market. Since 
USIMINAS was a flat products producer, continous casting would be used 
for the production of slabs. As the Brazilian industrial sector (the 
main consuming market) was going through a phase of rapid expansion, 
and since considerable technological improvements were still taking 
place in continous casting, USIMINAS opted for a flexible line. On 
the one hand it was to cover not only all the types of steels manufac-
tured by USIMINAS but all those which could be produced by continous 
casting. On the other, it was to attend to a very wide range of dimen-
sions including the new 4,100 mm plate mill which was also included 
in this expansion plan. 
Specifically the 2.4 M.t.a. plan projected one million tons 
increase in steel capacity whicV t 0 he filled by the new steel shop. 
The project designers decided to use two 160 ton. converters to supply 
the one million ton increase in view of the future expansion plans and 
the fact that small converters would not be as economic and would not 
be very adequate to supply continous casting of slabs of large dimen 
sions. The«new steel shop was projected to supply both conventional 
ingot casting and continous casting. Conventional casting capacity was 
projected for up to 0.4 M.t.a. in order to supply the existing slabbing 
mill in conjunction with the old steel shop. The capacity of the conti-
nous casting was thus established by subtraction to run from 0.6 to 1.0 
M.t.a. Studies based on the correlations between types of steel to be 
(1)Information for this section is base on USIMINAS, Superintendencia 
Geral de Engenharia da USIMINAS. "Aciaria n'2, Desenvolvimento Pro 
jeto e Construgao" USIMINAS REVISTA. Ano 6, n* 12 (Setember 1975) ~ 
pp. 36-54. 
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produced, dimensions of the slabs, cycle time for converter operation 
stops for preventive maintenance, stops for modifications of the dimen-
sion of the.slabs, etc, determined the need for two. continous casting 
machines of two channels each. A third was to be added in the next ex-
pansion. 
The equipment for the steel shop including the two casters 
was divided into eight p a c k a g e s w h i c h were opened to international 
bidding^ as required under the IBRD contract. An average of 36 sup-
pliers responded per package and an average of 12 were found to meet 
the prequalification criteria. 
As in the case of the blast furnace the projects for the equi 
ment were done by the respective suppliers. The civil construction, 
totalling about 5.8 million man/hours was done by local Brazilian 
firms. The foundation for the steel shop, the continous casters and 
the water system, however were projected and detailed by the respective 
equipment manufactures. The foundation work itself was controlled by 
the Superintendency of Construction with technical assistance from the 
General Superintendency of Enginneering and follow up was done through 
a PERT CPM system. Mounting of the continous casters was done by Mon-
treal Engenharia (the same local Brazilian engineering firm which did 
the mounting of the blast furnace) under the control of the Superin-
tendency of Construction. To better accompany and control the work, a 
special steel group was created with members drawn from engineers of all 
sectors related to the steel shop. Nippon Steel provided almost eleven 
thousand man/hours of supervisory assistance for the mounting work, 
and the equipment suppliers provided another 106 thousand man/hours of 
supervisory assistance in mounting the various equipment. 
(1) The packages, their distribution as a percent of equipment costs 
and their nationalization index (in parenthesis) were: steel shop 
42.5% (26); laddies, 1.2% (73); continous casters, 36.4% (0); wa-
ter system for continous casters 2.7% (0); press for refractory, 
1.3% (0); heavy cranes, 4.0% (0); light cranes, 11.21(100); spec-
trometer with computer, 0..8% (0). The total equipment cost was 
59.8 million dollars of which 23% were spent in Brazil. 
(2) For the steel shop itself 12 firms representing 7 different coun-
tries met the qualification requirements', for the continous casting 
equipment 8 firms representing 5 countries met the prequalification 
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The total cost of the equipment, civil contruction and 
mounting of the second steel shop, including continous casting but 
excluding administration and supervisory, costs, was U.S. $ 110.2 mil-
lion dollars. This was distributed as follows: equipment and structu-
res, 63.3%; mounting, 22.Si; civil works, 14.21. Of the total 58.2 % 
was spent in Brazil. 
6.4.3. Conclusion 
From these relatively detailed descriptions several inte-
resting points can be learned. First of all they show the relatively 
long planning horizon which is required. Notice that plans were alre-
ady underway in 1971 for equipment which did not enter into operation 
until December 1974 (blast furnace) and September, 1975 (steel shop.) 
Secondly attention should be drawn to how the specifications of the 
equipment very strongly depend on interrelationshipwhith other exis-
ting equipment not only in timing when it should enter but it what ca 
pacity it should have. Third notice the kind of preparations necessary 
in terms of elaborating and explaining the specifications to the po-
tential suppliers. Notice too that the basic equipment was dissagre-
gated into various packages, each of which was opened up to interna-
tional competion. It is hot clear to what extent this would have been 
done if it were not a IBRD requirement, but in any event it is proba-
ble that if it resulted in better deals it was an proceedure which the 
firm would have learned to use for future plans. 
The descriptions also serve to show the incredible amount 
of planning and coordination of involved in the set-up and mounting 
of the equipment. This requires not only competent technical capacity 
from supervisory units internal to the firm, but from the equipment sup-
pliers and subcontracted parties. In this intermediate phase, USIMINAS 
required technological assistance in planning, basic conception, 
selection of suppliers, mounting and inspecting the equipment, but this 
served as an investment in experience such that USIMINAS was able to 
do all this on its own for the third expansion plant. 
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Although somewhat off the main topic, it is also possible 
to see growing participation of Brazilian firms a vis a vis foreign 
firms not only is some of the engineering (concentrated in detail en-
gineering) but also in terms of equipment supply. This is a long way 
from the situation at the time the firm was first constructed when 
nearly all the equipment and engineering had to come from abroad^ 
Clearly the participation of Brazilian firms in these kind of projects 
under close technical supervision and advice from USIMINAS, its advi-
sor, and the equipment suppliers provides an important learning expe-
rience which helps to further develop local engineering and capital 
equipment manufacturing capacities and prepare .them for even greater 
particaption in future projects. This is a non-negligeable technolo-
gical externality which should be taken into account along with the 
firms other contributions in terms of human capital training and the 
flow of human resources developed inside the firm to other firms . 
From the specific perspective of the relationship between 
expansion and technology very interesting interrelationships, are aJL 
so implied. 
(1) See figure 7.5. for aquick graphical survey of Brazilian steel 
project engineering. 
For example Manoel Moacelio de Aguiar Mendcs, formerly the Superintendent of 
Project Engineering left USIMINAS to become president of AQOMINAS; Luiz Verano, 
formerly General Superintendent became, president of USIMHC; US1MEC itself is 
such as externality as it was conceived by USIMINAS and was initially staffed 
with USIMINAS personnel.. 
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Hptiçe the. tremendous amount of negotiation which is invol. 
ved.not only in selecting the equipment, but in dealing whith the cho 
;sen suppliers* This wouia.seem to. be a critical point because it is 
through tne. original specifications ana subsequent negotiations and 
.meetings. (11.0 for thé blast furnace, for example) that the firm can 
call for specific technical details in the equipment and ask for adap-
tations and modifications of the supplier's basic design for better 
performance in the local conditions and in relation to better intégra 
tion with, the plant's existing equipment and processes. 
We would have liked to* have had more specific details on 
the specifications asked for,the modifications made in the basic 
equipment, and at whose initiative (manufacturer, USIMINAS,or advisor) 
they were made, in order to trace the contribution of eacn of the three 
parties to the adaptation to local conditions. Although we could not 
get this kind o± detail it is obvious that in the give and take over spe 
(1) 
cifications there were important contributions nor only from general 
advances in the technological frontier which may have already been 
built into the basic equipment model, but also from the suppliers, the 
firm and the advisors in terms of specific features added to better 
adapt it to operating conditions in general and to specific local con-
ditions in particular. 
It is worth remembering, for example, that since USIMINAS 
planned its first blast furnace the frontier evolved in terms of larger 
size blast furnace, oxygen injection, continous charging, and increased 
automatization of control. All of these technological features plus 
others which were available when the first furnaces were planned but 
UJ An interesting point according to a high placed official within the 
company is that there was a problem in specifying the details of 
wUhe?hePheeîo PoafCÎLgC T f° r t h 6 M d S t 0° £ i ^ this'was °done 
with the help of the Japanese it sometimes turned out that the spe-
cifications were such that only the Japanese could meet them Th? 
i n e r S V ^ T T 1 w a V h " equipment packages should he less rTgoroSsly 
S t h î l e d -ef°re t h e b,ids a n d t h a t t h e r e should be more nego?il?ïon with the winner to work out the details. g u u o n 
- 195 -
not then adopted, were built into the new blast furnace. Also there 
is no doubt that all of the operational experience under Brazilian con 
ditons developed by USIMINAS with more than 10 years of work with its 
original bast furnaces also were incorporated into some of the speci-
fic features asked for in the new blast furnace. With respect to au-
tomation of control of the blast furnace there is an interesting aspect 
which shows USIMINAS' cautious step by step strategy allied to provi-
sons for the future. The blast furnace was built with all the sensors and 
specifications necessary for completely automatic control by computer. 
This automatic computer control was not adopted initially because of 
the lack of experience in computer control of such a large furnace. 
The strategy adopted for computer automatization is to proceed 
through three steps as operational experience is gained. Phase one 
consists off-line calculation of the charge and on-line calculation of 
the flame temperature, monitoring and execution of monthly reports. 
Phase two is to develop guidelines for the operation of the regenerators 
with off-line calculation of the volume of pig iron and slag accumu-
lation in the ciucible.Phase three is for direct closed circuit com-
puter process control of the furnace and to hook up the process com-
puter with the integrated computer information system which is being 
developed for the whole plant. 
An interesting note on the interrelationship between equip-
ment supplier and a firms operating experience is that according to a 
well informed' source , the third blast furnace is supposed to suffer 
from some project deffects which are due to a problem between ISHIKAWA-
JIMA and Nippon Steel. Apparently, although ISHIKAWAJIMA built several 
furnaces for Nippon Steel, the latter was unwilling to give it detailed 
information on their operational performance so ISHIKAWAJIMA has not 
been able to correct some problems. The newer blast furnaces more re-
cently installed at CSN and COSIPA reportedly do not have these pro-
blems because they were supplied by Nippon Steel. 
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In short although we have not been able to get as much 
detail as we would have liked or to get more specific information on the plan-
ning and implementation of phase III, which is being done by USIMINAS 
itself, we believe we have drawn attention to the importance of engi-
neering and technical change in terms of the possibilities opened up 
by expansion plaiis . Theses changes involve not only being able to 
get new units which embody more advanced technological developments 
(such as large size blast furnace with automatic charging and computer 
control) or changes in the process (adoption of continous casting) but 
also innumerous technical details built into the specification 
of thefiquipment and to the plant layout. This is an area where the ope-
rational experience and technical knowledge acquired by the firm over 
time can have important payoffs. The very choice of techniques and spe-
cifications of details require a well developed engineering and infor-
mation gathering structures within the firm. As will be shown in the 
next chapter these have been very much developed withing USIMINAS and it 
is the growth of this technological infrastructure for the development 
of operational improvements and expansion plans which has made possible 
its impresive technological advances. 
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6.5. Costs, expansions, and the Energy Crisis 
The distribution of relative cost shares of va-
rious imputs in the various production' sectors of USIMINAS is 
given in figure 6.23. The costs are based on real costs for the 
first semmester of 1978, but they do not include depreciation or 
expenses with the head and regional offices. 
The figure shows the importance of raw material 
costs in the overall cost structure They always account for more 
than 851 of the costs whereas labor never accounts for more than = 
6%. If the share of raw materials in the cost of producing steel 
were to be broken down into its components the share of labor 
would increase somewhat while that of raw materials would fall, 
but it is clear that the bulk of the costs would still be repre-
sented by raw materials. 
The very large share of materials cost as well as 
the effects of various qualities of such materials on the produc-
tivity of the other factors is why so much of the technical change 
in the sinter and blast furnace section "^ as related to the selec-
tion, preparation and control of material imputs. 
Figure 6.2 4 shows the evolution of a deflated in-
dex of standard costs for each of the four products since 1969.^ 
The most striking feature of the indexes is the 
dramatic rise over the period 1974-1976. Although we have not been 
CI) The actual cost figures were deflated using the price indexes 
for steel and derrived products supplied by the Fundagao Getu-
lio Vargas. 
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Figure 6*23 RELATIVE SHARE OF VARIOUS IMPUTS IN PRODUCTION COSTS 
Products 
Imputs 
COKE SINTER PIG IRON STEEL 
Raw materials 94.82 85.29 87.21 88.16 
Direct Laoor 0.40 0 .38 0.25 0.25 
Indirect Libor 0.49 0 .46 0.30 0.29 
Repairs ana Maintenance 3.38 6.22 7.91 3.27 
i Fuels (4.02) 1.34 (4.85) (0.26) 
5 Energy and Transport 0.70 3.48 5.77 3.6,8 
Supplements to Operation 0.06 0.0Ö 1.13 2.95 
Administre! ci on of Plant 4.15 2.74 2.28 1.66 
T C T A L 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
NOTES: lj Shares were based on actual costs in 1978 , which." are supposed to be 
historically representative. 
2) Depreciation and expenses with head and regional offices were not included 
3) Parenthesis indicate a credit 
SOURCE: Information supplied directly by firm. 
FIGURE -6.2 4: 
RELATIVE COST OF COKE, SINTER, PIG IRON AND STEEL 
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Source: Information supplied directly by firm. 
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able to obtain appropriate imput price series it seems that to 
large extent cost increased were due to the rise in the cost of 
raw meterials, particularly of coal which has a consequence of 
the 1973 energy crisis. As shown in figure 6.25 the price of 
coal approximately quadrapled as a reuslt of the energy crisis. 
It is particularly striking ' to follow the evolution 
of the cost of sinter. Its costs had fallen about 20% between 
1969 and 1971 probably in close connection with the more rigourous 
control of burning and ignition described in section 6.3.1, and 
the sharp rise of productivity per area of machine (figure 6.7.). 
Although its costs remained more or less constant between 1971 
and 1973 they increased over 100% from the latter year to 1976.As 
can be seen in figure 6.24 during this period which also coincides 
with the entrace into operation of the new sinter machine, the 
productivity of the old sinter machine fell almost 100% in terms 
of output per square meter of area, and the new machine did not 
have as high a level of productivy as the old machine reached at 
its peak. It has not been possible to separate out the effects of 
the expansion from those of the crisis on such reduced performan-
ces, but it seems that both played an important part. 
In the case of pig iron as well as steel the inde-
xes show that the costs were maintained more or less constant 
between 1969 and 1973 after which they both rose in a very similar 
manner. The rise in the price of steel is very mnch a reflection 
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Figure b.Zb 
AVERAGE PRICE OF COKING COAL AND PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL 
COAL USED BY BRAZILIAN STEEL INDUSTRY 1965-1976 
Average Price of Coal (1) 
US $/Ton 
% Nacional Coal 
Used in Brazilian Steel Industry 
1965 15.71 36 
1966 15.56 '30 
1967 15.88 33 
1968 15.99 33 
1969 16.69 32 
1970 21.32 30 
1971 21.36 3.0 
1972 21.97 32 
1973 25.64 31 
1974 50.99 40 
1975 56.16 26 
1976 59.12 28 
(1) Average of prices in USA, Australia, Canada, USSR, Poland 
and South America 
Source: Appendix III 
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of the rise in the price of the other products since directly or 
indirectly they are its material imputs. 
The rise in the cost of pig iron can be in large 
part attributed to the rise in the price of imported coal and the 
need to use a greater proportion of poorer quality national coal 
which reached a high of 40% in 1974.^ Notice that as a result 
of the poorer quality coke the output of blast furnace one suf-
fers a sharp drop related to a fall in its productivity rather 
than to its operating index, (see figure 6.11). 
The energy crisis lead the firm to orient research 
towards the reduction of energy consumption. One of the more im-
pressive results of such a research effort was the development 
of a project to use coke oven cases for a Midrex direct reduction 
process. This would enable USIMINAS to sare 20% of the fuel in 
the blast furnace s ection and to increase steel production 20% 
with the same equipment originally foreseen for the 3.5 M.t.a. 
v, (2) phase J 
As a result of various energy conservation efforts 
involving several projects;USIMINAS achieved a reduction of 10% in-its^ 
overall energy consumption in 1977 as compared to 1976 even 
though its output increased 16% over the same period. 
(1) For more details see Appendix III 
(2) This project has not yet been implemented but Midrex has 
worked out a contract with USIMINAS whereby it will pay 
USIMINAS a royalty every time thee process is used. 
(3) 19 77- 5,561 Giga Calories/t. G. 1-
1976- 6,176 Giga Calories/t.G.1 
Source information provided directly by firm. 
- 203 -

C H A R T E R SEVF.M 
7. ADMINISTRATIVE AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES 
What was analyzed in the previous chapter is just 
one aspect of technical change - the changes in machines, operating 
methods and physical indexes. The other part of the process of tech 
nical change is the human element behind the changes, its training 
and development, and the evolution of the administrative and orga-
nizational infrastructure within which such change is made possible-
This chapter highlights some of these topics including an important 
administrative reform carried out in 1966, the. implantation of a 
standard cost system and the technological support structure it re-
quired, the concept of a technological prism, organizational changes 
related to the expansion plans, investment in human capital, and 
technology contracts. 
7.1. The Administrative Reform of 1966 
As was explained in chapter three, initially ope-
rational responsibility for the firm was in the hands of the Japa-
nese partners. They were in change of setting up the administrative 
structure and the various operating norms as well as of training the 
Brazilian team. 
In general the firm rapidly attained satisfactory 
technical operational indexes. However as early as 1964 ^  there was 
(1) Information from a 1964 report to the Board of Directors "Considerations on 
the Present Operating Conditions of The Intendente Camara Works". 
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a feeling that the company had Some problems in its administrative 
area. In part they derrived from the difficulty of transplanting 
a foreign administrative structure developed for a large estabi-
lished Japanese plant t o a smaller plant getting started in a dif-
ferent socio-economic and cultural setting where there was less 
èxpenenced personne^ and a low professional level among workers 
in general.^ there was also concern that the Brazilians were just 
being trained in the technological area and not for the administra-
tive part, and that as a result their contributions for the impro-
vement ot the administrative conditions was very small. It was re-
commended that 1) there be an increase in the professionalization 
of the various key positions through training and intensive courses 
and through the admission of more qualified persons; 2) the Japa-
nese be given even greater authority in the technological area but 
also increasing that of the Brazilians in the administrative areas 
so that both groups participated in the administration of the plant; 
31 the responsibility of the various positions be defined more cle-
arly; and 4) a specialized consulting service outside the firm be 
hired to study and propose a new administrative structure for the 
plant. 
As a result in 1964 USIMINAS decided to hire the 
American consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton International to study 
the company and to suggest a general administrative and personnel 
f 21 restructuringv J of the firm. The study was done in 1965. 
-(l)Amcng the problems resulting from this.situation were low worker efficiency, 
excess number of employees, difficult labor relations; lack of adequate raw 
material stocks; inadequate accounting, cost control, or budgeting; poor 
analisis, control, and maintenance services; piecarious transport and pro-
duct expedition services; and errors in the emission of documents. 
(2)According to a various Brazilian officials in the firm, one of the reasons 
for the o-zerstaffing in the plant was that the Japanese wanted to be sure 
that enough workers would be trained so that the best could be chosen to 
insure that each unit of their equipment reached record operational and 
production indexes. 
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Parenthetically it should be noted that in terms 
of participation in the capital stock, the Japanese share which had 
started at 40% and was iraintainea at that level through the first 
capital expansion in 1962 fell to 21.5% when capital was again ex-
panded in 1965. In the various expansions since then it has been 
maintained at slighty less than 19%, as can be seen in figure 
Notice too that in USIMINAS the largest shareholder has always been 
the Government (counting direct ownership and indirect ownership 
through its organs such as the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento, 
the State Government and CSN.) Recently Government control has been 
centralized in SIDERBRAS a Government holding company for all of 
the stock it owns in the Brazilian steel companies. 
In 1966 the Japanese turned over operational con-
trol of the company to the Brazilians. The relationship between 
the fall of the Japanese share in the company and the acquisition 
of operational control by the Brazilians a year later is not clearf1^ 
As far as we have been able to ascertain the switch as made by Ja-
panese initiative as they had finished the star-up of the plant and 
completed the period of free technical assistance.^ 
In any event the recommendations of the BAHINT 
study started to be implemented in 1966. Among the main reforms 
(1) It should be remembered that representation cn the board of Directors was 
supposed to be in proportion to the ownership of stock. As a result of the 
capital expansion five directors were chosen by the Brazilians and only one 
by the Japanese. 
(2) Technical assistance was provided free of charge until one year after start-
up. As the last units entered into operation in 1965 the assistance ended in 
1966. After this a 10 year general assistance contract was signed between 
USIMINAS and Nippcn Steel. It shall be discussed in section 7.6.. 
(3) In the second half of the sixties various memorandums of understanding 
were negotiated between the Brazilians and the Japanese whereby the later 
were supposed to reattain their 40% share. However, this was never accom-
plished as it seems that the Japanese were very worried about the finan-
cial performance of the company 
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Figure 7.1 
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NOTES: a) This increase actually took place in two stages 
b) Through incorporation of reserves 
c) Transfer of stock from the State of Minas Gerais to the 
BNDE and from the BNDE to Nippon USIMINAS 
d) Through incorporation of. reserves 
Sources: Alfeu Barbosa, "21 Anos de USIMINAS", USIMINAS REVI STA, 
Ano 8 N9 16 (Julho 1977) p.47 and USIMINAS COMPANY RE-
PORTS, 1956-1976.' 
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were: 1) the introduction of the line staff system of administration 
under which line activities revolved around production and sales 
while staff activities were responsible for the maximization of 
performance and were to be carried out by newly created Industrial 
Engineering, and Metallurgy and Control Departments; 2) the intro-
duction of the standard cost system as an administrative system for 
the control of results at all levels, and 3) the definition of 
Director's functions as those of a board responsible for the defi-
nition of policies and objectives of the firm, giving only the 
President executive powers. 
Based on those BAHINT recomendation USIMINAS re-
duced its personnel from 7.800 to 5.500 at the plant between 1966 
and 1968. ^  Figure 7.2 shows the reduction of personnel, production 
and productivity between 1966 and 1968. Notice that even as, the 
personnel reduction was carried out production was increased,lea-
ding to a dramatic increase in productivity. 
(1) Manocl Moacelio de Aguiar Mcndes, "Geragao da Tecnologia - 0 cxem 
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7.2 The Implantation of the Standard Cost System 
The most important part of the reforms from the 
point of view of the future technological development of the firm 
was the implementation of the standard cost system^. With person-
nel from the newly created Industrial Engineering Department the 
BAHINT consultants went to each section of the firm and after dis-
cussing the various operations involved in each activity with the 
operation personnel, they worked out the goals to be attained and 
surpassed. 
In a recent conference on the steel industry and scientific 
and technologial progress, Amaro Lanaro Junior^2\ the man who was pre 
sident of USIMINAS for 18 years (1957-1975) and is generally conside-
red to have been the person most directly responsible for USIMINAS' 
technical evolution, divided the method.of knowing and formulating 
the technological problems into four stages: observation, analysis, 
information and comparison. 
Through observation the characteristic indexes of the parti 
cular production process in question are measured. These include pro-
duction indexes, quality performance, rejects, losses, etc. 
Through analysis the observations are sub-divided and each 
elementary operation is studied in detail trying to relate the obser-
ved indexes with qualities or defects in the raw materials, the equip-
ment, or the training of the personnel. 
Through information a search is made in the specialized li-
terature, in contacts with equipment manufacturers, in technical pa-
(1) It is claimed that the standard, cost system, which had been deve-
loped in the U.S., was used by USIMINAS before it was used by Ja-
panese steel plants and that, in fact, the Japanese who saw it im-
plemented at USIMINAS were responsible for introducing it in Japan. 
(2) Amaro Lanari Junior. "A Empresa Siderrfrgica no Proccsso Cientifico 
e^Tecnologico"^PUND13P -Fundagao de Desenvolvimento da Pesquisa:Sim 
posio fobre Ciencia e Tccnologia em Universidadc, Instituto de Pe_s 
quisa e limpresa, Belo Horizontc, 27 de abril de 1977 . 
- 211 -
pers, or through the direct knowledge of the experience in the best 
enterprises in'the industry, for the production indexes which are good 
or excellent by current international standards in the present state 
of technology. 
Finally,, through comparison an identification is made of 
the strong and weak points in technique, of the deficiencies, and«. .of 
the defects in own process as compared to those of similar enterpri-
ses and of the indexes which have to be improved. 
By going through these four steps, Lanari suggests, the 
size and nature of the problem and the.technological diagnosis of the 
enterprise can be made. 
From the outline presented it is obvious that the basis of 
the support and control structure for the methodical and routine iden-
tification of the technological problem of the enterprise is the stan-
dard cost system. Once the standard cost system is formulated all the 
way from each elementary operation up to each of the cost centers and 
on to the whole operation of the enterprise, the variations in each 
standard element observed through out the month become the basis of 
points to be debated, explained and resolved. 
The general picture of standard costs and all its varia-
tions gives a measure of the technological level of the enterprise and 
serves as the basis for observation, analysis and comparison with inter 
nationally accepted standards in order to identify the problem to be 
solved and the new goals which are to be set and gradually attained. 
The standard costs and goals are constantly revised and higher goals 
set. In order to accomplish this there have to be a whole series of 
technical support departments.. The enterprise must not only be looking 
at and analysing its own technology, production and productivity indc-
(1) These are presented in-physical imput as well as in price terms 
so it is possible to separate out the influence of changes in 
prices from that of changes in imput. 
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xes but must also be searching for information on the performance and 
technology of other plants and on the development of the technological 
frontier. 
It means that within the firms there must also be a well 
developed mechanism to analyze the causes of the problems and to de-
velop their solutions. In practice this means that a lot of depart-
ments are involved-Once the production personnel identify a bottle-
neck they need the cooperation of the Department of Industrial Engi-
neering to decompose the operation into its elementary operations and 
to study alternatives. The personnel from the Department of Metallurgy 
and Quality control help to idientify the problems which they are not 
prepared or equiped to study and appeal to the Research Center to 
learn about and correct the causes for low performance. The Maintenace De-
partment .knows the weak points and deficiencies in the equipment and 
advises the Engineering Department to correct those defects. 
There is thus a complex interaction betweem the production 
r 
departments and the support departments, between information on in-
ternal technology and technological indexes and between information 
on external technology and technological indexes in other plants or 
in the technological literature. In the case of USIMINAS it was lar-
gely through the effective development of this mechanism that it was 
possible to carefully study its existing equipment, compare its per-
formance to that of other plants, and in that way stretch the capa-
city of the existing equipment to its limit. It should be noted, ho-
Veverjthat its effective implementation required the active develop-
ment of the firm's technological and organizational infrastructure. 
With the BAHINT reform a Department of Industrial Engineering and a 
Department of Data processing were established as the basic instru-
ment to measure' operational efficiency. In addition^ the Departments 
of Metallurgical Control, Planning and Coordination of Production, 
were restructured to give suppot to production. 
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•In 1967 the training of personnel for the research center to 
•jxe set up later was started by sending personnel abroad for training. 
In 1968 a Center of Technical Information was created. 
In 1970 the research Center was set up. 
In 1971 USIME^a subsidiary for the manufacture of steel 
equipment^was created and the Research Center was innagurated. 
In 197.2 the data processing, center was restructured and 
a special group with the task of developing the automation of produc-
tion processes was organized. 
In 1974 a Department of Information Systems (Computer) was 
created. 
In order to explain a bit more clearly what the functions 
of some of these departments are, a brief description of the most im-
portant is given below: In addition Appendix IV gives some selected 
case examples of the type of projects the main oneicarry out. 
7.2.1. Metallurgical Control and Plant Inspection^ 
This department is in charge of analysing, absorbing and 
applying all the metallurgical techniques acquired and developed by 
the firm. Its main reponsibilities are: specification of raw materials 
and products, the establishment of quality and operational controls, 
participation in the development of new products and processes, and 
the analysis of the behavior of the products in use by clients. I.t is 
also in charge of coordinating at the plant site all the technical 
services given to Operation by external firms. 
(1) The information in this Section is based en COTA, "Investimcntos..• 
p. 31 
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One of the most important functions of this departments is 
to give technical support to Operation; it carries out metallurgical 
studies aiming to improve the efficiency of the processes, the quali-
ties of the products, and cost reduction. Another important activity 
is the routine analysis of operational results which permits that the 
production departments are constantly informed on the achievement of 
the standards and quality goals set. All industrial scale tests for 
the implantation or modification of standards are done through this 
department. Also, it serves as the link between Sales and Production 
personnel in the implantation of new products demandeH by the market. 
Finally,it is also through it that the greater part of the ideas ge-
nerated in the Research Center are pi. t tract-ice-. 
In 1976, it had 127 persons in the area of Metallurgical 
Control, 32% with higher education and 341 with technical educationj 
and another 370 in inspection activities. 
7.2.2 .Industrial Engineering^^ 
The main functions of this department are: maintaining the 
standard cost system, economic analysis of alterations and improvements 
in production processes, operational evaluation and applied mathema-
tics, control and determination of material inventory levels, method, 
time and motion studies and determination of labor force. 
In 1976 the department had 80 persons. Fifty three percent had 
a higher education level, 381 had a technical education and 9% were 
administrative. 
(1) COTA, Op Cit , p. 31 
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7.2.3. Information Services 
As already pointed out an efficient and effective informa-
tion service is an essential part of the technological .infrastructure 
of the firm. The firm needs information to define correctly which are 
its technological needs and to be able to obtain that technolo-
gy in the most econommical way possible. This requires obtaining in-
formation1 . on-modern techniques of production and control, productivi-
ty and quality indexes achieved by other firms, trends in the steel 
product market, etc. 
USIMINAS has centralized the^e.functions in a Center of 
Technical Information. Among other things this center has the best 
librarv on steel in the country and maintains permanent contacts with 
the main information organs in the country and in the.world in order 
to collect information of interest. The CIT regularly publishes seve-
ral publications among which are a monthly patent Bulletin, a bi-
weekly series on Bibliographical Information. Recently it has started to 
publish a series of reports on the general state of steel technology 
It has also started to publish a series on general macroeconomic con-
ditions in the main steel producing countries including excepts and 
abstracts from relevant articles. 
The Research Center has its own technical library staffed 
with 19 persons with over 5,000 books and its own subsription to 329 
revelant technical journals and magazines apart from those of the 
main library. 
The Research Center's library regularly circulates a mon-
thly periodical indexj monthly Tecnical News Bulletin, which carries 
information and abstracts on the most recent innovations which have 
occurred in the various sectors of steelmaking; and a monthly Infor-
mation Bulletin,which gives bibliographical references of all the li-
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terature received and all the bibliographical research undertaken 
during the month. 
As will be discussed in section 7.4., besides the Center 
t 
of Technical Information, the Superintendency of Research on Processes 
and Information in the General Superintendency of Engineering is ano-
ther information collecting organ. 
7.2.4.Computer System^1^ 
Allied to general administrative .reform of 1966 USIMINAS 
adopted data processing. Initially this Was done through IBM but by 
1968 they had installed their own IBM 360 at the plant. At the begin-
ning it was used primalily for administrative and financial services. 
Since then, however USIMINAS has started to use it for production re-
lated purposed as well. By 1971;it was being used to compile basic 
statistical data on production and raw material consumption, for the 
blast furnaces and steel shop, and for programming control and opera-
tional indexes of the rolling section.Its use was also being extended 
to the coke and sinter plants as well as to inventory maitenance con-
trol. By 1972jthe original IBM 360 system reached its capacity ana-
plans were made to adopt a new IBM 370 system which entered into ope-
ration in 1973. With its entry it was possible to start implanting an 
Operation Control System in the areas of steel shop and hot rolling. 
This is system comprises all operations which go from receiving a 
(1) Information for this section is based en José Roque Rossi, "O Uso 
do Computador na Gestäo Empresarial" USIMINAS REVISTA, Ano 2 n* 3 
(1971) pp. 69-72; Roberto de Freitas Ramos and Romeru Pries Couveia 
"Teleprocessamento de Dados na USIMINAS" USIMINAS REVISTA, Ano 5 , 
n* 5 (1972) pp. 55-60; Paulo Roberto de Carvalho Coelho, et. al"0 
Computador no Planejamento e Controle de Produgäo da USIMINAS" 
USIMINAS REVISTA Ano 4 n* 7 (1973) pp. 52-7,' the company's Annual 
Reports 1972-1976, and Cota,"Investimento ..." p.. 32. 
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purchase order to production programming. A second IBM 370 was instal-
led in 1974 and the functions of the system expanded further. In 1975 
a computer system for the calculation of the end of oxygen blowing 
was implanted in Steel Shop n9 1 and a terminal for the execution of 
charging and other calculations were installed for tl^ e third blast 
furnace. 
It is our understanding that USIMINAS is currently instal-
ling automatic computer process control of the steel shops and the 
third blast furnace, and eletricity demand. 
In 1976 the number of people involved in the Computer acti 
vities was 201,Thirty percent are university trained specialists , 30% are middle 
level technicans, and the rest are administrative staff and operators. 
The system has grown significantly since then , but we do not have 
any more recent information on staff. 
7.2.5. The Research Center 
This section on the Research Center will be more detailed 
than the others in order to show the step by step proceedure adopted, 
and to give idea of its evolution and of the type of projects is has 
undertaken. 
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It is our- understanding that initially it took a lot of persua-
sion to sell the idea of the Reisearch..Center to the Operation person-
•nel This was finally accomplisited. when USIMINAS started to have opera 
tiona] problems in the blast furnaces as a result of a switch in the 
-source of -the mineia-1 or« which :wa.s being used. The production person-
nel were then finally convinced that it vould be useful to have their 
j&wn research, center which could help, to analyse and solve such problems 
Planning for the research center began in 1967 with the se-
lection of 5 team o± six engineers who were sent abroad^^ for trai-
ning and specialization. In 196.9. USIMINAS signed a five year contract 
with its Japanese partner NIPPON US.IM1NAS for the specification of -
equipment and training of personnel. The research center itself was 
magurated in 1971. It is one of the eight staff departments directly 
subordinated to the General Chief of Plant at Ipatinga ^Although it 
originally started out with five^Vections it is currently subdivided 
into seven sections: pig iron research, (46 people) steel research 
(21 people), process research (26 peopleJ, product research (36 people), 
chemical analysis (39 people), instrumentation unit (51 people). The 
first four units are development units . They carry out studies 
corresponding to the main production activities of the plant, for the 
support sectors, and for third parties. The last three are support 
units which service the first four research units develop methods of 
analysis, and project and set up equipment for the specific projects 
of the Research Center. 
(1) Four went to Batelle Memorial Institute: (U.S.A.) two went to IRSID 
(France). 
(2) The other seven are: Metallurgy and Inspection,Industrial Enginee-
ring, Information Systems, Industrial Relations, Industrial Acoun-
ting, Planning and Control of Production, Supply. (See figure 7.7) 
(3) Until 1976 chemical analysis and instrumentation were one unit.Un-
til 1978 process and product res-earch. were one unit. 
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In the initial planning, the work to be done by the rese-
arch center was divided into three broad areas:^ TECHNICAL SUPPORT: 
the study of raw materials, especially mineral ores, and coal, with 
the objective of improving the technical and economic conditions of 
their utilization in the blast furnacesj studies on the metallurgical 
factors which influence the yield of the process or the quality of the 
process, as well as the better utilization of the products; studies on 
materials consumed in the plant such as refractories and ingot casts, 
with the purpose of improving their utilization; studies for the intro 
duction of new techniques and the maximum utilization of existing equi-
pment. DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH: development of new products and experimen-
tation of new processes as well as substmcial improvements in the pr£ 
duction and quality indexes, using laboratories and pilot plants. 
APPLIED RESEARCH: practical exploration for the creation of new products 
and processes through technological and scientific laboratory research. 
f ' • 
According to planning in 1970 initially 1001 of the effort 
was to be concentrated on technical support. In five years they plan-
ned to devote 651 of the effort to technical support, 301 to develop-
ment research and 5% to applied research. 
In 1977. the main objectives of Research Center were stated 
as: 1 « 
1 -• Analysis of raw materials available for the steel indu£ 
try from various sources in the sense of defining those 
which in certain conditions offer the firm greater 
economy. 
Z - Improvement in the efficiency of the processes employed 
and feasibility analysis of the introduction of new pro 
cesses with the objective of reducing production costs 
by reducing energy consumption, increasing production, 
and increasing process yield. 
(1) Amaro Lanari Junior, "Pesquisa Tecnologica na Empresa" USIMINAS REVISTA, Ano 1, 
n« 2 (1970) p. 12 — 
(2) Francisco Leal Lamia and Joâo Luiz R. Pimenta, "0 Centro de Pesquisas" USIMINAS: 
Simposio de Pesquisas em Administraçâo de Cicncia y Tecnologia, SP, Dezembro,1977. 
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3- Improvement in the quality of the products manufactured 
and development of new products with the objetive of 
supplying the consuming market products with the quali-
ty demanded and superior to that of competitors. 
4- Give assistance to all units of the plant in the solution 
of technological problems. 
5-= Cooperate for the raising of technical knowledge i"n all 
the units of the plant. 
6= Give technical assistance to National firms with the ob-
jective of cooperating with the technological develop-
ment of the country. 
7- Development research work in conjunction with the Univer_ 
sity with the objetive of fostering the integration of the 
University and the enterprise according to Government 
directives. 
Notice that development research has now been dissagregated 
into product (item 2) and process (item 3) research as also reflected 
by the distinction between the product and process research divisions. 
Notice also that lending technical assistance services to third par-
ties is explicitly stated (item 6), and that closer work with the uni-
versity is being sought(item 7). 
The 1977 distribution of the technological effort 
of the Research Center is summarized in figure 7.3. Research projects 
accounted for 42.2% of the total number of projects and for 69.0% of 
the costs which shows that they are relatively more expensive than pro-
jects for technical support or for third parties. Technical support 
projects accounted for the largest share of the projects (52.4%) but 
for the relatively lowest share of the costs (26.7%). Research services 
for third parties were 5.9% of the projects and 4.3% of the costs. In 
terms of the overall distribution of the Research Centers costs the 
greatest portion (33.0%) was process research, followed by product re-
search (23.6%), techniques and methods (20.7%), imputs (14.1%), and 
development and improvement of equipment and instruments (8.6%). As can 
be seen in the figure ,however,the relative share of each of these types 
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F igure 7 .3 
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Sub Total (1 ) 56 44.391.150 . 42,94 1.9,16 2,94 4,28 2,02 2S .5 Î 3,'15 100,00 ' 
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R o l l i n g . 31 7.815.737 4,67 14,89 - . 10,66 1,14 14,14 ' 45,SQ 
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Research 
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For Th i rd 
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Sub Total (3) 8 2.766.405 29,88 63,01 - - - 7 ,11 100,00 
Grand T o t a l 136 64.335.000 33,00 23. S9 1,75 8,04 4 .3 20,74 8 . S 8 . 100.00 
Source : In f o rmat i on supp l i ed d i r e c t l y by USIMINAS 
of technological effort varies depending on the nature of the projects. 
Over 40% of the effort in research projects was on process research 
whereas product research was less than -20% , and techniques and me-
thods was over 2 5%. On the other hand technical support was more or 
less evenly distributed among all the categories with the largest 
share going to development and improvement of equipment. Finally,almost 
all the effort of Research services for third parties was for product 
and process research with a clear emphasis or products rather than pro-
cess which is the opposite of the case in research projects. 
In the last three years approximately 60% of the activities 
of the Research Center correspond to technical support and 40% to for-
mal research projects. Of the latter, 70% are related to process develop-
ment and 30% to product development. Ten of the 50 projects currently 
underway are being done for third parties such as SIDERBRAS,PETROBRAS, 
AQOMINAS, etc, with an.estimated gross income (1978) in the order of 
Cr$ 15 to 20 million. 
It should be noted that since the beginning an effort was 
made to have the Research Center be in close contact with production. 
The technicians which were sent out for training and specialization 
abroad first had to spend some time at the plant to familiarize them 
with its specific problems. Currently personnel sent abroad first spend 
a minimum preparatory period of three years at the plant. 
In addition, from the very begining a research desk was 
set up in each of the productive departments. A delay of almost two 
years in the installation of the research center and its equipment 
provoked a high turnover rate among the personnel initially sent abroad 
and some problems in the relationship between research and production 
The period 1970-1972 was considered an adaptation stage. Betweeen 
1973 and 1975 a good relationship between research and operation was 
achieved. During the last three year's in fact, the Research Center has 
passed from being the one seeking to solve problems in the operation 
area, to being sought by that personnel to solve their problems. 
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Fixed investments - in the Research Center total four mil-
lion dollars. Forty eight percent were obtained throught an Inter-Ame 
rican Development Bank loan for equipment purchased, 24% from the Fon-
do Nacional de Desenvolviment de Ciencia e Tecnologia and 28% from 
USIMINAS' own resources. Equipment^^ accounts for 62% of tfte total 
and buildings for the rest. As of 1977 nearly 70% of the equipment 
had already bein been installed and nearly 80% of the building had 
been done. 
The annual operating budget of the Research Center is fi-
xed at :0.S! fo USIMINAS'- gross sales^Figure 7T4 gives the annual bud-
gets since its implantation in 1971. The total budget in 1977 was 
US$ 5 million (approximately 75 million cruzeiros) .and was distribu-
ted as follows: personnel 73%, research supplies 9%, work by third 
parties 8%, equipment and construction 10"%. 
(1) In 1975 Research Department was equipped with: a sintering pilot 
plant, pilot coke oven, coal bricketing and reduction, vacuum 
induction furnace of 50 kg,and atmospheric induction furnace of 
100 kg; pilot rolling mill line, with 2-High and 4-High mill 
(rolling charge capacity of 250 tons., 0,-1 mm - 0.01 mm minimum 
thickness, .300 mm maximum width),down coilers, heating and anne-
aling furnaces, mechanical tests , dilatometer formator~..f for heat 
treatment CCT and TTT; optical microscope and quantimeter, X-Ray 
diffractometer , X-Ray micro-analyser, 200 kv transmission elec-
tron microscope, scanning microscope with energy dispersion sys-
tem (EDS); a chemical laboratory equiped for instrumental analy-
sis for raw materials, slag, gas,oil, pig iron and steel,* elec-
tronic instrumentation laboratory and machine shop. 
(2) This is close to the figure in the U.S. industry where the average 
is 0.60% of sales. However;in the Japanese industry it is 0.78% 
although Nippon Steel spends 1.50% (Source: Francisco Lanna Leal, 
Chief of Research of USIMINAS) 
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Figure 7,4.: Research Center's Operating Budget 
(1,000s of current cruzeiros) 
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Currently the total staff of the Research Center is 258. 
Twenty two percent have higher education, 34% have a technical educa-
tion and 43% are administrative, or laboratory workers and equipment 
operators. Between 1967 and 1977 thirty three persons were sent abroad 
for specialization and training for the Research Center. Forty percent 
of that training and specialization has been at Nippon Steel with which 
USIMINAS had a technical assistance and training contract for the Re-
search Center between 1970 and 1975. USIMINAS is currently negotiating 
a second five training contract. 
The research plan for year is based on the solicitations of 
the various units of the enterprise within the guidelines set by the 
high administration. A preliminary plan is elaborated by the Research 
Center after discussion with the various operating sections. The pre-
liminary plan is examined by the Head office at the plant which defi-
nes priorities and chooses the actual projects. These are analyzed mo-
re carefully and detailed with repect to stages and resources necessa-
ry. Based on this the final plan is elaborated and presented to the 
high administration. 
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Together with the yearly plan a five year plan which serves 
as the long term plan for equipment purchases and personnel contrac-
ting is elaborated.^ 
Currently the Research Center is developing close to 50 
research projects and 70,technical support projects . A general sketch 
of the main activities of the Research Center in the past few years 
is given b e l o w . ^ 
1971 - 16 projects were concluded and the development and 
another 9 were started. 
1972 - 16 research projects were concluded, among them were 
the development in industrial scale of a new product 
line (eletrical plates with silicon) and of research 
on the utilization of sub-products of coke gas. 
16 technical support projects were carried out. The 
preparation of patent solicitation for 14 inventions 
were carried out. Four patent solicitations were 
published. 
1973 - 26 research project relating to steel processes and 
development of instrument techniques for chemical 
analysis were completed 
75 technical support projects were carried out. 
32 of them were directly related to fullfilling the 
quality and productivity goals of the enterprise. 
3 more patent soliciations were deposited with the 
Instituto Nacional de Propriedade Industrial. 
1974 - 15 research projects were concluded. Among them were 
one which sought more rational utilization of excess 
combustion gases generated in the plant, one saving 
201 of fuels used in the blast furnaces,and one for 
increasing the production of the plant another one 
million tons with the same equipment. 
51 technical support projects were concluded. 
(1) Lanna and Pimenta, Op Cit pp. -12-14 
(2) This information was collected from the Companys annual Reports 
1971-1976. 
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1-975 - 40 -of 48 research projects planned were concluded. 
TJie others were transfered to the next year because 
pf delays in the installation of equipment. One of 
the most significant projects undertaken was "The 
Miorex Process as Used by USIMINAS" which is for the 
use of coke oven gas for direct reduction and may 
permit the p l a n t to produce 4.5 M.t.a. with the 
equipment projected for 3.5 M.t.a. 
88 technical support projects were carried out. 
In addition the Research Center continued a technical 
assistance program it hadinitated with SIDOR of Vene 
zuela for training research staff for that steel 
plant's research department. 
1976 - 48 research projects were carried out. 
103 technicax support projects were carried out. 
11 more piocesses were prepared for patenting. 
Among the highlights were the development of 5 pro-
jects foi other enterprise: 2 on mineral ores, *1 on 
the utilization of babacu nuts, manganese and iron 
from the new deposits at Carajas for sinterization 
done for SIDERBRAS, 1 on briqueting babacu coal for 
the Cia Industrial Tecnica do Maranhao; and 1 on 
the development of high resistance steel for the 
Centro Te'cnico Aerospacial. 
Recently, the firm has felt the need for more basic 
research which is beyond the scope of its in-plant research center. 
There is an interest in setting up a central research center away 
from the plant to carry out the more basic research. In theory,this 
would be a cooperative research center financed by the steel firms 
and the state which would tackle the basic research problems pre-
sented to it by the member firms. However,this is still at the pre-
liminary talking stage with no concrete coinitments from any of the 
parties involved. 
7.2.6. Others 
We were not able to obtain infornation uii two other impor-
tant departments. The Department of Planning and Control of Production 
and the Maintenance Department. In terms of maintenance,however, we 
know that each operating department has its own maintenance section 
distinct from the Maintenance Department proper. 
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7.3. An Aside on the Technological Pxisnv 
The development of a plant's technology takes place within 
the context of the need to maintain competitivity in a market where 
new products, higher quality standards and new ways of producing more 
efficiently are constantly appearing. These demands of the market im-
ply a need to constantly select, absorb and adapt external knowhow. 
An interesting insight into USIMINAS' strategy with respect 
to the need to import is given in two articles by high administrative 
officers of the company. The main argument is that importation of fo-
reign technology should not be seen as an end it itself, but as a means 
to enable the firm to develop technologically and to create profit op-
opportunities. One of the objectives of the Research Center is to 
attend to that need. However, the simple existence of a research center is 
not a sufficient condition. Enginering services are also necessary to transform the 
conclusions of research into a project. Engineering services,in turn,need basic ex-
perimental data because the licensors of processes try to hold back 
on these data and on methods of dimensioning, the equipment in an attempt 
to neutralize national engineering. For that reason it is necessary 
for national industry to create infrastructure which permits it to 
dissag'regate the technological package through technological and sci-
entific knowledge and to. develop the know-how acquired. They suggest, 
that Research and Engineering constitute an innovative capacity in the 
enterprise and that between them there must be a joining of efforts. 
However, for that capacity to be used efficiently, it is' necessary that 
it be allied to the ability to apply that knowledge in equipment manufac-
turing. Furthermore, that system still needs an indis-
pensable component which is the feed back supplied by those who use 
the equipment and the process - the people involved in operation and 
control of the plant's production. Research, Engineering, Equipment, 
Manufacture and Production thus ..form what they refer to as four planes 
•jf a technological prism. 
(1) Manoel Moacelio de Aguiar Mcndes "0 Papel das Organiza^oes de Engenharia no Pro-
cesso de Descnvolvimcnto Tcchnologico" USIMINAS RP.VISTA Ario 6 n9 12 (se.tembro 
1975) pp. 25-29 and COTA, '•Mnvcstimcntos .... Op Cit,.pp. 29-21-
- 228 
Based on that philosophyjUSIMINAS created the Research Cen-
ter, then a Superintendency of Engineering and USIMEC, a subsidiary 
to manufacture capital goods, which in 1972 became an independent enter 
prise with stock participation by USIMINAS^. 
(2) 
Cota adds that in terms of transforming the results of the 
research work into practice or products an interaction is necessary 
among Research, Metallurgical Control and Sales. Metallurgical Control, 
which is responsible for the establishment and observance of operational 
standards.informs the researcher on the limitations of the industrial 
process, and is in charge of programming and undertaking experiences 
on an industrial scale. An interaction between sales and research is 
necessary not only with respect to'marketing in order to identify 
threats or new market opportunities, but also for the commercializa-
tion of new products. In the latter case technical studies and follow 
up on performance with the clients are decisive in the acceptance of a new product.(3) 
An interesting point on USIMEC is that since it became to-
tally independent there have been jealousies between it and USIMINAS 
about what each is learning,and that the flow of information has been 
considerably impaired by bickering on what sort of payments should 
accompany the flows. Apparently this problem exists more generally 
between equipment producers and their clients, as is exemplified by 
the problem between Ishikawajima and Nippon Steel with respect to the 
large size blast furnaces mentioned -earlier. 
(1) In 1968jUSIMINAS created a Special Advisory Group for the promotion 
of the use of steel in civil construction which was then limited to 
concrete technology. The need to have an organization which could 
act in the market led to the creation of USIMEC in 1970. Its main 
objective was to build metal structures, bridges, roads, and rail-
ways. In 1973 it broadened its objectives to manufacture capital 
equipment for the steel industry. It is now one of Brazil's major 
capital goods suppliers. See Appendix V for more details on USIMEC. 
(2) COTA, Op Cit, p.31 
,en'a mP I e o f L t h e latter, Volkswagen recently complained to 
USIMINAS about the quality of the surface finish on the steel sheets 
it was purchasing. They were having problems in the phosphatiza-
tion base which was applied before painting. The Research Center 
was asked by the marketing department to look into the matter. The 
center did an exhaustive study including electron microscopy on 
the optimal properties of the metal-finish for phosphatization 
was able to show that the problem lay not in the finish, but in 
the technique used by Volkswagen. 229 
7.4. Expansion Plans, The Development of Engineer-in? Services 
and the Emphasis on Basic Engineering 
7.4.1. Engineering in the.Eirst Expansion Plan 
The Development of the engineering element of the 
technological prism is very related to the companys expansion plans. 
As will be recalled from chapter three initially all the engineering 
for the plant's creation was done by the Japanese partners. It should 
also be recalled that its first expansion plan to increase production 
to 1.4 M.t.a. was doner by the Japanese, who were primarily respon-
sible for all the engineering. When that plan was approved by the 
Government in 1968 USIMINAS created an Engineering Nucleus for the 
Coordination of Expansion Services which was called the Expansion 
Group. It was responsible for all aspects of the implementation of 
the expansion plans although it was still organizeu under the pre-
mise that the bulk of the work would be done by consultants, equip-
ment suppliers, engineering firms, and construction subcontractors. 
It should be noted that until recently project 
engineering was not too well developed in Brazil. This can be seen 
in figure 7.5. which is taken from a recent study on Brazilian en-
gineering capacity that is on® of the studies for the Master Steel 
Plan mentioned in chapter f i v e . ^ Within the definition of engi-
neering services developed in that study a distinction is made among 
CI) Luiz Eduardo Klinger Abreu, Chief of the General Superintendency 
of Engineering of USIMINAS presentation on "The Problem of the 
Adequation of Production Processes for Capital Goods", contained 
in MIC-STI Industrial Technology Week: Capital Goods Industry ., 
(Sao Paulo, September, 1975) p.298. 
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tanning and project engineering^? 
FIGURE 7.5 DEVELOPMENT OF BRAZILIAN ENGINEERING 
CAPACITY IN STEEL PROJECTS 
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Cited in Roberto Tambase o et al "Una Aprecia gao da 
Engenharia de Projetos Siderúrgicos no Brasil", in 
I1AFA, Inginieria y Fabricación de Equipos Siderúr-
gicos en America Latina (Rio de Janeiro: 1978 IIAFA 
Congress). 
Taking 1959 as the base year for when engineering 
services were required for the initial construction of USIMINAS 
and 1970 as the base year for the engineering necessary for the 
large expansion plans, the Brazilian participation was as follows: 
Feasibility studies engineering 
Basic project engineering 
Purchase engineering 






Notice that the two areas where Brazilian capacity were still very 
weak in 1970 wore basic project engineering and purchases. 
(1J Planning consists of basic conccpticn which involves a preliminary market stu-
dy, location, product mix, production plan, processes, specifications, fluxo-
grams, chronograms and genera] lay-out; and a feasibility study which involves 
a market study, investment, infrastructure and worker availability, operating 
cost estimates, definition Of location, and technical, cconanic and financial 
analysis as well as sources of financc. Project engineering consists of the 
basic project, purchases, and detail. The basic projects engineering refers to 
layout, s'clcction of equipment, general specifications, tcclmical planning of 
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7.4.2. Japanese ^ Eftgineerì'rìg Assistance For th|gf?Second bxpan-
sion Plan. 
As-mentionerÎVearlier the I BRI), and IAÏ),lb.aïiks lent 
IJSIMINAS 105-million dol^ars^fpr uS^coM, expansionLplan> As part 
of the loan agreement they required USIMINAS- toyxontr|act a' consul-
ting firm of large experience to serve- as an advisor 'for the plan. 
USIMINAS - chose itsf ô.ld pâi'itneiST^ÂPP.çii^St^lSMCorp.ç^tion. 
The flow of engineering services, in .the second ex-
¿.e- Qi*f>x.-ioa,iCP. tornlj" i s j e ooasoms'i 0 3"i9du>i ¡;>:/V.:' 
pans ion plans isxip r.e'sen ££d a ina^f e3b7:g650 jbj^iw ^  qu-rGimain-.; parties 
were involved: SS&SP J&frtiifft >pSufcplier s a-i/iii &\ i aft oiSt) znzy&l :<-• 
and Builders. 
' I x firj ' o - - J 
<-/'.' iliiiCJ ys<i Ml NAS^ prepareditihe': ta&iqrc|£|L-.aikl-,-5<hen. worked ...: , 
out- the-detailed^piian^'icionstruotigon- eoiS;t ieJS;timat,es>;i ;acq^si£iqn;;, r 
classi'ficatiohb aMv'c<S*sf^$ioifchrenogranfMJ&#ippS?i.StqefL.^ThiSx.cq^rised,, 
the technicals; study phase. The-,rest comprised technical engineering for the 
Footnote continued from previous page 
acquisition, detaille'cPspecifications o f ^ H p l U n ^ u n f 
qualification of bidders, technical analysis of the proposal, 
and approval of suppliers designs. Purchases engineering refe.rs 
to cataloguing of vSUppMer:sU preparation .of u pur chase ;>'d oeumen t,& i to H 
organization.,qifci^su, emission, of bidding invitations, clarifi-
cation meétings; ^ commercerai3 ^Vâ^iW'c^^he^ïHs^'^djÙdrcatfroiï5^ 
ti on. 
• .vi. 
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plan itself. The specifications were prepared by USIMINAS with its 
advisor. USIMINAS then approved the specifications and called for the 
bids in conjunction with its advisor. Notice that construction budge-
ting .budget control, and construction periods were set by USIMINAS,al-
though the control of the process was done in conjunction with its 
advisor.. The explanation of the specifications to the bidding parties . 
evatuation of the bids, and decison on suppliers, technical discussion 
with suppliers, correction of the buying specifications,and specifica-
tions of the contract were all done in conjunction with the advisor 
USIMINAS and its advisor then had technical discussions with the 
supplier for the project and construction of the equipment, and with 
the civil works contractor for the foundations and buildings. USlMlv^s 
specified the civil construction and after receiving designs from the 
manufacturer., elaborated the project for execution by the foundation 
contractor.. Control of the construction and mounting was done t\ 
USIMINAS with the help of its advisor. The equipment supplier also 
supervised the amounting and the testing and adjustment which .^s dc\e 
by USIMINAS with the help of its advisor. Operation of course fin^ll-
rested with USIMINAS. 
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Figure 7.6 
Besides giving; am idea of the complexity of the engineering 
and planning process involved' in the' elaboration and implementation 
of the expansion plani the above.schero&tisa^ion se.rves to show the m -
terration ship; wi.thi the advisor:. Notice that USIMINAS always maintai-
ned control of decisons". It reiliedl o e the adviso*: to help; in the d e -
tails of the planning" and* ism aspects of acquiring and installing 
and testing the equipment. Notice toa that all these phases were done 
in conjunction so that U S I I W must have learned all the fine points 
of such arrangements so that it. was; in a position to do them all itself 
by the third expansion; plan;.. 
7.4.3. The Dtevelopjnent of: Basic. Engineering Capacity-
I'm- terms- o£; the development of the internal orga-
nization to accompany the expansion effort the .sequence was as 
foil ows.. In 1970: the; General Super.in.tendency was turned into the 
General Supexi n te ndency of Operation to attend to the plant's normal 
operational activities, and', a General Supe-rin tendency of Development 
was created to attend to the coordinated development of the plant's 
expansions. 
By 1972 the General Superintendency of Development 
was already subdivided into the Superintendences of-Planning, Project 
Engineering, Technical Services and; Construction:, and had absored 
the functions of the old: Expansion Group. The main; emphasis of the 
Superintenency of Development, was still the implementation of ex-
pansion plans. Although it already had: the basic elements for the 
development of capacity in basic engineering this was hampered by 
the day to day pressure of supervising operations; to. ensure that 
the expansion deadlines were met. Also, to some extent, the depen-
dence on the Japanese., although beneficial for the. fullfillment 
of the programs, made it difficult to fully develop this capacity^^ 
(1) Luiz Eduardo Klinger Abreu, Op. Cit., p.298 
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AltTiOUgl USIMINAS* original goal was to do 50-1 of the various types 
of engineering for the expansion plan their effective participation 
turned out to be only SDI". The rest was done by the Japanese.^ 
However the goals for- ste'e] expansion set by the 
national government and its policy that there "be th€ greatest pos-
sible degree of national participation m ifie- steel equipment ins-
talled from then on had important effects on the further develop-
ment of USIMINAS' engineering s t r u c t u r e - ^ USIMINAS identified 
three areas which would have to be developed to make the Govern-
ment objectives possible, ^hc first was the basic engineering capa-
city of the steel firm "since the uni t-s: hac to be made t-o ordei and 
it had the best knowledge of what it would -need as well' as experi-
ence accumulated from the operation of it's-- older unit's. The second 
wa-s the engineering -of the inMv-idual-'"equipment units -and their 
details. Finally , the third-was the" engineering -of actual equipment 
manufacture which was the" area of the equipment producers. World . 
experience was that the engineering in the second area was done by 
engineering firms with close links to steel firms from which they 
drew on the original designs, operational experience and the feed-
back of that experience on changes in the de'signs. 
Keeping that in mind, USIMINAS hired a consultant 
to do a survey of the capacity of capital equipment and engineering 
firms in Brazil related to the steel sectori More than 80 firms were 
visited. The conclusion was that in terms of capacity to build in-
dividual units (rather than all the units necessary) the national 
industry could build 80V "of the equipment . The weak" point was thp 
project engineering for the i^dlvidua 1 units, but 'it was felt that 
it could be overcome with assistance from b cee l f irms to the eauip-
ment manufacturers . Gone-reteiy. the former • cbuld: 1) supply drawings 
{!) Information supplied by Arnaro Lana'ri Junior 
(2) Luiz Eduardo Klinger Abreu, Op. Cit. , p. 298 . 
' 1 2 36 - ' ' : • 
from which to copy equipment, 2) supply their experience with which 
equipment could be improved, and 3) give feed-back on the experience 
with the new equipment manufactured so that the equipment s pplier 
could perfect his product.^ To accomplish that USIMINAS would have 
to assume a greater and more direct role in the supply of basic en-
gineering to structure equipment packages for the bids, increase the 
(2) amount of details contained in the specifications and designs,etc. 
As a result, USIMINAS decided to emphasize the ac-
tivities of basic engineering in order to support the needs of its 
expansion program and fullfill the government objectives of increa-
sing the participation of national equipment, manufacturers in the 
expansion.^ The organization of basic engineering then existing 
had to be strengthened. This involved increasing the capacity of 
process engineering in terms of quantity and quality, and in assu-
ming though detail engineering greater responsibility going someti-
mes to the level of specifying manufacturing in the initial phases 
of nationalization. 
This led to a restructuring of the Superintendency 
of Development. In 1975 it was divided into two superintendences -
the a General Superintendency of Engineering and the General Superin-
tendency of Construction. The former in turn consists of a an advi-
sory group on planning and installations and five subdivisions. The 
first is that of Process Engineering which is in charge of selecting the 
processes most adequate for expansion plam; or improvements of ins-
tallations, and for the coordination of all the technical activities 
necessary to complete every project. The second is that of Basic En-
(1) Amaro Lanari Junior presentation on theme "The Problem of the Adequation of 
Production of Capital Goods" contained in MIC-STI Semana Tecnologia Indus-
trial: Industria de Bens de Capital (Sao Paulo, Setembro 1975) ppT 294-297, 
322-323. 
(2) Luiz Eduardo Klinger Abreu, Op. Cit., p. 299 
(3) It should be remembered that USIMINAS is a State controlled company which 
gives it aperspective wider than narrow profit maximization as well as makes 
it able to embark or such wider programs because to a certain degree it is 
not so dependend or internal capital generation for its development. 
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gineering which is responsible for coordinating and preparing the 
basic engineering for all the projects including layout, cost es-
timates, technical evaluations programing plans, etc. The third 
is that of Equipment Engineering which is responsible for all the 
preparation of all the detailed specification for the purchase or 
manufacture of the equipment units and the construction specifica-
tions including the structuring of equipment packages adequate for 
the capacity of national manufacturers and giving such manufactu-
rers technical assistance. The fourth, Engineering Services 
is in charge of maintaining the system of cost control and pro-
gress reports. Finally that of Research and Information Processes 
is directly responsible for keeping the engineering group up to 
date or development in techniques and processes. It sets up and 
directs team studies in the research of processes or equipment spe-
cialized in steel production, acts as a link between the engineering 
department and the research center, and manages a special library 
of technical information and patents.^ ^ 
An idea of where- the engineering section fits into 
the overall organizational structure of the firm and its relative 
size can be seen in figure 7.7. Unlike the various units which were 
discussed in section 7.2 which are part of the organizational struc-
ture actually at the plant site in Ipatinga, the Superintendency of 
Engineering is part of the organizational structure at the head-
quarters in Belo Horizonte. It represents 14. 7%. of the personnel 
in that structure. 
(1) An interesting note from the point of view of the firms scan of the tech-
nological frontier is that as opposed to the more routine scan of techno-
logy information done by the CIT, this subdivision is more attuned to the 
frontier of newest developments. This group has a plant layout of every 
major steel firm in the world. Its mains sources of information cn what 
other firms are doing is the annual reports of steel companies and of steel 
equipment manufacturer and equipment advertisements. Whenever they run 
accros something interersting they immedidately write away for it, to check 
whether it is of potential use for USIMINAS 
(2) Information drawn from Luiz Eduardo Klinger Abreu , Op. Cit., pp. 300-320. 
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7 - . 4 . 4 . The Third Expansion Plan and the Sale of Engineering 
Services. 
For the third expansion p l a n ^ , Amaro Lanari Junior, then 
president of USIMINAS., judging that USIMINAS had acquired enough experjL 
ence^prohibited foreign participation in the engineering so the whole 
plan was done by USIMINAS personnel. Thus USIMINAS rapidly evolved from 
complete dependence on foreign (Japanese) technical assistance for the 
engineering work for the original plant and the first expansion plan 
to independence in the third expansion pla^ which was started less than 
15 years after the start of operations of the company. Further eviden-
ce of how much USIMINAS has developed in terms of engineering capacity 
is the fact that it is now providing much the same type of assistance 
which it initially received from the Japanes to the AÇOMINAS steel 
plant which is to start'production in 1980 with a capacity of two mil-
lion tons. The technical contract for technical assistance to AÇOMINAS 
forsees the utilization of 400j000 man/hours distributed accros 14 sub 
projects over a 10 month period with further assistance until the start 
up of the plant in 1980. Among the subprojects are plant planning, ba-
sic specifications, buying, dealing with equipment suppliers, approval 
of designs and documents, and technical assistance during equipment fa-
brication, plant construction and start-up. A separate agreement was al-
so signed to cover the financial area. 
The rapid transformation from a purchaser to a seller of 
such engineering is truly remarkable and should be considereed as one 
of the main, if not the most important technological change in its tech 
(1) The equipment for this plan was estimated to cost U.S.$1.061 million 
dollars. 
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nological evolution. Each expansion plan involves an effort similar 
to that of building a new plant. It is hard to overemphasize what 
is required in terms of technical capacity and administrative abi-
lities or what it allows in -terms of integrating the experience 
gained in operation under specific Brazilian conditions to the 
search for, selection, and adaptation of the most appropriate tech-
nology for such conditions. 
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7.5. Investment in Training 
As one of the main elements in its technological 
strategy USIMINAS has emphasized the training of its personnel. 
The information we have on training is presented in figure 7.8. 
Unfortunately,it only covers the most recent years, and we do not 
have nrach detail. We would like to draw Attention , to the 449 en-
tries for persons trained abroad during the eight year period for 
which we have information. Presumably ,those are hi-gher level per-
sons who have gone abroad for specialized and advanced training. 
Notice too that during the last four years the average cost person 
has been around half ~a million cruzeiros . 
Figure 7.8. 
Investment in Training Human Resources 




4,862 - 21,414 20,462 17,673 15,287 42,617 
Millions of 








9 20 28 83 53 
Sources: 1969 - 1971 - Company Annual Reports 
1972 - 1976 - Cota "Alguns Aspectos da Contribuido da USIMINAS para o De-
senvolviinento Nacional" USIMINAS REVISTA Ano 8 n9 16 (Julho, 
1976) p.84 
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Figure 7.9 "USIMINAS DISTRIBUTION OP TRAINING 1973-1977" 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Total InPlant Cütside Total InPlant fbtsidc Total InPlant Cütside Total InPlant CUtside Total InPlant Outside 
A.Producticn 1402S 12623 1402 12815 11399 1416. 9550 8594 956 30373 23335 3038 26687 23712 297S 
1. Skilled Workers 9414 8473 941 71S9 6443 716 6135 5521 614 20695 18625 2070 na 




2974 2677 297 4012 3476 536 2193 1963 . 220 6775 6097 678 na 
3. Supervisory 
Persale 1 
1637 1473 164 1644 1480 164 1222 1110 122 2903 2613 290 na 
B. Administration Ser- 6234 S610 624 4597 3283 1314 5239 3696 1S43 119S9 9884 207S 9814 7769 2045 
vices ami Support 
1. Staff 2436 2192 244 4630 3978 652 na 
2. Middle Level 
Management 
3. High Iievel 
Management 












446 832 467 36S na 
4. Higher Educa-
tional Level 




1552 1397 1SS 2089 1422 667 1875 1300 375 6262 S207 1055 na 
$. Teaching Perio-
ral In General 
11 10 1 9 8 I 148 133 IS IT 24 3 na 
6. Student Trai-
nees 
- - - 304 304 0 168 168 0 208 208 0 na 
Total Number of Per-
sons Trained 
202S9 18233 2026 1714 14682 2730 14789 12290 2499 42332 37219 5113 36S01 31481 S019 
Total Employees in 
US I Ml .SAS 
8422 9692 11207 12940 13821 
Av. No. of Courses 
Per Employee 2.4 1.8 1.3 3.3 2.6 
Figure 7.9 dissaggregates the types of training^1*' 
by various skill levels and whether it was received inside or out-
side the enterprise. Roughly two thirds of the training is concen-
trated on people directly related do production (with the bulk of 
the training focusing on skilled production workers) and one third 
on administrative service and support personnel. Overall 85-901 
of the total training is done inside the firm although tlie propor-
tion trained in the plant is somewhat lower for administrative, 
service and support personnel. Notice that among the latter grou-
ping roughly one quarter to one half of the training is as the hi-
gher educational level. 
Figure 7.10 gives a quick overview of the educa-
tional composition of the labor force which helps' to see some of 
Figure 7.10 
QUALIFICATION OF USIMINAS EMPLOYEES 1973-1977 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 








Technical Level 1005 (11.9) 1263(13.0) 1487(13.3) 2718(21.0) 3126(22.6) 
Skilled Labor 6461 (76.7) 7410(76.5) 8580(76.6) 8815(68.1) 9130(66.1) 
Ncn Skilled Labor 24 (0.3) 22(0.2) 20( 0.2) 20 (0.2) 18(0.1) 
TOTAL 8822 9692 11207 12940 13821 
(1) The total figures do not match those in figure 7.6 because the latter in-
cludes training of youngsters through SENAI which, is not included in the 
numbers given in figure 7.7. 
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the results of the training programs. 
Although the percentage of employees with higher 
education has been maintained more or less constant at around 11% 
of the total in spite of an increase of total employment of 57% 
over the period 1973-1977, the percentage of employees with a tech-
nical level has continually increase from close to twelve percent 
to slighly over 22% over the same period. As a result the number 
of employees with higher or technical educational has increased 
from 23% to almost 34% of the total over the past five years. 
In large part these results can be attributed to 
the massive training programs although it is also possible that 
it may have been accomplished by hiring more qualified personnel. Figure 
7.11 shows the evolution of turn over and labor force growth over 
the period. The high admission figures, particularly since 1971 
help to explain in part why the firm has so many training courses. 
Most hiring is of young people with little previous experience. 
Figure 7.11 
USIMINAS TURNOVER AND LABOR FORCE GROWTH 
Y E A R 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Admissions 4.9 4.8 14.3 24.6 21.2. 42.6 48.1 i, ' 33.5 29.8 19.4 
Demissions 10.0 5.9 15.2 23.1 23.7 17.5 34.4 19.4 15.8 12.8
(2 
Net Growth -5.2 -1.1. 
., „. .... 
-0.9 1.5 3.5 25.1 13.7 14.8 14.0 6.5 
(1) This was unusally large because ah expansion from nearly ACESITA and various 
manufacturing firms lured away a large proportion of the workers. 
(2) Close to 80% of the turnover is in the skilled and non skilled group. Among 
the high administrative and engineers which total about one thousand USIMINAS 
only loses about 5% per year. 
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Over the last five years the percentage of total employees aged 
25 and less had increased from around 381 to close to 45%. 
Recently USIMINAS signed with the Federal University of 
Minas Gerais a contract for training 12 professionals for its research 
Center at the masters level. The program is estimated to cost USIMINAS 
U.S. $ 1,650,000. Besides showing the advancement of post graduate 
technical education in Brazil this contract also shows a significant 
new approach. The thesis topics are to focus on real production pro-
blems and in a sense could be classified as development of applied 
technology. This greater integration between the firm and the Univer-
sity is expected to bring benefits to both-more academic objectivity 
to the work carried on in USIMINAS, and closer touch with real world 
problems for the university. 
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7.6. Technology Contracts 
in addition to formal and informal courses, another way in 
which USIMINAS has raised the technical capacity of its personnel is 
through technical assistance contracts. By focusing on specific pro-
blems these provide an excellent practical learning experience which 
the firm has utilized very successfully 
Based on data presented in a thesis on the importation of 
technology by Brazilian steel enterprises^ we know that between 1965 
and 1975 USIMINAS received approval fo'r 190 contracts. The total pay-
(1) The thesis is based on the technology contracts registered with 
the Central Bank of Brazil between April 1965 and March, 1975. 
During that period 217 variable payment contracts and 517 fixed 
payment contracts were registered between 31 Brazilian steel firms 
and 300 technology selling firms representing 20 countries. Infor-
mation was not available for variable payments, but fixed payments 
totalling U.S. $ 116.3 million were authorized under the codes techni 
cal services, technical assistance and patents, and trademarks and 
patents. Both the number of contracts and the payment have shown 
an almost exponential increase over the period which is greater 
then the dramatic increase in Brazilian steel production.81.31 of 
the contracts and 72.81 of the non-n/ariable payments were for tech 
nical services. Technical assistance and patents accounted for 
18.31 of the contracts and 21.7 I of the value. There were only 3 
trademarks and patents, but they represented 5.6 % of the non-va-
riable payments. The main supplying countries were: Japan, 5 0% of 
of the value, 24! of the contracts; USA, 29! of the value, 38! of 
the contracts; and West Germany, 13% of the value and 22% of the 
contracts. While the Japanese contracts supplied technology almost 
exclusively to the state firms, the U.S. contracts supplied both 
the private and the state firms, and West Germany was the largest 
supplier of the private firms.70.4% of the contracts and 93.1 % of 
the non-variable payments were made by the 8 state-owned firms. 
USIMINAS signed the most contracts (25.4%) and made the most pay-
ments (28.0) followed by CSN (16.8% of the contracts) and then 
by COSIPA (10.9%).although COSIPA paid more (27.4%) than CSN (20.411 
andjin fact, had the highest average payment per contract. Given 
the similarity in their technological profile and the fact that 
only a few firms have been responsible for the majority of the con-
tracts it has been suggested these state-owned firms may have each 
bought the same technology package in some cases. 
See Eduardo Galvao Moura Jardim, "Importado de Tecnologia pelas 
Empresas|Sidorurgicas: Urna Anilise com Base nos Registros do Ban 
co Central do Brasil no Período de Abril de 1965 a Margo de 1975." 
Masters of Science Thesis Submitlcd to the Postgraduate Program 
in Engineering of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro,Brazil 
February 1977. - 247 -
ments for these contracts could not be determined because they inclu-
ded 13 variable payment contracts for which there was no financial 
information. . However, for the fixed payment contracts, slightly 
over U.S.$ 32.5 million dollars were authorized. These were distribu-
ted as indicated in Figure 7.1Z. Note that there is a strong upward trend 
which coincided with the expansion plans, and that it does not include 
all the contracts since March 1975. 
Figure 7.12 
TECHNOLOGY CONTRACTS 
April 1965-March 1975 
Number of Contracts Payments Authorized 
(U.S. Dollars) Total Variable 
m s " ) 10 6 6,257,663 
1966 6 1 54,030 
1967 4 2 36,575 
1968 5 1 200,666 
1969 9 2 821,572 
1970 10 1 3,209,257 
1971 22 - 1,098,946 
1972 13 - 6,502,975 
1973 48 - 3,870,387 
1974 52 - 8,670,307 
1975^2) 11 - 1,762,247 
Total 190 13 32,564,620 
(1) APR-DEC. 
(2) JAN-MAR. 
Source: Jardim, Op Cit, Annexes 12 and 13 
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We have been able to compile a list of the 18 main techno-
logy suppliers, during this period, which is presented in figure7.15. 
Although it covers only 58.9% o f the contracts, they account for 94.6% 
of tne payments. The Japanese strongly predominate, accounting for 
75 of the contracts and 73.9! of total payments. They are followed by 
£h© Germans with 20 contracts and 16.2% of the payments and then by 
the U.S. with 17 contracts and only 3.8% of the payments. Notice the 
Strong concentration in the supplying firms in that the three main 
jDR.es supplied 52 of the contracts amounting to 69.7 % of the payments. 
In terms of specific ccntracts one of the most, if not the r*ost 
import-ant'was a ten year general assistance contract which USIMINAS signed 
With Nippon Steel^. This contract was signed at the time the Japanese 
had finished their original free technical assistance package and had 
turned operational control of the firm over to the Brazilians.^ The 
contract was primarily for the manufacture and standard operation con-
trol of a series of products of specified grades listed in figure 7 
The assistance included guidance on rolling operations, process control 
f 31 
on and after the rolling process, and maintenance. J The assistance in-
volved both the dispatch of Nippon Steel personnel to USIMINAS and the f 41 
training of USIMINAS personnel at Nippon Steel Plants in Japan. J 
USIMINAS could ask for up to 1-0 per-sons from Nippon Steel per year for 
no longer than six 'months per person for technical assistance for strip . 
(1) The contract was actually signed with the Yawata Iron and Steel Co 
which became Nippon Steel after a merger with the latter in the 
early 1970's. However we shall always refer to the contract as one 
between Nippon Steel and USIMINAS*. 
(21See sections 3.2 and 7.1. 
(3)Standard operation control included oil injection in thé blast furna-
ces; component, range, oxidation, ingot mold, teeming, and component 
aim in the LEL Converters; and rolling schedule , ingot weight, slab 
weight, rolling temperature, and supersonic tests in the rolling 
section. 
f'4)USIMlNAS could send to Nippon Steel up to eight persons per year 
for training in strip and plate, products and up to four per year 




USIMINAS : MAIN TECHNOLOGY SUPPLIERS 
COMPANY Number of Contracts Payments Authorized Total Variable 
Nippon Steel 21 1 8,591,979 
Nippon USIMINAS Co. 12 3 9,828,602 
Xsikawajima ' 
Harima Hearvy Ind.Cu 9 - 1,999,602 
Sankiu Transportation 
Engineering 2 997,185 
Mitsubishi Co. 5 658,500 
Okura-Trading Co 1 32,564 
Kawasaki Heavy Ind. 3 103.264 
Kobe Steel Ltd. 10 1 493,868 
Hitachi Ship Building Co 1 493,360 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 3 215,631 
Mitsubishi Shojikaisha Ltd 1 17,113 
UBE Ind. Ltd. 4 322,936 
Yawata Iron Co. 3 1 310,000 
Sub-total Japan 75 6 24,064,604 
USS ENGINEERS Consultants 3 - 496,600 
BOOZ Allen Hamilton 6 2 582,500 
BATELLE 8 - 185,406 
Sub-total U.S. 17 2 1,264,506 
Gutte Hoffnungs 
Hutte Sterkgrade 




Sub-Total Germany 20 1 5,282,836 
Sub-to tal identified in the 
list 112 9 30.813,287 
Total 190 17 32,564,620 
'Source: Jardim , Op Cit; Computed from illustration n9 19 
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and plate products and for up to 6 persons per year under the same 
six month limitation for technical assistance in operation control. 
This scheme gave USIMINAS great flexibility in adapting the techni-
cal assistance to the various needs or problems which arose since 
it could routinely change the speciality of the Japanese consultants 
ill brought in.1 J 
The fruits of the contract were felt very soon 
particularly in terms of the introduction of new products and im-
provement in quality which was very important given the depressed 
market of the period. In the second semmester of 1966 USIMINAS was 
already manufacturing new products under guidance from Nippon Steel. 
By August for example, it was producing killed steel with aluminum 
for deep-stamping and resistance to ageing for the automobile in-
(21 
dustry. .By September it began manufacturing steels for high 
(31 
pressure pipesv ' and steel with high resistance to traction and 
good solderability, ^  . In 1969 it also introduced a new steel^ 
(1) Overall the contract was very favorable for USIMINAS. It involved a fixed 
annual payment by USIMINAS for each of the 10 years plus a variable payment 
based an annual output for the last 5 years of the contract's duration. 
USIMINAS also had to pay travel; living, and foregone Japanese salaries to 
the Japanese technicians dispatched to provide the assistance. USIMINAS, 
however, could not transfer the technology to third parties. It could ex-
port any where except Asia in which case it would have to receive written 
permission to do so. Improvement and inventions made by either party and 
covered under the scope of the agreement would be available to the other 
party free of charge and in the case of patenting by one party the other 
would have non-exclusive right in Brazil. 
(2) By 1969 which was the first year the car and truck manufactuerers bought more 
Brazilian than imported steel USIMINAS supplied 45! of the domestic steel. 
(3) Series API 5LX-46 thick plates;5LX-52 Hot Strips 




Grades of Steel Products Covered by the 10 year Technical Assistance Contract 
Products Grades 
a) Hot and cold rolled carbon 
steel sheets and strip 
SPN 1-5; SPC 1, 2 
SAE 1006 - 1025 
ASTM A.415, 425 
SA 32, 38, 41, 45 
and their equivalents 
P. •H 
b) Steel sheets and strip for 
deep-drawing 
SPC 3; SPK; SPKD; SSPD 




c) Steel sheets and strip for 
porcelain enameling 
pure iron 
(equivalent to Armco iron) 
ASTM A424 
and their- equivalents 
i 0) 0> 43 W d) High-strength steel sheets and strip for welded 
structures 
SM 41, 50; WT 50, 55, 60H 
ASTM A373; YES 36, 40; YAWTEN 50 
and their equivalents 
e) Hot rolled steel strip for 
line pipe based.on API 
Specification 
API-5DC 42, 46, 52, 60 
and their equivalents 
a) Steel plates for general 
structures 
SS34, 41, 50; ASTM A-7, 36 (A,B,C,D) 
ASTM A-113 (A,B,C); ASTM A-283A 
and their equivalents 
b) Steel plates for hull 
construction 
Unified Requirement A, B, C, D, E 




 c) Rolled steel plates for 
boilers 
ASTM A201-A, B; ASTM A-285-A, B, C 
ASTM A-30 
and their equivalents 
d) High-strength steel plates 
for welded structures 
SM 41, 50; WT 50, 55, 60H 
ASTM A373; YES 36, 40 
YAWTEN 50 and their equivalents 
e) Steel plates for line pipe 
based on API Specification 
API-5LX 42,.46, 52, 60 
and their equivalents 
Note: The "equivalents" as referred to in the above table shall mean 
those products based on other widely accepted standards than 
those specified in the above table and considered to be 
equivalent to those standards. 
Scurce: Information provided directly by. Company September, 1978 
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which was the only one in Brazil specified for wagons. 
In 1970 it developed and or began producing eleven 
new types of steel in order to attend market demands. By that year 
it supplied 93% of all Brazilian Steel used in the shipping indus-
try 52% of that used in the auto industry and 51% of that used in 
the railroad industry. Figure 7.15 summarizes some of the main 
steels introduced since 1970. Despite the different nomenclatures 
many of them were those covered under the technical agreement. No-
tice too how much o£ a price premium the majority of them involved 
Due to the success of the original contract, when 
it expired in April 1976, USIMINAS worked out a second contract 
with Nippon Steel Although this time the contract just for five 
years it is structured very much like the original contract. The 
main difference is that the new contract covers about 7 times as 
many steel products and grades as well as 57 specific technologies 
covering ten areas of operative technology^ integrated metallurgi-
cal control; maintenance; production planning and control; testing 
and analysis; product applications, and antipollution technology. 
Overall it is more specific and covers much more than the previous 
(2) contract, showing that USIMINAS has learned how to ask for more*- '. 
(1) Nippon Steel is the worlds largest steel producer (1976 production was 25M.t) 
USIMINAS was its first venture outside of Japan. Since then Nippon Steel 
has made 221 technical assistance contracts in 32 countries. Fourty four per-
cent c£ the contracts have been in developed countries. See Makoto Okaki, 
"Idea basica y practicas de cocperaciai para el establecimiento de plantas 
siderúrgicas integradas en paises en desarollo". Siderurgia Latino Americana 
N9 212 (Diciembre 1977) pp. 60-70. 
(2) Unlike the original contract the new ene requires the payment of a fixed 
lump sum rather than a combination c£ fixed and variable payments. It pro-
vides for 72 man months of technican assistance from Nippon Steel personnel 
and the training of 40 man months • of USIMINAS personnel at Nippon Steel and 
in all cases the maximum amount of time per perscn has been reduced. There 
is no export restriction, and the restriction or non-disclosure to third 
parties has been reduced to five year after USIMINAS' receipt of the infor-
mation. The treatment of improvements and invention is completely symetrical. 
(3) Appendix VI gives a graphical idea of the introduction of new products 
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f t i a r e 7.IS NEW STEEL PRODUCTS AND QUALITIES INTRODUCED BY VSIMINAS 1971-1977 
APPLICATIONS 
Type o f 
Product QUALITY 
S t a r t o f 
Manufacture 
Orders Accepted 
l rs t Semester 
1978 
t I n c r ease 
In P r i c e 
High s t r e n g t h w e l d a b l e s t r u c t u r a l 
s t e e l ( f o r a p p l i c a t i o n in g e n e r a l 
s t r u c t u r e s , machines, b r i d g e s , b u i l -
d i n g s , s h i p s , c r a n e s , a g r i c u l t u r a l 
t o o l s , wagons, p r e s sure v e s s e l s , 
o i l tanks , e t c . ) 
PLATES 
NTU-CG-SAR-SO-B 










ASTM- A-6 0 7 - SO, SO-EEP 










High s t r eng th we ldab l e s t r u c t u r a l 
s t e e l r e s i s t a n t t o a tmospher i c 
c o r r o s i o n ( f o r a p p l i c a t i o n i n b u i l -
dings' , c i v i l c o n s t r u c t i o n work, 
wagons, a g r i c u l t u r a l t o o l s , s h i p s , 
mining equipment ) 











F l o o r Sheets 
PLATES NTU-CG-USIPISO 1974 0.6S 36.3 
HOT 
STRIPS 
NIU-FQ-USIPISO 1974. 0,35 36.3 













P i p i n g and Tubing s t e e l ( f o r a p p l i -
c a t i o n in g e n e r a l c o n d u c t o r s ) 
PLATES API-5LX-X52 1971 0 ,30 23.? 
Sh ipbu i l d ing s t r u c t u r a l s t e e l ( f o r 
- a p p l i c a t i o n in s h i p s ' s t r u c t u r e s ) 
HOT 
STRIPS 
GL-A 1977 0,42 11,s 
S t e e j s f o r l i q u i f i e d pe t ro l eum 
c o n t a i n e r s 
HOT 
STRIPS 
ABNT-EB-253 1973 1.S1 9.9 
S t e e l s f o r the automobi l e i n d u s t r y 
( f o r use in beams, c h a s s i s , wheel 
r ims and habs, e t c . ) 
HOT 
STRIPS ABNT-EB-593-LN-20 1973 0,20 9,. 9 
E l e c t r omagne t i c q u a l i t y ( f o r use ir 
motors f o r r e f r i g e r a t o r s , smal l ge-
n e r a t o r s , magnets, motors f o r e l c c -
t r odomcs t i c s , smal l a l t e r n a t i n g cut 
rent motors, d i r e c t cu r r en t motors , 
r e l a y s , p o l e p i c c c s , e t c . ) 
COLD 
STRIPS . 
NTU-U£ICORE-360 1974 0,14 SO.8 
Source : I n f o rma t i on supp l i ed d i r e c t l y by the company. September. 1978 
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Another contract signed with Nippon Steel was for the specification 
©f the equipment for the research center ancl training of the research 
staff tnsvering the period 1970-1575^. USIMINAS "is ctrrr^nTiy- nego-
tiating -another five year contract with Nippon Steel oriented more to 
advan^-d training of the research staffs In 1972 a speca-al contract 
was signed -with Nippon Steel for the training of personnel and star-
up of the new continous cold strip mill which among other things in-
volved sending 12 engineers, technicians and operators to Japan for 
training. Note too that Nippon Steel was contracted fo supply the en-
gineering for the second expansion plan. 
In 1972 -a contract was- ^a-iso -signed with United States Steel 
Engineers anr Consultants for the area of industrial engineering. It 
should also be remmembered that one of the first contracts signed by 
USIMINAS was for the s-tudy of administrative structure and reform 
with BAHINT which lead to the administrative reform and the introduc-
tion of the standard .cost system which was very important for the 
firm. It is interesting to note that the i^onxracts ;vith the U.S. have 
been with consulting, engineering or research firms rather than with 
steel companies or equipment suppliers as is more common in the case 
of Japan and Germany. 
With respect to Germany, the contracts with Guttehoffnungs 
Hutte Sterkgrade seem to have been more related to technical assis-
tance for the equipment supplied by that firm, although we know that 
one of the contracts was for assistance in the development of the use 
of steel structures in civil engineering work as part of the product 
diversification strategy behind the creation of USIMEC. The Mannesmann 
contract was probably related to the technical assistance with continous cas-
ting. 
(1) During this period 13 persons were trained at Nippon Steel. 
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In summary, the basic strategy behind its technology 
contracts has been to have a general contract to cover product de-
velopment and standard operational control, and to contract for 
specific technical assistance in various specialized areas as the 
needs arise. This has enabled USIMINAS to have a certain degree 
of integration in its basic technology while at the same time pro-
viding flexibility for eventual problems. It also seems that when 
USIMINAS contracts for assistance in a specialized area such as di-
namiting of scaffold formed inside a blast furnace it takes measures 
t-o insure that its own personnel carefully accompany and partici-
pate in the operation as much as possible so that it can solve 
the problem on its own the second tine it comes ar.ound. In that 
way as it absorbs what it pays for it is able to continually push 
back the frontier of the technical assistance it purchases to more 
advanced and specific areas. 
7.7. Summary of Investments in Technology 
A more dissagregated though less comprehensive 
view of USIMINAS' investments in technology is given in figure 7.16. 
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Figure 7.16 
USIMINAS INVESTMENTS IN TECHNOLOGY THOUGH 1976 
1.000s of dollars Percentage 
a) Personnel training abroad 
b) Personnel training in the firm 
c) Manufacturing licenses 
d) Technical assistance to production 
e) Engineering consulting 
f) Administrative consulting 
g) Research consulting 




4 . 9 0 0 
5 . 0 0 0 
1 . 4 8 0 
1 . 3 6 0 
4 . 2 7 0 
6 . 5 
3 2 . 5 
5 . 8 
1 5 . 9 
16.2 
4 . 8 
4.4-
1 3 . 8 
3 0 . 8 1 0 99.9 
a) This represents .expenses incurred in sending 380 specialists (243. 
of higher level, 137 middle level) abroad for traineships or cour,. 
ses lasting between 3 and 24 months during the period 1966-19'76. 
Besides these, numerous technical visits were made and various 
technical congresses were attendend. 
b) Training in Brazil includes training within the firm as well as 
training in other institutions. The ten million figure is the ap-
proximate dollar equivalent of costs incurred in training just the 
persons within the firm over the period 1966-1976. 
c) Refers to patents and licenses for manufacturing of steel products. 
d) Refers to consulting services for metallurgincal control and ope-
ration problems related to the manufacturing process. 
e) Includes expenses undertaken with consulting and or development 
of engineering projects for expansion of the plant. 
f) Embodies all outlays on consulting for administrative reform, com-
puters, and information. 
g) Includes all payments to foreign inst tions in consulting and plan-
ning, and technical preparation of the personnel for the sep-up 
of the research center. 
h) Refers to the costs of the research center and its equipment. See 
section 2.4 for more details. Besides this equipment, there are labora-
tories for metallurgical control and inspection covering physical 
and chcmical tests. In 1976 these laboratories had four X-ray spec 
trometers, various equipment for instrumental chemical analysis, 
mechanical analysis and thermic treatment. Unfortunately^no cost 
estimate was available. 
Source: COTA, "Investimentos ..." p. 32-33. 
- 257 -
In should be noted that the list is not complete in that 
categories c-gand sum to 14.5 million dollars whereas, as was seen 
above, slightly over 32.5 million dollars for technical assistance 
had been approved between April 1965 and March 1975. Part of the 
discrepancy may lie in that the latter figure includes technical 
assistance for mounting and start-up of equipment which does not 
seem to be included in the list dissagregated by type of investment. 
Adding in the 18 million dollar difference the total investment in 
technology is close to 50 million dollars. Almost 251 of that total 
was spent training personnel apart from the research center staff. 
The research center and the consulting services to set it up accounted 
for nearly 111 of the total. 
All of the costs mentioned so far represent investment of 
one sort of another in the technological infrastructure. It should be 
emphasized that it does not includ any operating costs, for which 
we could not obtain any information. The main point to be made is 
that USIMINAS has invested a lot in creating its technological infras-
tructure. Due to the lack of detailed data we cannot attempt any 
estimates of the relative returns to the different types of invest -
ments^^However, our impression, given USIMINAS dramatic technologi-
cal performance is that they have paid off handsomely. What-we hope 
to have made clear, however is that the absorption of foreign tech-
nology in order to develop and adapt it to specific domestic needs 
and to eventually be in position to create technology requires an 
active participation of the domestic partner and significant invest-
ments in the preparation of its human resources and its organizational 
structure. 
(1) Lanari, states that until 1975 USIMINAS invested close to 15 mil-
lion dollars in its technological development contracts and 
to give an idea of the return he points out that just the impro-
vement of the yield of cold rolled sheets between 1966 and 1975 
was worth 15 million dollars. (USIMINAS Relatorio Anual 1975,p.5) 
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C H A P T E R E I G H T 
3.. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
6-1.. Type and Nature of Technical Change 
The objectives of technical change encountered 
in this case, study have encompassed the whole range from cost re-
duction to production increase to product diversification(inclu-
ding- quality improvement) and to changes in imput type and mix. 
As developed in seption 5.3. and detailed in sec-
tions 6.2j one of the overriding concerns during the first ten years 
of operation of the firm was cost reducing technical change through 
capacity stretching of the original equipment. During this period 
there was virtually no new investment. What little investment 
occurred was is small peripheral equipment such as sintering screens 
roll crushers, minor modifications in major equipment units, etc. 
Technical change was thus of the disembodied type in terms of the 
definition developed in chapter four. 
Although most of technical change which occurred 
during this period depended on and indeed was in function of an 
expansion in production.it did not depend on scale multiplying 
plant expansions but on capacity stretching of the existing plant. 
As detailed in section 6.3 and explained in the context of the 
raw material and capital dominated nature of steel production 
pointed out in sections 4.2 and 6.5, such capacity stretching was 
achieved mostly through better selection and control of the physi-
cal - chemical properties and preparation of the raw materials 
(particularly in the sinter and blast furnace sections) and of the 
better utilization of the existing equipment units through changes 
in operational methods or useful volume (blast furnace and steel 
sections). The problems with raw materials and their variations in 
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quality (which was something beyond the firms control) conditioned 
the technical change path and forced the firm to develop a whole 
series of homogenization and uniformization measures in its raw 
materials receiving and preparation yard which were crucial for 
the improvement of the whole operation of the firm since steel 
production is a multistage process. For that reason, changes such 
as those which led to an increase in the capacity of the sinteri-
zation and blast furnace sections have repercussions on the steel 
section and create pressure for internal changes there which focus 
attention on increasing capacity, and vice versa. 
Although it was not possible to explicitly quantify 
any saturation effects there was evidence of such effects parti-
cularly in the case of the steel shop and blast furnaces. As was 
pointed out, however, in several occasions it was possible to over-
come these effects by the use of auxiliary technologies such as 
the three channel oxygen lance in the case of the steel shop;and 
fuel injection and oxygen enrichment in that of the blast furnaces. 
All three are examples of how important external technological de-
velopments can sometimes be grafted on to older vintage equipment 
and in that way improve it. 
Even though no meaningfull cost - benefit type com-
parison could be made between the cost and returns to technical 
change realized within the plant versus those due to the utiliza-
tion of technology embodied in new equipment units because of the lack of 
cost data dissagregated by equipment unitSjit would seem that She 
former would compare quite favorably with the latter,at least 
over limited scales. 
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Because the crisis seriously affected the opera-
tion of both new and old units and led to their subutilization no 
detailed attempt could be made to separate out how much of the 
production increase had been achieved by endogenous improvements 
as opposed to increases achieved with installation of new units. 
Very roughly however it could be calculated that the 7 00,000 ton 
increase from initial nominal capacity to production of 1,200,000 
with the same equipment was an internal contribution whereas the 
expansion from 1.2 Mt to the current production of 3 Mt was exter-
nal. 
This would credit internal technical change efforts 
with 39! (7/18) of the production increase but it abstracts from 
the costs. It should also be noted that to some extent the expan-
sion itself embodied some of the internal learning since such 
learning and operational experience was utilized in making the 
choice and specifications for the expansion plan. 
As developed in section 6.4 the possibility of 
undertaking a large expansion plan permitted the firm to adopt new 
technologies which were embodied in capital equipment such as the larger 
size blast furnace and all its embodied advances, larger oxygen 
converters, continous casting, and production of wide plates. 
It is important to emphasize that such capital embodied technical 
changes were quite firmly tied to -scale multiplying plant expan-
sion for it is hard to imagine that they could have been introdu-
ced at the expense of scrapping the existing equipment which was 
operating very efficiently. This implies that capital embodied 
type expansions will usually be closely linked to the scale of the 
units involved, the size and rate of growth of market demand.and 
the degree to which various disembodied technical changes can be 
« adopted by existing equipment which may prolong their useful life. 
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8.2. The Technological Strategy of the Firm and 
Conditioning Factors 
Chapter three explained how the creation of 
USIMINAS was the result of the joint interest of the State of 
Minas and the Japanese. Minas produced practically all the iron 
ore in Brazil and wanted its own integrated steel plant but lacked 
the technology and the capital for such a venture. The Japanese 
wanted a show-case for their technology as a sales strategy for 
their steel equipment and know how. The Japanese Government helped 
organize the private groups in order to not Qnly supply equipment 
but also to participate in the capital stock and Droviie technolo-
gical assistance to insure that it wouli be indeed a showcase. 
Initially the Japanese were in charge of operatio-
nal control and the administrative structure of the firm. While 
the results in the first area were good there were serious pro-
blems in the later because of the difficulty of transplanting 
the administrative structure for a large plant t'o a smaller one 
in a different socioeconomic and cultural context. However as 
this problem was quickly identified the_Brazilians took measures i 
to change the administrative structure.,This was accomplished by 
1966 when the Brazilians had acquired the technical capacity to 
run the plant themselves thanks to the training received from 
the Japanese. 
The changeover of operational responsibility 
occurred in the midst of a Brazilian steel market crisis and of a 
continuing financial crisis of the company. The only way for the 
company to break-even was to expand output to at least one million 
tons per year. However because of the market crisis and because of 
its poor financial shape it was not able to obtain financing for 
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the expansion. This forced it to stretch the capacity of its ori-
ginal equipment in order to get a better capital output ratio . 
Such cap-acity stretching was possible thanks to the implementation 
ofastandard cost system with an elaborate organizational infrastruc-
ture to study its existing equipment, compare it to the best world 
performance, and then try to reach the' same or higher levels. 
The preocupation at this stage,, now that the basic 
operation of the plant had been mastered, was to move beyond the cook book 
phase to study what was behind the recipe. The implantation of the stan 
dard cost system was a way to break the recipe to its basic elements 
and to study them independently and how they fitted together. Each ele 
ment and the parts it formed were then compared' with those used else-
where in order to learn where USIMINAS was weak and where progress 
could be made. This required and expansion and specialization of the 
support structure including computer services to compile internal sta 
tistics and the development of an information organ which could search 
for and collect technological information external to the firm. 
The brazilians were carefully stud-/j n^ t_ae rlvanta-
ges and dissadvantages of their own equipment no from just what the ma-
nufacturers had suggested, but from their own experience and learning as 
wel. They began to modify and adapt the equipment, to increase thier 
control over the production process, and to streamline its operation 
in order to obtain the maximum performance from their initial plant. 
As this stage developed a greater emphasis on tech-
nical support was necessary and this led to the the creation of the 
Research Center, to give support to the support structure. The Research 
Center was initially oriented 100% to technical support activities. Its implementation 
was gradual and it required an initial adaptation period. Lanari ^ has 
(1) Lanari, "A Empresa Siderurgica..." p.13 
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suggested that the premature advance to this stage can often lead to 
failure if the operation sector is not yet well aware of the need for 
or usefulness of a well-developed support structure. Happily, the cen 
ter succesful'ly weathered the initial adaptation phase and was able 
to develop a good working relationship with the operational sector as 
it gained its confidence. 
In the early seventies when the market was once 
again booming and the Government was sponsoring and in fact sub-
sidizing large capital intensive expansions, USIMINAS responded 
by proposing a large capital intensive expansion which would 
increase its capacity three fold in less than a decade. Also, in 
response to such massive expansion needs and the lack of suffici-
ent national engineering capacity to meet those needs,USIMINAS re-
organized its internal structure to develop its basic enginee-
ring. By 1975 it was in a position to do all the engineering work 
for its third expansion plan. 
Now, rather than buying mostly from the Japanese 
a s was the case of the original plant and its first expansion 
USIMINAS is in a position to scan the whole technological fron-
tier and to draw up its own specifications for what it wants to 
purchase. In addition it is able to provide engineering assistance 
to domestic capital goods producers as well as to other steel 
firms. It is doing for the new Agominas steel plant in Brasil ba-
sically the same thing which the Japanese did for it when it was 
getting started. 
USIMINAS also spun off a subsidiary (USIMEC) which 
j 
was initially launched as a way -of diversifying production into 
large metal structures. With the development of a market for na-
tional capital goods producers as a result of the massive Govern-
ment sponsored expansion plans USIMEC also entered that industry 
(1) As revealed by the thinking behind the technological prism the-
re was a growing concern for the necessary interrelationship 
between operation, research, engineering, and equipment manu-
facture, where the latter was closey tied in to the needs of 
expansion plans. 
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and has rapidly became one of the country's largest manufacturers. 
To a large extent USIMINAS has been forced to de-
velop because of the exogenous demands placed upon it. First the 
profitability problem in the context of a depressed market, its high 
debt sales ratio, and the inability to obtain finance forced it 
to develop its technological infrastructure in order to squeeze as 
much as possible out of its existing equipment. Then the boom in 
the market and the Government sponsored expansion plans forced it 
to develop its basic engineering and in that way enabled it to 
obtain a higher d e g T e e of technological independence. However, as 
is demonstrated by the poorer perfoimanee of the other two large 
state owned firms in the flat products sector who were subject to 
more or less the same exogenous demands, a part of the credit must 
also be placed on factors internal to the firm. Although these are 
more difficult to identify it seems that they are related to the 
emphasis USIMINAS has given to the training of its personnel, 
to the use of technical assistance contracts as learning experien-
ces, and to the long period that it was under one management which 
thus had a chance to implement a long range technical capacitation 
program. 
Overall the USIMINAS experience suggests that 
successfull local technological development depends on a relative 
long term strategy of building systematically on experience as it 
is acquired. 
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The first phase of this process involved accepting the 
practices and advice given by the Japanese in the initial operation 
of the plant. However, as a clearer idea of the technological packa-
ge was obtained through this initial experience and the firm passed 
to the stage of analysing the contents of the package it passed 
from the know how stage to the know why stage. 
As it learned by doing, it entered into the more difficult 
phase of studying and understanding its technology in order to 
pinpoint its deficiences and corect them. This involved the pur-
chase of a more specific and more focused technological assistance. 
USIMINAS absorbs the technology in purchases at each step so that 
it has progressively moved the type and nature of the assistance 
which it buys to a higher and more specific level . 
By developing this internal technological capacity along 
with better information on what is currently happening in the techno-
logical frontier it is in a better possition to know how it can best 
acquire it and has become more technologically independent. This does 
not necessarily mean that it is buying less, but that it is buying mo-
re selectively and more efficiently what it can not itself do. 
The next stage, toward which it now seems to be moving>is 
to go beyond.importing and adapting technology to creating new techni-
ques, new processes and new production In the Research Center emphasis 
is already being put on training personnel with a higher theoretical 
level and the center is already strrting to take out important patents. 
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The evolution of USIMINAS thus shows a technologi-
cal strategy which rather than seeking to resist foreign technolo-
gy, as is currently advocate by many, has sought to pull itself 
up byit. USIMINAS started by being completely dependent on foreign 
technology and using that as a base from which to selectively absorb 
more advanced technology through which it has progressively deve-
loped its technological potential. From a technological dependent 
firm it had evolved to the point we Where it is developing techno-
logy of its own and selling technical assistance both nationally 
and internationally. It is important to notice however, that this 
was achieved in a step by step process as part of a long term 
strategy which involved development of the human element and a 
complex organizational structure to provide the technical support 
for such progress. While it may be the exception rather than the 
rule it is an example of what is possible when the domestic partner 
pursues an active or even agressive technological strategy. 
What stands out from this case study of USIMINAS 
is the tremendous amount of learning which has taken place. The 
measurement of such learning def ies any conventional type learning 
curveapproach because it inuclutes m ch more than cost reduction 
with existing equipment. As developed in section 7.4 it involves 
the learning in basic engineering which can affect the cost struc-
tures possible through expansion plans. It includes such externa-
lities as the engineering assfetance which the firm gives national 
equipment manufacturers through its expansions and the training 
it provides for Brazilian engineering firms and Brazilian workers 
in the firm. It also includes the flexibility to adapt to changing 
conditions which might have otherwise led to increasing costs or 
production stops. Also, and even more difficult to measure it is 
the basis of a change of attitude towards more self confidence and 
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